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This study examines the social costs and benefits of the gentrification process 
using qualitative methods. The neighborhood of Over-the-Rhine (OTR) in Cincinnati, 
Ohio, represents certain universalities of gentrification in an older city, and was thus 
chosen as the site for a case study. OTR’s prime location between the Central Business 
District and uptown medical and university community has spurred rapid gentrification, 
particularly since the early 2000s. Using in-depth interviews, participant observation, a 
focus group, and print media, this dissertation sought to understand the social costs and 
benefits of gentrification in OTR. 
Adopting the language of “revitalization” and “renaissance,” the city of 
Cincinnati formed the Cincinnati Center City Community Development Corporation 
(3CDC) as its economic development arm. Unlike traditional CDCs which act as liaisons 
between the community and the city, 3CDC plays the role of the main developer. 3CDC 
has the full political and financial backing of the city and the corporate community, 
enabling it to take redevelopment in OTR from pocket-sized development to one large-
scale development effort. This devolution and privatization of power is a testament to 
Cincinnati adopting a neoliberal imperative. 
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Today, the city is no longer the regulator of development, but instead, its 
progenitor. Acting in tandem with 3CDC, the developers, and the corporate interests, the 
city has adopted policies geared toward attracting the middle- to upper-middle income 
class back to its urban core. Conspicuously missing from the decision-making table are 
OTR’s longtime residents, social service organizations, advocacy groups, and the 
displaced and homeless.  
This study examines the social costs and benefits of gentrification, going beyond 
a profitability analysis and incorporating the voices of all the actors involved in the 
process of gentrification, using qualitative analysis. By taking into account all 
perspectives, this study permits a holistic understanding of the social costs and benefits 
associated with gentrification.  
As expected, the greatest social cost of gentrification is displacement and the 
erosion of social capital. In OTR, gentrification also caused a palpable rift between its 
proponents (city, 3CDC, developers, corporate interests, and newcomers) and its 
opponents (longtime residents, social service organizations, advocacy groups, and the 
displaced and homeless). The greatest social benefits include increased tax receipts, 
social mixing via de-concentration of poverty, and an upgrading of the disinvested 
neighborhood.  
Some unexpected findings included the fact that in addition to the well-
documented positive “trickle-down” effects of gentrification via social mixing, there are 
also positive “trickle-up” effects. Another unexpected finding was that although the 
displaced are typically portrayed as being voiceless and disenfranchised, the in-depth 
interviews revealed that displacees were actually empowered by their experiences, 
vii 
 
finding greater resiliency and spirituality. Two of the six displacees interviewed also said 
they chose to remain homeless because it brought them greater happiness.  
As gentrification becomes more pervasive in cities across America, a holistic tally 
of the social costs and benefits of revitalization projects becomes imperative. When 
social and monetary costs are tallied against social and monetary benefits, the true costs 
may in fact be greater than the true benefits. The study concludes with policy 
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Gentrification is a form of socio-spatial urban development wherein working class 
or lower-income residential neighborhoods are transformed into middle-class residential 
or commercial neighborhoods, resulting in the displacement and geographical reshuffling 
of existing residents. The past two decades have witnessed a third-wave gentrification 
and arguably a fourth-wave gentrification wherein the recession of the early 1990s was 
followed by a more state-led form of gentrification – this dissertation uses the terms 
‘state-led, ‘government-led,’ and ‘municipal-led,’ interchangeably (Hackworth and 
Smith, 2001; Lees et al, 2008). Side-stepping the negative connotations associated with 
the term ‘gentrification’, city officials have adopted and embraced the language of “urban 
renaissance” and “community regeneration” (Lees, 2003a; 2008; Lees and Ley, 2008). 
Urban renewal efforts are often portrayed as beneficial to the city, leading to less 
segregated and more sustainable communities (‘the emancipatory city thesis’). The 
purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the social costs and benefits of gentrification 
using qualitative methods. 
A shift from a Keynesian form of social governance to neoliberal models of urban 
governance via economic development initiatives has led to the state becoming a more 
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aggressive actor in shaping the socioeconomic environment of cities (Addie, 2008; 
Hackworth, 2002b). As cities employ boosterist strategies focused on attracting footloose 
capital in the form of corporate interests, creating “a sustainable city” has become an 
ordinary slogan for political campaigns. Cities are at the mercy of constant competition to 
increase their tax base; as a result more recently, state intervention and government 
programs have begun to mold inner-city redevelopment. Social mixing initiatives that 
deconcentrate the poor and attract the middle class back to the city have become a means 
of escape from the “blight” that plagues inner cities. Increased state support manifests 
itself in the form of “urban renewal” or “revitalization” efforts with greater developer 
involvement in the early stages of gentrification.  
The decision to revitalize disinvested neighborhoods rests in the hands of elite 
interests - city officials, real estate developers, and investors. Conspicuously missing 
from the table are the existing residents of these neighborhoods. The elites are unified via 
a “growth consensus” that works to “eliminate any alternative vision of the purpose of 
local government or the meaning of community” (Logan and Molotch, 1987 p. 51).  
Policy-makers view gentrification as a means to improve the quality of 
deteriorated neighborhoods and mix residents from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds, bringing vibrancy to a previously decrepit neighborhood (Freeman, 2006). 
Another celebrated aspect of gentrification is an increase in property tax revenues as 
more affluent newcomers replace lower-income residents. 
  There has been substantial debate on state-led gentrification as a ‘positive public 
policy tool’ (Cameron, 2003; Lees et al., 2008; Davidson, 2008; Slater, 2004). Many 
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scholars contend that it leads to further socio-spatial polarization, exacerbating the very 
problems it hopes to ease (Hamnett, 2003; Lees and Ley, 2008). Atkinson (2002) 
identifies nine interrelated impacts associated with the gentrification process: 
displacement; harassment and eviction; community conflict; loss of affordable housing; 
homelessness; change to local service provision; social displacement; crime; and 
population loss. Some argue that recent waves of gentrification are nothing more than a 
strategy to actively secure greater tax revenues under the auspices of curing inner-city ills 
(Slater, 2004). 
There has been extensive scholarly debate on the costs and benefits of 
gentrification. Much of this debate has revolved around studying the quantifiable costs 
and benefits of gentrification, for example, comparing initial outlays to subsequent tax 
receipts (Lang, 1986). There has been little attention devoted to analyzing the social costs 
and benefits of such a form of gentrification by design, one that is inclusive of 
“externalities” such as the loss of social capital and community networks or the increase 
in safety. The paucity of information on a comprehensive accounting of the costs and 
benefits of gentrification is regrettable because it presents policy makers with a very 
myopic lens when considering urban renewal projects. By only analyzing quantifiable 
costs and benefits of urban renewal projects, policy makers do not incorporate the voices 
of the participants of the gentrification process. One issue that arises, then, is that 





1.1. Purpose of Study 
This qualitative study adds to the research literature by analyzing the social costs 
and benefits of the gentrification process. This dissertation uses a case study format, 
focusing on the Over-the-Rhine (OTR) neighborhood in Cincinnati, Ohio. The qualitative 
data, gathered via in-depth interviews, a focus group, participant observation, and print 
media probes and explores the “intangible” costs and benefits associated with 
gentrification in order to gain a more holistic picture of the gentrification process. 
 
1.2. Organization of Study 
Chapter 2 presents a review of scholarly literature on the production of space and 
in particular, gentrification. It first describes the social production of space and uneven 
development, situating it within a broader context of economic and political forces that 
shape the restructuring process. It then describes the process of gentrification as is 
prevalent today and reviews explanations for gentrification, situating the process within a 
historical context. Next, it focuses on the growth consensus and the main actors that 
shape the process of gentrification. Fourth, it enumerates the costs and benefits of 
gentrification.  
Chapter 3 presents a methodological framework for the study. It first presents details 
on the site chosen for the case study, Over-the-Rhine. Next, it discusses the history and 
demographic characteristics of the neighborhood, with special emphasis on the 
redevelopment that is currently taking place within OTR. It presents the overarching 
research questions used to guide the study as follows: 
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1. What is the rationale for redeveloping Over-the-Rhine? 
2. What are the relationship dynamics amongst various actors in the redevelopment 
efforts? 
3. Who has decision making power? 
4. What are the perceived social costs and benefits of gentrification? 
The chapter further discusses the methodology used, in the form of in-depth interviews, a 
focus group, participant observation, and print media. The chapter ends with a description 
of the demographic characteristics of the interviewees. 
Chapter 4 presents the qualitative findings from the study. It discusses the 
revitalization and redevelopment that is occurring in OTR, followed by a description of 
the political landscape. It then discusses the impact of redevelopment on longtime 
residents, newcomers, and social service organizations. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of 
gentrification in OTR, focusing on the social costs and benefits of the process. It also 
discusses displacement in greater detail, and the distinction between the often 
interchangeable terms ‘revitalization’ and ‘gentrification.’ 
Chapter 6 summarizes key findings, and discusses the significance of the study, 












2.1. Social production of space 
Space is an inter-dimentional, multi-faceted concept. It is at once a simple and 
complex idea with multiple and sometimes contradictory meanings. Space cannot be 
reduced to simply the built environment or location or social relations of property 
ownership. Space is a physical location, a piece of real estate, a site for buildings and 
infrastructure. It is also a container of human activity; it is a place to live and work- a site 
for action or the possibility for action (Gottdeiner, 1994; Lefebvre, 1974; Castells, 1977). 
Space holds a central place in both the individual and collective psyches. An 
individual’s relation to that space creates memories, associations, a sense of belonging, 
community, and ultimately the formation of an identity. As such, space becomes a place. 
Each of us has places that are meaningful to us but “places also have collective meanings 
and memories – the local swimming pool saved from demolition by community 
fundraising…a roadside memorial to a local character. In these terms, place also has 
spirit, memory and desire” (Porter and Barber, 2006, p. 227-228). As Blomley (2004) 
states “while property can, indeed, be individualistic and reified, it also contains more 
collective and fluid meaning” (p. 91).  
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Communities are place based; however, there exists “some form of communal 
connection among individuals – whether or not such connection is locality based – that 
provides for the possibility of group identity and collective action” (Chaskin, 1997, p. 
522). Neighborhoods, on the other hand, are a spatial construction of a geographic unit 
based on shared proximity (Ibid.).   
Places are not created equally. The urban built environment is characterized by 
uneven geographic and economic development. This includes stratification according to 
class or income and race, expressed as disparate land-use patterns ranging from suburban 
enclaves to high rises to ghettos.  
Unequal development and the resulting socioeconomic polarization lead to 
pathologies such as concentrated poverty and blight that are then described as spatial 
problems. The urban poor, while geographically central, have become culturally, socially, 
and economically marginal (Wilson, 1989). The resulting “concentration effects” lead to 
outcomes such as crime, joblessness, and pathological delinquency. 
Government-sponsored interventions to mitigate urban social problems have 
included initiatives that directly and indirectly promote gentrification. Cities, in an effort 
to revitalize disinvested neighborhoods, have embraced greater private developer 
involvement in the early stages of the restructuring process. As cities become more 
entrepreneurial, competing for investors, residents, businesses and tourists, public-private 
partnerships have become a welcome salvation (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). Private 
developer involvement includes transforming swathes of devalued property into chic 
residential condominiums and modish art galleries, thus spurring gentrification and 
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displacement of the original residents. Public-private partnership manifests itself in the 
form of developer subsidies such as “progressive” housing policies, Enterprise Zones and 
tax subsidies (Hackworth, 2002).  
Davidson and Lees (2005) argue that “a ‘gentrification blueprint’ is being mass-
produced, mass-marketed, and mass-consumed around the world” (p. 1167). As 
gentrification becomes more developer-driven, it simultaneously becomes more 
pervasive. Gentrification no longer happens “naturally” with one or two “urban pioneers” 
moving into the disinvested neighborhood. It takes place in bulk, with mass-
reconstruction, changing the very landscape and constitution of the neighborhood. An 
inescapable aspect of such gentrification is the displacement of the original residents 
either forcibly through evictions or indirectly through rent increases or spiraling property 
values. 
Gentrification is a spatial representation of social inequality in the form of uneven 
development. Revitalization efforts portray it as a positive sign of a healthy real estate 
market (see Lees et al., 2008, p. 165). If we are concerned about injustice, the 
measurement of inequities cannot be reduced or limited to the geography of resource 
allocation (Porter and Barber, 2006, p. 228). It must also include dimensions of culture, 
place, and belonging. The displacement of existing residents is a flip side of the coin of 
gentrification. Any analysis weighing the net benefits of gentrification should account for 




Given the various economic and political forces involved in the restructuring of 
urban space, it becomes important to first understand the concept of the Urban and the 
economic, political, and social forces that shape the uneven development of space. 
 
2.1.1. Uneven development of space 
The relationship between social processes and urban form has been the subject of 
numerous studies. The paradigm of Urban Ecology accepts city form as a result of free 
market forces. Using a complex analogy of organicism (Comte, 1875), Darwinism 
(Spencer, 1909), and a laissez-faire economic framework, ecologists explain the urban 
form as a result of the division of labor (Turner, 1978). Comte (1875) views cities as 
“real organs” of social organism in a complex biological analogy while Spencer (1909) 
stresses the division of labor according to the biological analogy of size leading to 
functional differentiation (Gottdeiner, 1994). 
According to the early Chicago School (Park, 1925; McKenzie, 1924), uneven 
development was initially characterized as a result of economic and cultural dimensions 
and a “natural” filtering of populations. Following the work of Von Thunen (1866) and 
Weber (1899), Burgess (1925) describes how a city goes through a pattern of 
centralization and decentralization, a functional version of the invasion-succession cycle 
(McKenzie, 1925) wherein different ethnic groups and economic functions locate 
themselves spatially. His model describes a “zone of transition” (which Harvey (1976) 
refers to as the devaluation of the built environment (Gottdeiner, 1994, 31)) which 
contains neglected slum development next to the central business district (CBD). 
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Acknowledging the role of real estate speculators, Burgess describes how the zone in 
transition waits for redevelopment as the CBD decentralizes and recentralizes. For 
Burgess, this uneven development is the “direct product of land speculation and 
economic competition” (Gottdeiner, 1994, 32). 
The theory of uneven development received renewed interest after World War II, 
when ecologists developed a more abstract formulation of urban social form. The 
contribution of Hawley (1950) is most noteworthy in explaining uneven development. 
Instead of Darwin’s notion of competitive survival, Hawley, like Park before him, 
stresses Darwin’s symbiotic concept of the “web of life.” According to Hawley, 
symbiosis is distributed unevenly and “since functional differentiation is a fundamental 
characteristic of the community, commensalism tends to occur disjunctively in each 
functional category” (1950, p. 209; quoted in Gottdeiner, 1994, p. 38). Shifting away 
from the concept of competition and stressing the concept of cooperation, Hawley 
explains uneven settlement (and resulting inequities) as a matter of adaptation and 
functional integration. Weber and Marx, on the other hand, recognize the powerful forces 
of unequal distribution of resources in shaping urban space. 
According to Marx (1858), the urban form is tied to the mode of production. The 
Marxian model emphasizes the process of capitalist accumulation, production, and 
reproduction facilitating a decision-making process which structures the urban form. 
From a Marxian perspective, the capitalist urban growth process internalizes the 
production of uneven development and is an inherent part of the process. Uneven 
development is a result of internal contradiction within the capitalist system - a 
manifestation of the inherent contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. 
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In classical political economy, use-value is the utility derived from consuming a 
good or service. Marx argues that if the good or service can be traded as a commodity, it 
additionally has an exchange-value. According to Marx, the inherent contradiction 
between use-value and exchange-value lies in the fact that use-value is based on the 
inputs of production while exchange-value is based on market fluctuations, thus 
suspending “value” between the past and the future. 
 
2.1.2. Space as a commodity 
David Harvey uses Marxist theory to develop a theoretical framework connecting 
urban restructuring to the processes of capital accumulation and class struggle. In a series 
of publications in the 1970s and 1980s, Harvey created a framework for analyzing 
capitalist investment and profit making within the context of how the built environment is 
formed. Harvey showed how overaccumulation in the 'primary circuit of capital’ (the 
means of production and the means of consumption) leads to a flow of capital into the 
‘secondary circuit’ in the form of investment in durables and physical infrastructure (the 
built environment). While this assists capital accumulation, such investment in the built 
environment may become an obstacle to capital accumulation in the future, thus creating 
the possibility of a crisis.  
According to Harvey, crisis formation can occur at different points in the circuit 
of capital flows. This is primarily due to the exhaustion of the potentiality for productive 
investment within that sphere (for example, social expenditures or consumption fund 
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formation). Thus, further flows of capital no longer expand the basis for the production of 
surplus value, setting the stage for a crisis (Harvey 1982, 324-33). 
Pressures within the circulation of capital lead to a systematic “annihilation of 
space by time.” Natural landscapes are replaced by built landscapes in a fragmented yet 
homogenized form, leading to uneven development of space. Harvey observes, “Under 
capitalism there is…a perpetual struggle in which capital builds a physical landscape 
appropriate to its own condition at a particular moment in time, only to have to destroy 
it…at a subsequent point in time” (Harvey, 1989). He describes a process of “creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942) whereby the created spaces of capitalism have to be 
annihilated to make new space, begging the question ‘how much more time in this 
space?’ (Ibid.).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, gentrification, an articulation of uneven development, 
began to be seen as an inherent form of social and geographic restructuring rather than a 
temporal anomaly. Some scholars argued that it was a “back to the city” movement 
(Laska and Spain, 1980) while others (Lipton, 1977; Smith, 1979) saw it as a more 
enduring form of urban restructuring. The next section looks at the process of 
gentrification in greater detail, focusing on its definition and prominent explanations, 








The word ‘gentrification’ evokes images of market-rate condominiums next to 
boarded-up vacant properties; posters advertising new-build luxury apartments against a 
backdrop of graffiti-art. Once labeled “a dirty word” (Real Estate Board of New York, 
1985), the term has evolved to describe an inherently geographic process that is rooted in 
class relations. 
The notion of class structure and conflict is implicit in the word itself. British 
sociologist Ruth Glass (1964) coined the term gentrification to describe a marked urban 
process in which upper-middle class gentry began to “invade” working class 
neighborhoods in London, displacing the original residents. First used to describe a 
quaint, localized process, the term soon became institutionalized. 
In an effort to better understand the concept, the term and its meaning have 
become the topic of much scholarly debate. As some scholars have sought to contain the 
concept within neatly defined stages, others have underscored its complexity and have 
attempted to provide a more nuanced definition of the process. Early stage models (Clay, 
1979; Gale, 1979) succeeded in explaining gentrification as a clean, linear concept. While 
robust, the models fall short of providing a methodology to explain later processes of 
gentrification in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (Ibid., 33).  
Rose (1984, p. 62) and Beauregard (1986), among others, have argued that 
gentrification is a ‘chaotic concept’ with different actors, housing tenures, motives, 
allegiances. Therefore, they argued, stage models that “lumped together different 
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processes and effects” needed to be “disaggregated.” As Beauregard has reasoned, “the 
diversity of gentrification must be recognized, rather than conflating diverse aspects into 
a single phenomenon” (p. 40).  
More recently, Clark (2005) refutes focusing on the chaos and multiplicity of 
gentrification, and instead suggests a more inclusive perspective on the geography and 
history of gentrification. Davidson and Lees (2005) also argue for a more “elastic and 
targeted definition of the term” (Ibid., p. 159). Lees et al. (2008) record the key elements 
of gentrification as follows: 
1. The reinvestment of capital 
2. The social upgrading of locale by incoming high-income groups 
3. Landscape change 
4. Direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups 
Thus, gentrification is at once an economic restructuring, a social reconfiguration, 
and a physical transformation which involves the displacement of original residents via 
teneurial transformation and economic or cultural constraints.  
While some scholars focus on the meaning of the term, others focus on the causes 
and consequences of the process. Having operationalized the definition, the next section 
presents prominent explanations for the process. 
 
2.2.2.  Explanations for gentrification 
Central to the definitional debate has been the question of whether the definition 
should revolve around the causes or consequences of gentrification (Brown-Saracino, 
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2010, 13). Causal definitions (Production-side explanations) are rooted in classical 
economic theory with a Marxian interpretation of capitalism. Gentrification is seen as a 
result of capital switching between different sectors and parts of the city and as a product 
of a new international division of labor lubricated by the flows of finance capital 
(Harvey, 1978, 1982).  
Heavily influenced by the works of Karl Marx, David Ricardo (1817), and Adam 
Smith (1776), Neil Smith (1979) presents one of the most influential (and heavily 
debated) explanations for gentrification in what he refers to as the rent gap hypothesis. 
He defines the rent gap as “the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the 
actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use” (p. 545).  
When a parcel of land is initially developed, there is an effort to maximize 
profitability so that nearly all of its full potential is realized. As such, initial development 
“succeeds in capitalizing nearly all of the full potential” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 52). Over 
time, as the building or structure depreciates due to normal decay and wear-and-tear, its 
value experiences a steady decline. Routine improvements and maintenance of the built 
structure can slow down the aging process, however, the structure will continue to 
decline in value as it falls farther below the highest and best use for the location (Ibid.).   
Over time, as depreciation of existing building structures occurs, there is a 
widening gap between capitalized ground rent (i.e., the rent based on its current use) and 
potential ground rent (i.e., the rent based on its potential use). The depreciation of the 
building results in a reduction in the amount of ground rent that can be capitalized 
(Smith, 1979). The potential economic return keeps in pace with regional growth, 
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economic development, and technological change, thereby widening the rent gap. Stated 
differently, the rent gap (as shown in Figure 1) is the difference between the actual 
economic return given the present land use and the potential economic return from the 
parcel’s highest and best use. It is important to return to the concept of profit. The rent 
gap produces conditions in which profitable reinvestment can occur in the form of 
gentrification (Smith, 1979). 
 
Figure 1. Rent Gap (adapted from Lees et al., 2008) 
The rent gap is based on the capitalist cycles of investment and disinvestment in 
the urban land markets. Disinvestment occurs as investors pour capital into new 
development, such as the expansion of suburbs. This is sometimes accompanied by 
under-maintenance of the built structures near the CBD. As the rent gap increases in size 
due to disinvestment and depreciation, the land becomes valuable for investment via a 
change in land-use, for example, working-class residential to middle- or upper-class 
residential (Lees et al., 2008, p 52). Thus, “the rent gap explains gentrification as the 
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product of investment and disinvestment in the urban land market…[it] is one way of 
closing the rent gap [through reinvestment]” (Ibid., 61).  
The rent gap theory is one of the most debated theories in gentrification literature. 
Lees et al. (2010, p. 82-83) outline three main points of contention. First, there has been 
substantial debate about the terminology used to describe the rent gap (Bourassa, 1993; 
Hamnett, 1984; Clark, 1988). Second, scholars have argued that the rent gap cannot be 
measured empirically (for empirical examples, see Ley, 1986; Smith, 1996a; Smith and 
DeFilippis, 1999; Hackworth, 2002b; and Hamnett, 2003b). Third, the implicit favoring 
of structure over agency is the cause of much dialogue and criticism (Hamnett, 1991; 
Ley, 1987). 
 On the other hand, definitions focusing on the effects of gentrification hinge on 
consumption-side explanations. Consumption-side explanations underscore the effects 
of deindustrialization and the formation of a “new cultural class” with anti-suburban 
sentiments and a penchant for the amenities of urban living. This analysis is rooted in 
questions regarding the identities, behaviors, and ideologies of gentrifiers. While 
structural Marxist production-side explanations stress the role of capital and profitability, 
liberal humanists offering consumption-side explanations stress the role of human 
agency, choice, culture, and consumer demand (Hamnett, 1991).  
Consumption-side theorists try to answer questions regarding the identities of the 
gentrifiers: who they are, where they come from, why they choose to locate in previously 
disinvested neighborhoods. Focusing on issues of class, culture, and aesthetics, 
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consumption-side explanations revolve around individual agency and seek to understand 
the behaviors and consumption patterns of gentrifiers. 
Early consumption-side explanations revolve around the formation of a new 
middle class. Challenging Marxist theories of societal development, Daniel Bell (1973) 
argues that as the economy of many capitalist cities shifted from manufacturing jobs to 
service sectors jobs, there was a rapid rise in the number of middle class professionals. 
The consumption patterns of such a “post-industrial society” were driven more by 
consumer culture than media, corporations, or government. 
Influenced heavily by Daniel Bell’s post-industrial thesis, David Ley (1972 
onwards) advances a postindustrial thesis on gentrification. Using Canadian cities as his 
basis for research, Ley called the expanding middle class a “cultural new class” whose 
consumption patterns could not be explained by the economic functioning of housing 
market dynamics alone. According to Ley (1996) “the convergence of rapid economic 
expansion, the specific growth of white-collar professional jobs, and the maturation of the 
demographic bulge of the baby boom, all conspired to create a demand surge for housing 
among the middle class” (p. 7). Ley describes how “for a particular fragment of the 
middle class [the inner-city home] is an integral part of their identity formation” (Ibid.). 
For Ley, the explanation of gentrification was intimately tied to the reform-era urban 
politics of gentrifiers. Focusing on Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, Ley (1994) 
showed how the new cultural class displayed left-liberal ideology and a rejection of 
“political conservatism, modernist planning, and suburban ideologies” (Lees et al., 2008, 
p. 96).  
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Critical of Neil Smith’s rent gap thesis and Saskia Sassen’s (1991) polarization 
thesis, which stated that there was a growing socioeconomic polarization between the top 
and the bottom echelons, Hamnett (1991) took Ley’s work a step further and developed 
the professionalization thesis. He argues that gentrifiers are professional and managerial 
workers. Focusing on London (as Sassen’s research did), Hamnett argues that an increase 
in purchasing power results in increased demand-side forces in the housing market as 
gentrifiers seek reduced commuting time and greater cultural and social venues available 
through inner-city living.  
Also focusing on Canadian cities, John Caulfied (1989) argues that the new 
middle class rejected homogenous, mundane suburbia and developed an appetite for 
center-city living. Describing a cultural shift, Zukin (1991) identifies potential gentrifiers 
as representing “a ‘reflexive’ consumption that is based on higher education and related 
expansion of consumers of both high culture and trendy style” (p. 187). 
The production-side and consumption-side explanations are usually seen as 
competing, but Hamnett (1991) states that “like Aesop’s fable of the blind men and the 
elephant, each of the major theories has perceived only part of the elephant of 
gentrification” (p. 175). In order to gain a more holistic view, it is important to situate the 
concept within a historical context. 
 
2.2.3.  Historical context 
The past fifty years have seen an evolution not only in the meaning of 
gentrification, but in the very nature of the process. Hackworth and Smith (2001) 
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demonstrate how gentrification became more than a geographic, economic, and 
demographic phenomenon as government policies began to take a forefront in the 
restructuring process. The authors provide a stage model outlining the history of 
gentrification and the role of government programs in facilitating the process. 
The “first wave” began in the 1950s and lasted until the global economic 
recession of 1973. Sporadic and highly localized, gentrification was funded primarily by 
the public sector. The “second wave” began post-recession in the late 1970s and 
continued through the late 1980s. Buoyed by federal programs such as block grants and 
enterprise zones, cities began to play a laissez faire role, encouraging more private sector 
involvement. Gentrification began to be associated with cultural processes such as the 
‘alternative’ art scene in SoHo (Zukin, 1982).  
The recession of the early 1990s witnessed a slow-down of the gentrification 
process but was followed by a “third wave.” The state became more involved than in the 
second wave and developers began to lead the reinvestment process. There was an 
intensification of the process as gentrification became linked to large-scale capital and the 
state began facilitating the process. 
Lees et al. (2008) suggest that there exists a distinct fourth wave in the United 
States. The years after the 2001 recession saw an increase in the flow of capital into the 
real estate markets. As banks relaxed their underwriting standards, real estate became a 
commodity for speculation. Lees et al. (2008) state “this wave combines an intensified 
financialization of housing combined with the consolidation of pro-gentrification politics 
and polarized urban policies” (p. 179). An expansion of credit in the housing market and 
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the resulting “speculative mania” fueled the growth of the “housing bubble” (Foster, 
2008, p. 4). The availability of low-interest rates and more relaxed reserve requirements 
for banks led to a rapid increase in mortgage lending accompanied by a rapid increase in 
housing prices (Ibid., p. 3). At the height of the housing bubble, in 2005, “new mortgage 
borrowing increased by $1.1 trillion between October and December 2005 alone, 
bringing outstanding mortgage debt as a whole to $8.66 trillion, equal to 69.4 percent of 
the U.S. GDP” (Ibid., p. 5). 
Today, gentrification is a very different process than it was before the early 1990s 
recession. Hackworth (2002) identifies four changes in the pattern of the process. First, 
instead of sporadic, localized gentrification pioneered by artists and gays, today’s 
gentrification is initiated by corporate developers. While corporate involvement occurred 
during later stages of the process, today, gentrification is becoming more and more a 
developer-driven process. The “pioneers” are no longer individuals but instead, large 
scale corporations. 
Second, local and federal intervention has become “more open and assertive than 
before” (Hackworth, 2002, p. 818). During the 1960s, the state could not openly support 
gentrification and the resulting displacement due to a form of Keynesian welfare 
governance. This was followed by a laissez-faire urban governance period in the 1970s 
and relatively indirect involvement in the 1980s. As cities began to rely more heavily on 
tax revenues and less federal support, the recession in the early 1990s was followed by 
substantially more direct state involvement (Ibid.).  
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Third, opposition and resistance movements have become marginalized- a far cry 
from the Tompkins Square riots of 1988. Hackworth and Smith (2001) argue that 
“effective resistance to gentrification has declined” (p. 468). Lees et al. (2008) and Watt 
(2009) agree that gentrification resistance has waned, but argue that it still exists. 
Finally, there has been a change in the land economics that produced earlier 
waves of the process due to gentrification becoming diffused into more remote 
neighborhoods. Reinvestment in the core increases the economic potential of adjacent 
parcels. This results in speculation as real estate begins to be viewed primarily as a 
commodity from which to gain profit. Such speculative investment eventually led to the 
bursting of the housing bubble in 2007, leading to a global financial crisis from 2007 to 
2010. The next section looks at the roles played by elite interests and speculators as they 
shape the process of gentrification. 
 
2.3. Actors 
When Ruth Glass coined the term gentrification, she was describing a process in 
which the main actors were middle class to upper middle class immigrants to a 
disinvested neighborhood. The past fifty years have witnessed a transformation of the 
very structure of the process. Today, key actors include city governments, corporations, 
and developers intent on “rejuvenating” the city and making a profit, either directly or 
through tax receipts. Once a sporadic, unsystematic process, gentrification has become a 
methodical, planned agenda.  
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The transformed role of the state, the incursion of global capital, and a waning of 
oppositional forces has made gentrification today an inherently different process. 
Gentrification is no longer “something that happens.” It is a planned, coordinated process 
that is profitable to elites. The next section looks at the role of the various actors and the 
intersection of political, economic, and social dimensions. 
 
2.3.1.  Political dimension - changing role of the state 
In order to provide a historical context, this section begins with President Lyndon 
Johnson’s War on Poverty campaign, which led to the passing of the Economic 
Opportunity Act by the United States Congress in 1964. During the 1960s, the federal 
government launched a series of anti-poverty programs, one of the most notable being the 
1966 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act, i.e. the Model Cities Program. Under 
President Johnson, the Model Cities Program originated as a response to disillusionment 
with the bureaucracy associated with preceding Great Society programs geared toward 
eliminating poverty and racial injustice. In the War on Poverty, President Johnson 
asserted that the goal of the program was “to build not just housing units, but 
neighborhoods, not just to construct schools, but to educate children, not just to raise 
income, but to create beauty and end the poisoning of our environment” (Patterson, 1971, 
p. 17). 
In a federal initiative to “improve livelihoods in American cities by channeling 
federal funding into their most blighted neighborhoods” (Schechter, 2011, p. 1), the 
program was a two-level place-based strategy that lasted until 1974. First, the program 
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selected 150 cities nationwide to receive funding. Second, each of the selected cities was 
required to select a particular (“model”) neighborhood area to which to direct all its 
federal funding. The Department of Housing and Urban Development developed a 
selection process by which to rate cities and select those most likely to provide successful 
results with their funding (Ibid.). The program's initial goals emphasized comprehensive 
planning, involving rebuilding and rehabilitation; social service delivery; and citizen 
participation (Waldhorn and Waldhorn, 1972). 
Utilizing decennial U.S. Census Bureau data, Schechter (2011, p. 2) finds that the 
program “had very little impact on its targeted areas…[however], the program did reduce 
outmigration from the most blighted areas of target cities, when compared to cities that 
did not receive funding.” Harrison (1973) also found that the program was not as 
effective as it should have been. According to him,  
“once again, the urban poor have not received as large a share as might 
have been possible of the benefits associated with a government program 
ostensibly directed to improving their welfare. This 'leakage' of public 
anti-poverty resources into the hands of individuals at least some of whom 
are of doubtful standing as proper recipients has characterized other 
federal programs. It is unfortunate that Model Cities appears to have 
begun its career in a similar way” (Ibid., p. 54). 
The Model Cities program was eventually folded into the new Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program in the early 1970s. CDBG program’s focus 
was on redevelopment of existing neighborhoods, rather than the demolition of rundown 
buildings in disinvested neighborhoods (Schechter, 2011). The 1980s and 1990s saw 
many disagreements over the outcomes of the War on Poverty and Great Society 
programs. The most seminal ‘nail in the coffin’ may have been President Raegan’s final 
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State of the Union address in 1988, when he declared that in America’s War on Poverty, 
“poverty won” (Germany, 2004). 
Currently, revitalization of urban neighborhoods is characterized as a combination 
of renovation, demolition, and economic development in the form of commercial and 
residential development. Today, the state’s role as regulator for economic growth has 
shifted to progenitor of economic development. Hackworth (2002) suggests that “state 
involvement…[has] become more direct recently, after a period of relatively indirect 
involvement during the 1980s” (p. 821). This involvement has occurred in the form of 
national urban policy as well as “municipal entrepreneurialism” (Hackworth, 2002, p. 
822). 
National urban policy, such as the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s HOPE VI program provides grants to local housing authorities to 
demolish “severely distressed” public housing complexes and replace them with mixed-
use developments. Since its implementation, Wyly and Hammel (1999, 2000) found that 
many of the grants under the HOPE VI program are geared toward public housing 
complexes in or near gentrified neighborhoods. Hackworth (2002) notes that HOPE VI is 
part of a larger restructuring of the American state – a shift from a Keynesian form of 
regulation to neoliberalism. In the case of HOPE VI, the restructuring of the state has 
enabled local development authorities to demolish public housing without having to 
provide full replacement – a crucial requirement during the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Hackworth, 2002). This dilution of regulation creates an impetus for gentrification as 
middle-income residences replace low-income housing. 
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At the local level, the changed role of the state combined with the functioning of 
global markets has created a shift toward entrepreneurial governance. With fewer outlays 
from the federal and state governments, cities are in a perpetual struggle to cut costs and 
raise tax revenues. Forced to compete in a global economy with the constant ambition of 
becoming a global city or being recognized as a player within a global hierarchy has put 
additional pressures on city officials. While cities compete with one another, they also 
compete with their suburban areas for tax revenues. As sprawl took a hold of most cities, 
their urban cores began losing population, and therefore, tax revenues. Hence, not only 
do cities feel outward pressure from other cities, they also feel inward pressure from their 
growing suburbs (Rusk, 1993).  
A shift away from Keynesian governance has enabled cities to more openly 
assemble with real estate capital to facilitate growth (Hackworth, 2002; Smith, 2002). 
This manifests itself in developers playing a pioneering role in the gentrification process 
with open state support via tools such as tax subsidies and public-private partnerships. 
More importantly, the local state takes a subordinate role to the market, making it 
“a junior if highly active partner to global capital” (Smith, 2002, p. 428). The focus is no 
longer on regulating and directing development; it is on letting market-forces dictate the 
trajectory of development with the local state playing a subordinate role. As the definition 
of the urban scale has shifted to a global scope, cities are caught in a zero-sum game 
(Brenner, 1998) of trying to attract capital “by offering carrots to capital while applying 
the stick to labor and dismantling previous supports for social reproduction” (Smith, 
2002, p. 433). 
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While the Keynesian city undertook social reproduction in the form of housing, 
welfare, and infrastructure, the neoliberal city is focused on production and finance 
capital at the deprivation of social reproduction. The traditional definition of 
Keynesianism includes greater government involvement in the form of regulation of 
markets, ensuring growth via full employment, with strong emphasis on aggregate 
demand (and therefore its regulation). Neoliberalism, on the other hand, focuses on 
production-side economics with a lack of government intervention in the functioning of 
the markets. However, in this dissertation, I argue that gentrification is a government-
driven process in a neoliberal climate. This seeming contradiction needs further 
explanation.  
In today’s capitalist economy, the dominance of finance capital and the changing 
definition of geographic scale due to globalization have “reframed…territorially rooted 
economic actors in and of the market, rather than external compliments to it” (Smith, 
2002, p. 434). As Smith (2002, p 441) describes it, 
“Urban policy no longer aspires to guide or regulate the direction of 
economic growth so much as to fit itself into the grooves already 
established by the market in search of the highest returns, either directly 
or in terms of tax receipts.” 
In order to receive greater tax revenues, the state has developed mechanisms to 
make the built environment more compliant to real-estate capital via strategies such as 
the deregulation of financial markets, tax increment financing districts (TIFs), and 
increased support for real-estate syndications, to name a few (Weber, 2002). The 
underlying belief is that corporate-profits are what drive economic growth. The neoliberal 
governance of urban development enables spatial practices to “flourish… around 
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financing, constructing, destroying, and reconstructing the built environment” (Ibid., p. 
533). Thus, municipal entrepreneurialism expresses itself as the state playing an active 
role of facilitation rather than regulation. The state supports corporate profiteering by 
supporting corporate-led economic development. As the focus has shifted to economic 
development, gentrification is seen as a competitive urban strategy in a global 
marketplace. With a devolution of public policy constraints on gentrification, cities have 
begun to actively form public-private partnerships that result in a “private-market 
transformation of the built environment” (Smith, 2002, p. 440). 
There have been numerous studies detailing municipal-led gentrification in 
various parts of the globe: London (Davidson and Lees, 2005; Watt, 2009); 
Birmingham’s Eastside (Porter and Barber, 2006); South Parkdale, Toronto (Slater, 
2004); Hoogvliet, Rotterdam (Uitermark and Kleinhans, 2007); Prenzlauer Berg, Berlin 
(Levine, 2004). Each of these studies points to more direct and assertive state 
intervention in the gentrification process. Never explicitly using the term ‘gentrification’, 
policy documents avert criticism by encouraging “social mixing” through terms like 
“urban renaissance, urban revitalization, urban regeneration and urban sustainability” 
(Lees, 2008, p. 2452). As Lees (2008) astutely puts it, “It is difficult to be for 
gentrification, but who would oppose ‘social mixing’?” (Ibid.). 
In the U.K., state-led gentrification has been promoted through a mixed 
communities policy with the renewal of housing markets suffering from failing owner-
occupied housing (Ibid.). Davidson and Lees (2005) present an account of the “new-build 
riverside renaissance” along the Thames (p. 1171). They describe how this development 
is smaller in scale when compared to the redevelopment of the Docklands in the 1980s. It 
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is also privately funded and sold under the rhetoric of “defeat[ing] social exclusion and 
urban malaise” (Ibid.). The authors analyze the language used in policy documents 
prepared by the Greater London Authority (GLA, 2002; 2004) and national government 
urban-policy guidelines (DETR, 1999; 2000) promoting “’sustainability’, ‘diversity’, and 
‘community’ in the face of forces that are destroying the physical environment, causing 
social exclusion, fracturing communities and disrupting our sense of place” (Ibid., p. 
1172). They conclude that policymakers ironically view gentrification “as a panacea for 
both regional and social inequalities” (Ibid., p. 1186).  
Watt (2009) also presents an account of state-led gentrification in London which 
“exci[ses] the concepts of ‘displacement’ and ‘working class’ from the analysis” (p. 230). 
He details the practices of stock transfer of public housing and the New Deal for a 
Communities Regeneration Program in London under New Labour’s ‘roll-out 
neoliberalism’ policies. He notes that, 
“The contrast between the disinvested [local authority] housing stock in 
London and the highly valued land it sits on creates enormous capital 
accumulation potential – in other words what can be termed a ‘state-
induced rent gap’…This process is also regarded positively in New 
Labour policy terms since it facilitates the transformation of council 
estates from being ‘ghettoes’ of social exclusion towards becoming 
socially mixed ‘sustainable communities’” (p. 235). 
 
Focusing on ‘England’s second city’ (Birmingham), Porter and Barber 
(2006) present a case study of Birmingham’s Eastside using the stories of two 
pubs “whose fortunes are permanently re-shaped by state-led development 
initiatives” (p. 215). Through a narrative of the urban changes surrounding the 
pubs, the authors note how “deprivation and urban decline are thus depicted as an 
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improper part of urban life, requiring (state-led) intervention to eradicate them 
from a city’s image…[as] a distinct set of policy discourses renders [the] Eastside 
‘ripe’ for redevelopment” (Ibid., p. 222, 223). 
Slater (2004) presents a case study of gentrification in South Parkdale, 
Toronto (Canada) where the state-led process is presented as being emancipatory. 
He concludes that state-led gentrification in South Parkdale is “far from an 
emancipatory process” (p. 303) and instead further marginalizes the vulnerable 
long-time residents.  
Uitermark et al. (2007) present a more nuanced interpretation of state-led 
gentrification, focusing on Hoogvliet, Rotterdam (Netherlands). The authors note 
how state actors and housing associations actively pursue gentrification projects 
in disadvantaged neighborhoods and contend that the driving force is not a need 
to strengthen the local tax base or to make a profit, but instead to “[generate] 
social order…pacify tensions and to reduce concentrations that pose a problem for 
authorities” (p. 125). Looking beyond the economic dimension (housing 
associations are legally bound to reinvest their profits in housing for social 
housing policies and, unlike in the U.S., cities receive most of their funding from 
the national government), the authors analyze institutional dimensions that 
explain state-led gentrification in the Netherlands. They find that attracting the 
middle classes is not the goal; instead, the aim is to “civili[ze] and [control] these 
neighborhoods” (Ibid., p. 127). Thus, “liveability” (Ibid., p. 128) is the driving 
factor for state-led gentrification in the Netherlands. 
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Levine (2004) studies state-led gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg in eastern 
Berlin since the fall of the Berlin Wall. He asserts that the case of Germany is 
unique given its history of a strong planning culture and less regard for private 
profit-making interests. He argues that while government policy has served to 
encourage gentrification, it has also served to mitigate the ill-effects of the 
process. He finds that giving weight to “community participation, local job 
creation, the incorporation of immigrants, and a willingness to form partnerships 
among churches, charities, and community-based associations organized along 
ethnic lines” has led to a much more balanced approach (Levine, 2004, p. 104). 
In the United States, state-led gentrification has been promoted through 
policies that seek to deconcentrate poverty (similar to the U.K.) and improve tax 
bases (Lees, 2008). Highly dependent on property tax revenues, cities in the U.S. 
have adopted regeneration policies under the umbrella of fiscal pragmatism 
(Ibid.). The creation of the Federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s HOPE VI program, wherein severely distressed inner-city projects 
are replaced by mixed-income housing, is in reality a testament to state-led 
gentrification. The most notorious example is Cabrini Green in Chicago where 
public housing towers were replaced by luxury condos selling at a price around 
$400,000 (Levine, 2004). Beauregard (1990) has studied state-led gentrification in 
the neighborhoods of Society Hill district and Spring Green in central 
Philadelphia. Lees (2008) also discusses post-Katrina New Orleans where “the 
aim is to lure middle-class families back into New Orleans and to build over, 
displace or ‘culturally integrate’ the African American/low-income communities” 
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(p. 2454). Over time, state-led gentrification has become more pervasive in the 
U.S. as cities strive to attract the middle class back to the central core under the 
rhetoric of creating more ‘sustainable communities’. 
2.3.2. Economic dimension – the incursion of global capital 
Gentrification in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was a highly regulated process that 
was heavily dependent upon public financing. Inner-city disinvestment necessitated 
dealing with questions such as those of social housing. Gotham (2005) argues that the 
1949 and 1954 Housing Acts that provided federal funds for the redevelopment of 
blighted areas spurred the first-wave of gentrification in the U.S. Gentrification, at this 
time, was thought to be too risky for the private sector (Hackworth and Smith, 2001). 
Subsequent stages of gentrification were not as dependent on public financing and were 
instead funded through private-market finance capital (Smith, 2002). The third wave of 
gentrification saw an intensification of private-market financing while the fourth wave 
has witnessed what Lees et al. (2008) refer to as “financialization” of the gentrification 
process as mortgage lenders begin to relax underwriting standards leading to further 
growth of the U.S. housing bubble (for more on the financialization of urban 
redevelopment, see Rutland, 2010; and Leinberger, 2001). Today, gentrification is 
facilitated by a merging of political powers and global corporate capital. As Smith (2002, 
p. 443) notes, 
“…gentrification as urban strategy weaves global financial markets 
together with large- and medium-sized real-estate developers, local 
merchants, and property agents with brand-name retailers, all lubricated 
by city and local governments for whom beneficient social outcomes are 
now assumed to derive from the market rather than from its regulation.” 
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Business interests are integrally tied to land-use decisions, especially as 
developers take a more prominent role in the restructuring process. Sustained support via 
campaign contributions ensures that systemic power rests in the hands of the business 
elite (Stone, 1981). Once organized, they become “mobilized interests” (Fainstein, 
Fainstein, and Armistead, 1983 as quoted in Logan and Molotch, 1987). Gentrification 
occurs as a planned agenda for profiteering under the guise of neighborhood 
revitalization. 
Real estate speculation cannot take place without secondary actors such as 
lawyers, syndicators, bankers, and property brokers who facilitate the business dealings. 
Together, they represent corporate interests that ensure that the gentrification process 
takes place in a methodical manner. Local government, as a subordinate actor, further 
facilitates and lubricates the process through actions such as providing tax subsidies to 
developers or laying the necessary infrastructure or “curbing” crime and making the 
streets safer (‘the revanchist thesis’).  
The lure for each actor is the profitability of the “deal.” Developers and landlords 
earn profits directly through increased rents. Lawyers, bankers, syndicators and other 
corporate interests earn profits in the manner of transaction fees. And, the local 
government justifies profits indirectly in the form of greater tax receipts as a more 
affluent class replaces a lower-income tax base. 
Noticeably missing from the table are the existing residents of the neighborhoods 
that are being revitalized. Perhaps, this is because they are the only group not making a 
profit. In fact, as gentrification takes a hold of the neighborhood, property values rise, 
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causing the existing residents to be displaced either due to teneurial transformation (rental 
properties become non-rental properties), economic factors (as residents can no longer 
afford the increased rents), and/or cultural reasons (as social networks become weakened 
as a result of friends and neighbors moving out). Thus, local residents not only don’t have 
a voice in the process of gentrification, they are also the sole losers. 
 
2.3.3. Social dimension – resistance movements 
 But in whose image is space created? (Harvey, 1973 as quoted in Lees et al., 
2008) 
Appropriated space is a representation of symbolic power that creates social 
meaning. As power shifts from local residents into the hands of elite business interests, 
resistance efforts take the form of community protests. The most renowned and well-
documented resistance movement took place in a violent clash between police and 
protestors at Tompkins Park Square in Lower East Side in 1988. Neil Smith likens 
Tompkins Park to a “new urban frontier” (Smith, 1996). In one of the most intense anti-
gentrification struggles of the 1980s, Smith (1996) recounts stories of revanchism where 
“it was a police riot that ignited the park on August 6, 1988” (p. 3).  
Hackworth (2002) notes that anti-gentrification movements have become “more 
marginal than in earlier decades” (p. 818). He outlines the limited success of opposition 
movements during the 1970s and 1980s as working-class groups secured limited 
agreements from banks and developers thus making the process less damaging. An 
example of such a compromise can be found in the Mexican-American Pilsen 
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neighborhood in Chicago’s Lower West side where long-term residents were able to hang 
on to a prominent retail strip that catered to the needs of the long-term residents, thereby 
maintaining some of the cultural fabric of the neighborhood (Wilson, Wouters, and 
Grammenos, 2004). The 1980s witnessed a more militant form of opposition followed by 
a marginalization within the political realm during the 1990s. 
Hackworth (2002) notes how anti-gentrification movements split into two kinds 
of oppositional forms (p. 823-824). On the one hand, opposition (such as the Tompkins 
Square riots and San Francisco’s Tenderloin District protests) were violent with strong 
retaliation from city hall. Such movements had some success as protestors were able to 
secure some compromise from the local government.  
On the other hand, less militant groups received more responsive treatment within 
the political sphere. Creative methods such as the formation of Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) have facilitated dialogue between elite interests and the existing 
community, especially with regard to affordable housing provision. CDCs are, however, 
reliant on state funding, creating tangible constraints to active criticism and advocacy (for 
examples of rescinded funding/disciplinary action from the state, see cases of Pratt Area 
CDC and Oceanhill Brownsville Tenants Association, both in Brooklyn (Hackworth, 
2002, p. 824)). 
Scholars contend that the reason for diminished resistance to gentrification is 
twofold. First, continued displacement results in a weakening of the core group of 
activists (Hackworth, 2002; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1991). Second, coordination and 
implementation of community organizing is increasingly difficult in a neoliberal state 
(DeFilippis, 2004; Newman and Lake, 2006; Lees et al., 2008). However, as Lees et al. 
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(2008 and 2010) and Watts (2009) point out, resistance movements, while not as overt, 
still exist in many communities. 
In his essay, The Right to Stay Put, Hartman (1984) suggests that “carefully 
prepared publicity and organizing campaigns can be important building blocks toward 
political and legal acceptance of a right to housing” (original emphasis) (p. 318). He 
explains how the right to stay put is “in the public interest” as the social costs of 
displacement outweigh the societal benefits. The next section takes a look at the 
neighborhood effects of gentrification and its associated costs and benefits. 
 
2.4. Costs and Benefits of Gentrification 
Gentrification has both positive and negative impacts on the neighborhood being 
gentrified. Proponents argue that it creates a more mixed, stable community that can lead 
cities back to fiscal health. Officials discuss benefits such as increased employment due 
to new construction; rehabilitation of existing housing stock; cleaner, safer communities; 
and increased property values (Lang, 1986). Opponents contend that it erodes the very 
fabric of the existing community through displacement. Additionally, the very essence of 
the neighborhood changes as the existing community is displaced by middle income 
tastes and values (Ibid.). Table 1 highlights some costs and benefits of the gentrification 






Table 1. Costs and Benefits of Gentrification (Atkinson, 2002) 
Costs Benefits 
Infrastructure outlays Property tax revenues increase 
Developer subsidies Wage tax revenues increase 
Increased law enforcement Parking revenues increase 
Increased costs for municipal services 
(sewer, utilities etc.) 
Business tax revenues increase 
Out-migration facilitated by Section 8 
restructuring [OTR] 
License/Permit fees 
Impaction Ordinance [OTR] Beautification 
Displacement through rent/price increases  
Loss of social capital  
Community tensions Valorization of disinvested neighborhood 
Loss of affordable housing Increased property values 
Speculative property price increases Reduced vacancy rates 
Homelessness Reduction of suburban sprawl 
Loss of social diversity Increased social mix 
Increase in crime Decrease in crime 
 
 
2.4.1. Costs of Gentrification 
The majority of research points to displacement as the greatest cost of 
gentrification (LeGates and Hartman, 1981, 1986; Lyons, 1996; Newman and Wyly, 
2006). Displacement can be direct (i.e. forcible; for example, through eviction) or indirect 
(for example, through rent increases). There is also exclusionary displacement (Marcuse, 
1985) as prices rise and property becomes unaffordable to low income households trying 
to move into the neighborhood. 
Spiraling rent prices lead to direct, indirect as well as exclusionary displacement. 
The loss of affordable housing translates into displacement over a longer distance which 
then impacts travel to work distances or even the prospect of gaining employment 
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(Atkinson, 2002). This further exacerbates the cycle of poverty and related pathologies as 
displacees are unable to secure employment. 
There are quantifiable costs to displacement such as search costs and moving 
costs. There are also psychological costs such as the stress of moving, loss of home, loss 
of social networks, and loss of community. As friends and neighbors are forced to leave 
the neighborhood, the social fabric of the community becomes eroded, often creating 
resentment and hostility toward the newcomers. Paradoxically, resistance movements 
become weaker as the voice of the neighborhood (Chernoff, 1980) changes due to 
displacement of local community activists. Thus, the resulting polarization of the 
community also imposes societal costs.  
One extreme of displacement is homelessness while the other extreme is a 
damaged sense of community (Marcuse, 1985). Homelessness has associated costs 
related to mental health, physical health, encounters with law enforcement, substance 
abuse and housing costs. A 2006 study by the Partnership to End Long Term 
Homelessness finds that the 150,000 chronically homeless people in the United States 
cost $10.95 billion per year in public funds.  
At best, displacement creates a damaged sense of community (Marcuse, 1985). 
The loss of familiar neighbors providing childcare and “looking out” for one another is a 
tangible and often irreplaceable cost. Not only is it a deeply private loss, the loss of 
community is also a palpable public cost. 
Although the results have been contradictory, some research suggests that crime 
actually increases in neighborhoods that have gentrified (Taylor and Covington, 1988; 
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Covington and Taylor, 1989). Rational actor theories suggest that a greater presence of 
affluent households will act as targets for criminals in neighboring areas, resulting in an 
increase in crime (Atkinson, 2002). 
While some of the costs outlined above are difficult to monetarize, there are 
several costs that are easier to measure. Such costs are usually borne by the city and 
include infrastructural outlays, changes to local service provision (water, sewer, utilities), 
costs of increased law enforcement, and developer subsidies. 
 
2.4.2. Benefits of Gentrification 
The most celebrated aspect of gentrification is urban renewal or the upgrading of 
a previously disinvested neighborhood. Upgrading occurs in the physical form of 
rehabilitated building structures, sometimes assigned a “historical home” designation. It 
also occurs in the form of social upgrading as a more affluent, well-educated middle class 
migrates to the neighborhood.  
As the neighborhood becomes more socially mixed, there are trickle down effects 
that mitigate the negative ‘neighborhood effects’ of concentrated poverty. The 
emancipatory city thesis which describes gentrification as a unifying process creating 
cultural diversity, tolerance, liberation, and social interaction has been presented in the 
works of Ley (1980, 1994, 1996), Butler (1997), and Caulfield (1989, 1994). 
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Social mixing allows people of different socioeconomic backgrounds to interact 
with one another, “broadening horizons and raising expectations” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 
199). As Byrne (2003) states,  
[gentrification] can ameliorate the social isolation of the poor. New more 
affluent residents will rub shoulders with poorer existing residents on the 
streets, in shops, and within local institutions, such as public 
schools…[providing] existing residents with the kind of role models and 
contacts the absence of which Wilson (1987) finds debilitating in the 
ghetto.(Byrne, 2003, p. 422 as quoted in Lees et al., 2008, p. 205) 
However, Blomley (2004) argues that interaction in mixed neighborhoods is 
limited and can lead to social segregation and isolation. Clay (1979) also shows 
apprehension at the viability of a socially mixed neighborhood. 
Another boon of gentrification is increased property tax revenues. As home 
ownership changes hands from existing residents to more affluent newcomers, 
improvements to the property result in property value increases which translate into 
higher property tax receipts to the city. Increased tax revenues are said to be a result of an 
increase in the number of owner-occupied households and an increase in the property 
value of such households. However, research finds that gentrifiers are not moving from 
the suburbs but instead moving within the city (Gale, 1984), thus undermining the claim 
of a net household gain. 
The process of gentrification also has secondary benefits such as a more 
aesthetically pleasing neighborhood and/or a safer neighborhood due to increased police 
presence. Studies (Henig and Gale, 1987) have shown that existing residents also enjoy 
such ameliorations; however, they may be displaced in time thus not being able to fully 
take advantage of such improvements (Atkinson, 2002). 
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Beside increases in property tax revenues, there are other measurable benefits. 
These include license and permit fees, increases in business tax revenues, parking 
revenues, and wage tax revenues.  
Gentrification has costs and benefits associated with it. The active involvement of 
government officials, developers, and planners in promoting gentrification is rooted in 
the assumption that the benefits of gentrification outweigh the costs associated with it. 
While there have been studies focused on analyzing the costs and benefits of 
gentrification, such studies have focused solely on the quantifiable aspects of the process 
(for example, Lang, 1986). Although such analysis takes into account externalities, it can 
only do so in a limited capacity. For example, it cannot quantify the loss of social capital 
or social networks. Hence, such analysis does not present a comprehensive accounting of 
the process, thereby limiting the lens through which government officials evaluate 
revitalization projects.  
This study adds to the existing literature by providing an account of the costs and 
benefits of the gentrification process using qualitative analysis. By gaining a more 
holistic view, policymakers will be better equipped to assess the merits and demerits of 
revitalization projects in their cities. The next chapter provides a methodological 













While quantitative analysis accounts for the cost effectiveness of city government, 
it can only take into account what neoclassical economics labels “externalities” up to a 
certain point. Again, the marginalized population is conspicuously missing from this 
analytical discussion. The decision metrics revolve solely around those concerned with 
monetary gain. Quantitative analysis simply accounts for profitability for a select group 
of actors - the business elite. Qualitative analysis goes one step further by providing a 
more holistic assessment of the social costs and benefits of a project, especially from the 
vantage point of those most directly involved in and affected by the gentrification 
process.  In this study, residents’ experiences and the perceptions of representatives of 
community organizations were examined in addition to the perceptions of city officials 
and developers. The next section provides some historical and demographic details on the 
site chosen for the case study, Over-the-Rhine. 
 
3.1. Over-the-Rhine (OTR) 
OTR was chosen as a case study because it represents certain universalities of a 
state-led gentrification process in an older city, Cincinnati (Miller and Tucker, 1998; 
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Smith and Feagin, 1995). The process of gentrification in OTR has been shaped by elite 
interests through coordinated efforts between the city, the Cincinnati Center City 
Community Development Corporation (3CDC), the OTR Chamber of Commerce, and the 
corporate community. In an effort to “promote economic vitality,” to date, 3CDC has 
invested over $300 million for renovation, revitalization and redesign in OTR. 3CDC’s 
focus on market-rate development has led to stricter police controls, resulting revanchism 
(reminiscent of “Operation Vortex” in the 1980s) and further marginalization of the poor 
and the homeless (Diskin and Dutton, 2006). Policies such as Cincinnati City Council’s 
“Impaction Ordinance” and “Historic district designation” have reduced the affordable 
housing supply and put economic pressure on existing residents via building violations 
and fines. The restructuring of Section 8 subsidized housing vouchers has resulted in the 
out-migration of low-income residents, weakening the social fabric of the existing 
community (Addie, 2008). As state-led gentrification becomes more pervasive in OTR, 
an assessment of the costs and benefits of such projects becomes imperative. When 
viewed comprehensively, do the social benefits of urban renewal really outweigh the 
social costs? 
 
3.1.1. OTR History and Demographic Characteristics 
 
OTR is a neighborhood located between the Central Business District (CBD) and 
Uptown medical and university community in Cincinnati, Ohio (Figure 2a and 2b). 
Additionally, the neighborhood is bordered by the neighborhoods of Mount Auburn, 
Mount Adams, and the West End. Lauded as Cincinnati’s oldest and most historic 
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neighborhood, consisting of 943 buildings of 19
th
 century Italianate architecture, OTR 
was designated as an historic district by the National Register of Historic Places in 1983. 
Originally settled by German immigrants in the 1830s, the neighborhood was named in 
honor of the Rhine River in Germany. During the 1930s, Appalachians began to move 
into the neighborhood. The original German settlers moved to the suburbs, leaving 
behind a primarily low-income, White community. OTR experienced demographic flux 
again during the 1960s, when African Americans migrated to the neighborhood. Today, 
the neighborhood consists of a primarily low-income African American population 




Figure 2a. Location of Over-the-Rhine in Cincinnati, Ohio (Source: Over-the-Rhine 




Figure 2b. The Over-the-Rhine neighborhood of Cincinnati, Ohio (Source: 
http://www.irhine.com/index.jsp?page=map_intro) 
 
Spanning 362.5 acres, OTR’s population has declined from 44,475 in 1900 (U.S. 
Census Bureau) to 4,351 residents today (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 American 
Community Survey 5 year estimates). In 2012, the population in OTR was 4,351 
individuals, categorized as 33% Caucasian (1454 residents), 61% African American 
(2640 residents), and 6% other races (257 residents) (Table 2). The demographics over 
the past twelve years have changed substantially, when in 2000, the population was 7,638 
individuals, categorized as 19% Caucasian (1482 residents), 77% African American 




















Census Tract 9 855 364 42.57% 463 54.15% 28 3.27% 
Census Tract 10 993 613 61.73% 337 33.94% 43 4.33% 
Census Tract 11 862 133 15.43% 727 84.34% 2 0.23% 
Census Tract 16 914 245 26.81% 664 72.65% 5 0.55% 
Census Tract 17 727 99 13.62% 449 61.76% 179 24.62% 
Total 4351 1454 33.42% 2640 60.68% 257 5.91% 
Source: 2012 ACS 5 year estimates       
 










Census Tract 9 2070 505 24.40% 1469 70.97% 96 4.64% 
Census Tract 10 1357 384 28.30% 921 67.87% 52 3.83% 
Census Tract 11 1141 166 14.55% 943 82.65% 32 2.80% 
Census Tract 16 1712 213 12.44% 1437 83.94% 62 3.62% 
Census Tract 17 1358 214 15.76% 1106 81.44% 38 2.80% 
Total 7638 1482 19.40% 5876 76.93% 280 3.67% 
Source: 2000 ACS Summary File Estimates      
 
 
According to the 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, the 
five census tracts (census tracts 9-11, 16, and 17) comprising OTR have 5,369 housing 
units. Of the 5,369 housing units, 62.8% (3,321 units) remain vacant while 37.2% (1,966 
units) are occupied. Of the occupied households, 12.2% (239 units) are owner occupied 
while 87.8% (1,727 units) are renter occupied (Table 4). 98.1% (4,611 units) of the 






Table 4. Housing Indicators in Over-the-Rhine 
 Number of Units Percentage of Total 
Vacant 3,321 62.8 
Occupied 1,966 37.2 
Owner Occupied 239 12.2 
Renter Occupied 1,727 87.8 
Total 5,369 100 
 (Source: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates) 
 
 
Of the 1,966 households, the average median household income for the five 
census tracts in 2012 inflation-adjusted dollars is $17,895 and the per capita income is 
$18,399. Of the persons for whom poverty status is determined, 55.2% earned income 
below the poverty level in the prior 12 months (2008-2012 American Community Survey 
5-Year Estimates).  
Of the 1,966 occupied households, the total population in those households equals 
3,882 individuals. Households with families equal 37.2% (732 households), and family 
households, those with their own children under 18 years of age, equal 28.2% (554 units). 
Married couple households equal 7.6% while those with own children under 18 years of 
age total 3.5%. Male headed family households equal 5.1% and male headed households 
with own children under 18 years of age equal 3%. Somewhat expectedly, there is a 
disproportionate number of female headed family households, totaling 24.5%, in the 
disinvested neighborhood. Female headed households with their own children under 18 
years of age equal 21.7% (Table 5a.1 and 5a.2). 
Of the five census tracts comprising OTR, 27.4% of households are located within 
tract 10. The remaining four tracts, each contains approximately 17%-19% of households. 
Tract 11 houses the largest number of family households (53.3%) as well as the largest 
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number of family households with own children under the age of 18 (43.5%). Tract 11 
also houses the largest number of married-couple family households (9.2%), followed by 
tract 10 (8.3%), tract 9 and 16 (both at 6.8%), and tract 17 (6.5%), respectively. 
Interestingly, tract 11 also houses the largest number of married couple families with own 
children under the age of 18 (5.7%), the largest number of male headed family 
households at 10.3%, and the largest number of male headed households with own 
children under the age of 18 (7.1%). Tract 16 contains the lowest number of male headed 
households at 1.4%. Tracts 16, 17, and 11 contain the largest number of female headed 
households at 35.1%, 34.8%, and 33.7%, respectively. Tracts 9 and 10 contain a 
substantially lower number of female headed households at 14.8% and 10.9%, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that there are no households with married-couple 
families with their own children under 18 years of age located in census tracts 9 and 17. 
Also, there are no male headed households with their own children under 18 years 















































































Tract 9 352 17.9 513 13.2 89 25.3 52 14.8 24 6.8 0 0.0 
Census 
Tract 10 539 27.4 905 23.3 131 24.3 89 16.5 45 8.3 29 5.4 
Census 
Tract 11 368 18.7 853 22.0 196 53.3 160 43.5 34 9.2 21 5.7 
Census 
Tract 16 368 18.7 884 22.8 159 43.2 118 32.1 25 6.8 19 5.2 
Census 
Tract 17 339 17.2 727 18.7 157 46.3 135 39.8 22 6.5 0 0.0 
  1966 100.0 3882 100.0 732 37.2 554 28.2 150 7.6 69 3.5 
Source: 2012 ACS 5 year 
estimates 
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9 13 3.7 0 0.0 52 14.8 52 14.8 
Census Tract 
10 27 5.0 15 2.8 59 10.9 45 8.3 
Census Tract 
11 38 10.3 26 7.1 124 33.7 113 30.7 
Census Tract 
16 5 1.4 0 0.0 129 35.1 99 26.9 
Census Tract 
17 17 5.0 17 5.0 118 34.8 118 34.8 
  100 5.1 58 3.0 482 24.5 427 21.7 
Source: 2012 ACS 5 year estimates 




According to the 2012 American Community Survey 5 year estimates, there are a 
total of 62.8% (1234 units) that are considered “non-family” households. Of those non-
family households, 8.3% (102 units) are occupied by those 65 years and over, living 
alone (Table 5b). Of all occupied 1,966 units, the average household size is 2, while the 
average family size is 2.93 individuals (Table 5c). 
 
Table 5b. Household Statistics in Over-the-Rhine 
CENSUS TRACT Nonfamily households 
Nonfamily households - 
Householder living alone - 
65 years and over 
Census Tract 9 263 21 
Census Tract 10 408 32 
Census Tract 11 172 27 
Census Tract 16 209 20 
Census Tract 17 182 2 
 Total 1234 102 
Source: 2012 ACS 5 year estimates 
 
 







Census Tract 9 1.46 2.21 
Census Tract 10 1.68 3.02 
Census Tract 11 2.32 3.28 
Census Tract 16 2.4 2.99 
Census Tract 17 2.14 3.15 
Average 2 2.93 




 A total of 1,243 individuals above the age of 3 are enrolled in school, while a total 
of 432 individuals are enrolled in college or graduate school. A total of 2,627 individuals, 
25 years and over, have some form of educational attainment. Table 6 provides further 
details, with the largest segment of the population (27.7% or 728 individuals) having a 
high school diploma or equivalency, followed by those having received education until 
the 12
th
 grade (15.3% or 403 individuals), however, not having received a diploma. 3.3% 
(87 individuals) have an educational attainment of less than 9
th
 grade. 15% (395 
individuals) have a Bachelors degree and 14.8% (390 individuals) have a graduate or 
professional degree, while 4.7% (123 individuals) have an Associate’s degree. The 
category “some college, no degree” is not reported. Therefore, the aggregate of the 
categorical educational attainment numbers does not equal the total for population 25 and 
over. 
 Next, looking at the data in further detail as a percentage of “Educational 
attainment, population 25 and over,” of the 87 individuals with an educational attainment 
of less than 9
th
 grade, 6.6% live in census tract 9, followed by 5.7% in tract 16, 1.6% in 
tract 10, 1.1% in tract 11, and 0.5% in tract 17, respectively. Of the 403 individuals who 
received education until the 12
th
 grade but did not receive a diploma, majority of them 
(35.9% or 142 individuals) live in tract 17, making them the highest demographic 
population within that tract. Tract 11 houses majority of the population with an 
Associate’s degree (9.0%), while tract 10 houses a majority of those with a Bachelor’s 

















































































































































Tract 9 159 69 618 41 6.6 52 8.4 294 47.6 14 2.3 81 13.1 43 7.0 
Census 
Tract 10 254 131 677 11 1.6 46 6.8 134 19.8 53 7.8 187 27.6 111 16.4 
Census 
Tract 11 306 50 443 5 1.1 69 15.6 148 33.4 40 9.0 45 10.2 63 14.2 
Census 
Tract 16 297 118 493 28 5.7 94 19.1 79 16.0 6 1.2 26 5.3 132 26.8 
Census 
Tract 17 227 64 396 2 0.5 142 35.9 73 18.4 10 2.5 56 14.1 41 10.4 
Total 1243 432 2627 87 3.3 403 15.3 728 27.7 123 4.7 395 15.0 390 14.8 
Source: 2012 ACS 5 year 
estimates 
              
 It is interesting to take a closer look at median earnings by educational attainment 
(Table 7). The less than high school graduates, majority of whom live in census tract 9, 
earned the lowest income ($4,583) in OTR. The highest income ($114,097) is earned by 
those with a Bachelor’s degree, living in census tract 11. However, those with a 
Bachelor’s degree, living in tract 17, earned the second-lowest income ($4,769) in OTR. 
While data for median income for less than high school graduates was not available, tract 
17 seems to have the lowest aggregate earnings. Interestingly, those with a graduate or 
professional degree living in tract 17 also earned the second-lowest income ($39,659) 
within their cohort. Tract 17 is somewhat of an anomaly, given that those with 
Associate’s degrees also earned the lowest income within their cohort. There could be a 
few potential explanations for the inconsistency. Those with advanced degrees earning 
lower income and living in tract 17 may be students or those employed in lower paying 
professions. For instance, Miami University’s Center for Community Engagement, 
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located in OTR, provides a residency program as part of the curriculum. Students 
“integrate academics with a full immersion experience to live and work in the “school of 
social life” for a full semester.” (Miami University website). Many graduates end up 
staying or returning to OTR. Based on casual conversation during the course of this 
study, it appears that many of the students were enrolled in college for social work and 
were employed as interns or part-time social workers. Based on in depth interviews with 
residents, advocates, social workers, and activists, to name a few, most of the social 
workers within OTR had advanced degrees but earned less than their counterparts in 
other professions. 
Tract 11 houses the highest paid individuals with a Bachelor’s degree as well as 
the second-highest paid individuals with graduate or professional degrees. The highest-
income earners ($97,625) in tract 16 are high school graduates, surpassing the other 
cohorts within the tract by a substantial margin. However, tract 16 houses the lowest 
number of individuals (16.0%) within the high school graduate cohort. It is interesting to 
note that the highest-income high school graduates are concentrated in tract 16, while the 
majority of high school graduates (47.6%) live in tract 9. Tract 11 has the highest 
aggregate income ($254,004), followed by tract 16 ($218,043), tract 9 ($156,127), tract 
10 ($155,201), and tract 17 ($68,042, though this may be misleading due to missing 
data), respectively. 
 Comparing educational attainment (Table 6) and median earnings by educational 
attainment (Table 7), it is interesting to observe some patterns. The majority of 
individuals with less than high school graduation live in tract 9 and earn the lowest 
income in OTR. Tract 9 also houses the majority of high school graduates. The highest-
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income earners in the high school graduate cohort reside in tract 16 but the majority of 
them live in tract 9. The highest-paid individuals with an Associate’s degree reside in 
tract 10 (7.8%), but are slightly more concentrated in tract 11 (9.0%). While the majority 
of individuals with Bachelor’s degrees reside in tract 10, the highest-income earners 
within this cohort reside in tract 11. Oddly, majority of those with graduate or 
professional degrees reside in tract 16 and make the lowest-income within their cohort. 
 






























Census Tract 9 $4,583 $8,419 $15,417 $50,208 $77,500 $156,127 
Census Tract 10 $14,375 $14,315 $25,339 $38,839 $62,333 $155,201 
Census Tract 11 $29,074 $20,625 $13,958 $114,097 $76,250 $254,004 
Census Tract 16 $35,417 $97,625 $13,438 $38,750 $32,813 $218,043 
Census Tract 17 - $15,739 $7,875 $4,769 $39,659 $68,042 
Source: 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
   
Once a vibrant, bustling neighborhood, today OTR is characterized by poverty, 
crime and inner-city decay. From 2003 to 2005, there was a drop of 7% in property 
crimes and a drop of 1.1% in overall crime (Table 7). While crime has reduced, crime 





Table 8. Crime Statistics in Over-the-Rhine 
 





Figure 3. Crime Statistics Comparing OTR to Neighborhood Average (Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Over-the-Rhine-Part-1-Crime-Per-Year.jpg) 
* Neighborhood average represents an average of crime statistics from Cincinnati’s 52 neighborhoods. 
 
 
As city officials and developers rediscover the neighborhood’s architectural 
heritage, OTR has become ripe for gentrification. Today, one can find the physical and 
social makeup of the community in flux as new middle-class residents replace longtime 
lower-income residents. The landscape is comprised of new build or renovated middle-
income housing next to boarded up, vacant houses. The upgrading of the neighborhood is 
visible in newly designed street signs and quaint coffee shops next to cash-check-smart 
shops. Gentrification is a palpable phenomenon, visible not only in the physical motif but 
also in the social and cultural stratification of the neighborhood. This dissertation aims to 
56 
 
study the social costs and benefits of the gentrification process underway in OTR since 
the early 2000s, when the city became more actively involved in the redevelopment 
process.  
 
3.2. Research Questions 
3.2.1. Umbrella questions 
1. What is the rationale for redeveloping Over-the-Rhine? 
2. What are the relationship dynamics amongst various actors in the redevelopment 
efforts? 
3. Who has decision making power? 
4. What are the perceived social costs and benefits of gentrification? 
 
3.2.2. Specific questions 
1. City, Chamber of Commerce (economic development) and funding source:  
a. What was the rationale and process of gentrification? 
b. What is their account of the revitalization of the neighborhood, including 
economic development and residential change? 
c. What kind of support system have the city and the Chamber of Commerce 
provided during the transitional stages? 
d. How do the city and Chamber of Commerce attract developers, new 




a. What is the rationale and process for developing in OTR? 
b. What is the relationship between developers and longtime residents? 
3. Community organizations (3CDC, social service organizations, community 
housing): 
a. What is the role of each community organization in the gentrification 
process? 
b. How much support and advocacy is there for affordable housing? 
i. Where is the support coming from? 
c. What is the general feeling about the revitalization project among 
longtime residents? 
d. How much voice do longtime residents have in the revitalization project? 
4. Residents: 
a. What is the motivation for longtime residents to leave OTR? 
b. What is the motivation for newcomers to move to OTR? 
c. What is the relationship between new residents and longtime residents? 
d. What is the general feeling about the revitalization project among 
longtime residents? 
e. What are the effects of displacement? 
f. How much voice do longtime residents have in the revitalization project? 




A complete list of interview questions, as approved by the Institutional Review Board, 
can be found in the Appendix. 
 
3.3. Methodology 
The qualitative data, gathered via in-depth interviews, participant observation, a 
focus group, and print media, explored the “intangible” costs and benefits associated with 
state-led gentrification in OTR. The reason for collecting qualitative data was to develop 
a comprehensive accounting of the costs and benefits associated with gentrification in 
OTR, thereby going beyond the “tangibles” and instead exploring a more holistic picture 
of state-led gentrification. 
Using qualitative methods provided for a rich description of the gentrification 
process, “illuminating the experiences and interpretation of events by actors with widely 
differing stakes and roles; giving voice to those views are rarely heard” (Sofaer, 1999, p. 
1101). Qualitative methods can be informed by quantitative methods and “provide ways 
to make reliable observations that would not otherwise be possible” (Ibid., p. 1105). 
Qualitative methods provided for a holistic assessment “which preserves the complexities 
of human behavior” (Black, 1994, p. 426). Additionally, qualitative methods provided 
data that captured the nuances and subtleties of costs and benefits to various stakeholders. 
Such data would not have been available through quantitative analysis alone. 
In-depth interviews were used as a means of data collection because interviews 
enable one to better understand and reify concepts such as the costs of displacement or 
the loss of social networks (Gillham, 2000). Since the topics are sensitive in nature, face 
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to face contact elicited the necessary trust needed to gather thick data. The responsive 
interviewing model (Rubin and Rubin, 2005) is anchored in interpretive constructionist 
philosophy with a bit of critical theory.  
Constructionists, unlike positivists, believe that different experiences, knowledge, 
and opinions result in different interpretations of the same events. In other words, there 
are different lenses through which people view events and experience reality. The critical 
theory paradigm “emphasizes the importance of discovering and rectifying societal 
problems” (Ibid., p. 25). In the responsive interviewing model the goal of the research is 
“to generate depth of understanding, rather than breadth” (Ibid., p. 30). The model 
emphasizes the fact that both the interviewer and the interviewee are human beings and 
that they form a relationship during the interview which creates ethical obligations for the 
interviewer. As such, the design of the research remained flexible through the course of 
the study. By utilizing the responsive interviewing model, it was possible to gain a deeper 
understanding of the gentrification process from multiple lenses. 
There were a total of 48 interviews conducted along with multiple participant 
observations at OTR Community Council meetings and tenant meetings; additionally, 
there was one focus group and print media were used in the form of social media, 
newspapers, websites, and email exchanges. Of all the interviewees who were contacted, 
the Chamber of Commerce and a developer who develops market rate and affordable 
housing specifically chose not to participate in the study. Table 8 and Figure 4 highlight 
the categories that the interviewees were divided into, the sampling method used, and the 
number of interviewees in each category.  
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Table 9. Breakdown of interviewees 
Category Sampling Method n 
Positional perspective Direct contact 5 
Developers Systematic Random Sampling 6 
Social Service Organizations Systematic Random Sampling 9 
Newcomers Snowball Sampling 6 
Longtime residents Snowball Sampling 6 
Displaced residents Snowball Sampling 6 
Key Informants Snowball Sampling 10 









The interviewees were representatives of the following groups (Figure 4): 
 Five interviews were conducted to gain a positional perspective. The interviewees 
included representatives of the City of Cincinnati, the OTR Foundation, 3CDC, 
OTR Community Housing, and a funding source. The OTR Chamber of 
Commerce chose not to participate in the study. Of all the financial agencies 
providing funding, only one funding source was interviewed due to its unique role 
in providing financing for affordable housing, making it a key informant 
(Gillham, 2000). Other traditional sources of funding (for example, banks, private 
sources, grants) were not interviewed since the cost and benefit information was 
gathered via interviews with developers, 3CDC, OTR Community Housing, and 
one of the social service organizations.   
 Additionally, of the approximately 17 developers identified from the 3CDC 
literature, two developers were chosen due to the fact that one of them is a 
Community Development Corporation that also plays the role of a developer, 
making it a key informant (Ibid.); the other developer develops affordable housing 
units in addition to market-rate properties, making it another unique developer. 
Unfortunately, the second developer chose not to participate in the study. Of the 
remaining 15 developers, a systematic random sampling procedure was used to 
create an additional sample population of 5. 
 Of the 18 social service organizations, three umbrella organizations were 
interviewed due to their extensive involvement in and knowledge of the displaced 
and homeless population in OTR, making them key informants (Ibid.). Of the 
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remaining 15 organizations, systematic random sampling was used to create a 
sample population of 6.  
 Additional interviews were conducted using a snowball sampling approach to 
identify gentrifiers, existing residents, and displaced residents. The existing and 
displaced residents were initially identified through interviews conducted with the 
social service organizations mentioned above. The gentrifiers were initially 
identified through interviews conducted with developers; by attending the OTR 
Community Council meetings; and by visiting new businesses on the main 
thoroughfare, Vine Street. Interviews were conducted until the point of theoretical 
saturation (Charmaz, 2010). 
 There were also a total of 10 key informants (identified using snowball sampling) 
who were interviewed to gain a holistic picture of the gentrification process. 
 
3.3.1. Direct contact 
Certain agencies were identified due to the role they played in the community and 
their outreach. These agencies included representatives from the city, 3CDC, a funding 
source, an affordable housing developer, and an agency focusing on the historical 






3.3.2. Snowball Sampling 
Snowball sampling was used to identify interviewees who belonged to the 
following categories: Longtime residents; Newcomers; Displaced residents; and Key 
Informants. After conducting an interview, the interviewee was asked for referrals to 
other interviewees, who once interviewed, provided referrals to other interviewees, 
creating a “snowball” effect. 
 
3.3.3. Systematic Random Sampling 
Systematic Random Sampling was used to identify developers and social service 
organizations. For the social service organizations, there were three umbrella 
organizations identified because of the scope and nature of their work. There were 
referrals to two other social service organizations based on reputation and network. These 
two organizations were removed from the all-inclusive list of social service 
organizations. The list initially included all organizations in greater Cincinnati, chosen by 
type of service, attempting to match service to the character and needs of OTR. The list 
was then alphabetized and narrowed down to two OTR zip codes: 45214 and 45202. 
After subtracting the organizations that had already been contacted and incidental 
duplication, the remaining list contained an n of 15. As per the proposal, every third 
organization from the list was chosen to equal an n of 6. In the event that a chosen 
organization was unresponsive, the next organization on the list was contacted. 
For the developers, systematic random sampling was used as well. First, all 
developers involved in the redevelopment efforts in OTR were identified, yielding an n of 
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15. Per the proposal, every third developer was chosen to yield an n of 6. In the event that 
a developer was unresponsive, the next developer on the list was contacted. 
The data were collected over the course of a little over a year, beginning in the 
Fall of 2012 and ending in early 2014. Appointments were made in advance and then 
followed up on, in person, on the agreed upon dates and times. Each digitally-recorded 
interview took an average of an hour and a half to two hours to complete. The interviews 
were conducted in an open-ended format in coffee shops, restaurants, offices, and three 
residences. Interviews in each category were conducted to the point of theoretical 
saturation. A template for interview questions, approved by the Institutional Review 
Board, is provided in the Appendix. 
In addition to the in-depth interviews, there were multiple sessions of participant 
observation, primarily by attending OTR Community Council meetings and Columbia 
Tenant Association meetings, totaling approximately 20 hours. There was one focus 
group which included members from the community. This interview was digitally 
recorded as well and data were parsed out during analysis. Additionally, print media was 
used in the form of newspapers, websites, social media, and email exchanges. 
After the data were collected, they were analyzed using a general inductive 
approach (Thomas, 2006). A general inductive approach “provides an easily used and 
systematic set of procedures for analyzing qualitative data that can produce reliable and 
valid findings” (Ibid., p. 237). The strategy has been used in qualitative studies and is 
guided by specific evaluation objectives (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Dey, 1993). As 
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Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 12) describe it, “the researcher begins with an area of study 
and allows the theory to emerge from the data.” 
For this study, rather than converting the raw audio data into textual form, data 
were “audio-coded” using the NVivo software program. The software program enabled 
the coding to be imposed directly onto the audio files, essentially eliminating the need for 
full manual text-transcription of each interview. First, the interviews were listened to and 
the content of each interview was spliced into points of categories, deriving a substantive 
code which was then further delineated. By listening to the interviews in category form, I 
was able to create theoretical codes. By identifying theoretical linkages and 
contradictions, I was able to construct the core codes, connecting existing theories and 
the empirical data collected during the course of the study (Punch, 1998; and Yeung, 
1997). The core codes were then queried against each other using NVivio software. For 
example, the code “displacement” and the code “intimidation and coercion” were queried 
against each other to create a better understanding of the inter-related nature of the 
emerging themes. The coded data were then further analyzed, thematically transcribed, 
and interpreted, thereby establishing clear links between the research objectives and the 
summary findings derived from the raw data (Thomas, 2006). 
 
 
3.4.Demographic Details of Interviewees 
The youngest interviewee was 19 years old, while the oldest was 72 years old. 
There were a total of 8 African Americans, 39 Caucasians, and 1 other race interviewed. 
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There were a total of 31 males and 17 females interviewed. Additional details per 
category are provided in Table 9 and Figure 5 below. 
 
Table 10. Demographics of Interviewees 
Category 
Age 
range Black White Other Male Female 
Positional perspective 40 - 60 0 5 0 3 2 
Developers 35 - 60 1 5 0 5 1 
Social Service Orgs. 35 - 60 1 7 1 6 3 
Newcomers 25 - 50 0 6 0 5 1 
Longtime Residents 35 - 60 1 5 0 2 4 
Displaced Residents 19 - 75 4 2 0 4 2 
Key Informants 45 - 65 1 9 0 6 4 
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The following chapter discusses the political landscape in OTR, and the impact of 
redevelopment on various segments of the population: longtime residents; newcomers; 























OTR, geographically a basin, is a neighborhood that has been described as a 
gateway for immigrants, a dumping ground for the homeless and mentally ill, and most 
recently, as a hip and upcoming place. OTR boasts a rich history of migration and social 
movements, dating back to the 1830’s. First inhabited by German immigrants, the 
neighborhood was transformed into a poor, white, Appalachian neighborhood, which was 
then replaced by a poor African American population. Today, the city’s goal is to make 
OTR a mixed income, diverse, vibrant neighborhood through deliberate and strategic 
revitalization efforts.  
 
4.1. Revitalization and Redevelopment in OTR 
Today, OTR is undergoing rapid redevelopment. When walking down a street, 
one almost has to walk in a zig-zag manner so as to avoid all the construction road 
blocks. Run down old buildings are being gutted, preserving and upgrading the Italianate 
exterior to develop stylish new buildings with commercial spaces, condos, and 
apartments. Entire streets are lined with yellow construction cranes and construction 
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crews. There is a lot of excitement surrounding this construction. As one fairly new-to-
the-area business wrote in their social media blog,  
“We've sat patiently for more than three years awaiting good news for the 
empty buildings on either side of us. Our landlord, TF, closed on 1200 and 
1208 Main Street this past week, which means we are poised to have new 
neighbors in the coming year. This is probably the best news we could 
receive as we reset for a new year. Freshen up your business plans, next 
generation of Main Street small store owners!” (dated approximately 
October, 2013). 
 
Although the concept of gentrification can be defined within a couple of 
sentences, it is a very palpable phenomenon for those living in such a transforming 
neighborhood. There is excitement and fear as power over turf wars changes hands. In 
OTR, as in any revitalizing neighborhood, there are mixed feelings about the change that 
is currently taking place. Proponents describe the change in OTR as positive and 
progressive, while longtime residents worry about being displaced from their homes.  
One can argue that OTR has experienced waves of demographic flux since the 
area was first occupied by German settlers. This dissertation focuses mainly on the 
demographic changes that have been taking place since the early 2000s when the city 
began to play a more active role in the redevelopment of OTR. Using 3CDC as its 
development arm, the city has invested significant amounts of money and resources in 
developing the OTR neighborhood.  
The first phase of development was called Gateway Quarters and was bordered by 
Central Parkway to the south and west, Main Street to the east, and Liberty Street to the 
north (Figure 6). The second phase of development is currently underway, called Mercer 
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Commons. It is a three-stage process (phases II – IV) costing $63 million, and 
encompasses 19 buildings and 26 vacant parcels on 2.695 acres yielding 96 market rate 
apartments, 30 affordable apartments, 28 condominiums, 17,600 square feet of 
commercial space, and 359 parking spaces. In addition to Mercer Commons, Phase V 
includes the renovation of another 18 buildings on Race, Elm and Republic Streets 
yielding 74 condos, 14 apartments, and 8,100 square feet of commercial space for a total 






Figure 6. Map of Over-the-Rhine (Source: 3CDC) 
 
As redevelopment has been underway, the prices of buildings have risen sharply. 
As a newcomer described to me in an email exchange,  
“And along the lines of our conversation - check out this listing for a one 
bedroom, one bath, one study loft condo in OTR:…Asking price is 
$258,000... I am pretty sure my entire building was less than $100,000 
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when the owners bought it 10 years ago! My, how times have 
changed.”(dated November 8th, 2013) 
 
In order to better understand the dynamics of gentrification in OTR, it is 
important to give voice to all the actors in the process. The following section begins by 
describing the corporate landscape in OTR, with specific emphasis on 3CDC. Next, it 
describes the role of the city in the redevelopment efforts. The focus then shifts to the 
second section which describes the various parties who are impacted by the 
redevelopment, in particular, the longtime residents, the newcomers, and the social 
service organizations.  
 
4.2. Political Landscape in OTR 
The governance of a community hinges on the political and economic forces 
shaping the spatial ethos and thereby its social culture. The OTR community is very 
polarized, not along partisan lines, but instead along socioeconomic and class lines. 
While this is visible on the streets, it is most visible in the OTR Community Council 
meetings, where tensions run high as different issues are addressed. On one side, there 
are proponents of redevelopment who adhere to a neoliberal imperative. This group 
includes the city, 3CDC, developers, and corporate interests, determined to redevelop 
OTR and attract the middle class back to the city. Opponents include longtime residents, 
social service organizations, advocacy groups, and the homeless population, who see the 
neoliberal agenda as spurring the gentrification process and weakening their decision 
making power. To better understand the power dynamics, it is important to understand 
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the current political climate of the place, by looking at the roles played by the corporate 
elite and the city. 
 
4.2.1. Corporate landscape in OTR 
Development in a neighborhood occurs through the actions of many vested 
parties. It is analogous to a piece of yarn being woven out of many individual strands of 
thread. When trying to understand how development occurs in OTR, it is easy to note the 
cohesion between developers, 3CDC, and other corporate interests. In-depth interviews 
with various actors provided some insight into the current redevelopment in OTR. 
After the 2001 race riots that took place in OTR, the corporate community, primarily 
located in the adjacent CBD, mobilized to make OTR a better place. As one developer 
put it,  
“The [corporations] knew they had billions of dollars in fixed assets. They 
can’t pick those buildings up and go away. Like, ABC Corporation can’t 
relocate their corporate headquarters. They’ve got OTR here. For them 
$100 million or whatever it is – to turn that liability into an asset – that’s 
a no brainer.” 
After much planning, discussion, and organizing, the Cincinnati Center City 
Community Development Corporation (3CDC) was formed in 2003 as a public-private 
partnership, with a mission to increase market rate housing and home ownership, and to 
preserve the historic character of OTR. Unlike traditional CDCs which serve as liaisons 
between the community and the city, 3CDC serves as the city’s economic development 
arm, playing the role of the main developer. A key informant described 3CDC as a “900-
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pound gorilla” that became a “game changer.” With financial backing from the city and 
the corporate community, 3CDC was able to purchase blocks of buildings, clear building 
titles, and turn over the buildings to individual developers. By strategically acquiring a 
critical mass of several different buildings, 3CDC was able to take development in OTR 
from scattered, pocket-sized development to one large-scale development endeavor. As 
one developer described it, 
“these buildings were assembled strategically for their location…these 
guys would then close down the buildings. The buildings were closed and 
they were fenced in and fenced off. So when renovation of buildings 
happened, [it] happened in a large scale fashion.” 
After inception, 3CDC quickly began to purchase vacant lots and buildings, 
amassing 200 buildings and 170 vacant lots within the city blocks bordered by Central 
Parkway, Liberty Street, Elm Street, and Main Street (Figure 6). A representative of a 
social service organization noted that “in the past 5 years, 3CDC was able to purchase 
more property than XYZ, an affordable housing developer, could in the past 30 years.” 
3CDC was very strategic in its acquisitions, purchasing corner lots and buildings, 
concurrently amassing 50-60 liquor license permits. To date, 3CDC has developed 186 
condos, all of which have sold, 70 fully leased apartments with waitlists, as well as 
91,000 square feet of commercial space.  
While the corporate community and the city enthusiastically support 3CDC, there 
is a strong anti-3CDC sentiment within the community. Often, 3CDC is seen as 
controlling, directing, and managing the gentrification process. As a representative of a 
social service organization put it, 
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 “3CDC was created with a purpose. They were created to remove certain 
people from this neighborhood and move other people in and make a 
small number of people lots of money. Their board of directors is only 
major corporations. And so they are doing what they are meant to do.” 
A displaced resident spoke with great hostility when he described 3CDC as 
“[Expletive]. Demo-enforcers. They don’t try to help or anything. I look at them like 
dictators…‘I got this money, this power; I can do whatever the [expletive] I want to do.’” 
Others conceded that 3CDC had softened its stance over the past few years and was no 
longer as severe in its approach. As a representative of another social service organization 
put it, 
“Some part of them is willing to give a little as well. They seem to be more 
willing to help those that have been here for many years than they were a 
few years ago. Take for instance the bathrooms. First it was ‘no, there’s 
no bathrooms.’ Then it was ‘well, let’s see what we can do.’” 
A developer provided some insight into the softer side of the “900-pound gorilla” when 
he said, 
“[The sentiment] has definitely softened. To their credit, 3CDC has spent 
a considerable amount of time and money for what they call their 
‘homeless to homes project.’ The CEO is not bashful about saying, ‘our 
community has done a very, very, very poor job of helping the indigent 
population, the homeless population, those in need. We have nothing to be 
proud of’….depends on which side of the alley you sit…some would say 
‘no you don’t wanna see a homeless person on the streets, you wanna 
move ‘em.’ [CEO] would argue ‘no, I don’t want to just move them; I 
want to help them.’” 
In the redevelopment efforts in OTR, 3CDC is often cast as the villain or as the 
hero. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. As some interviewees observed, 
3CDC has done a very good job at doing what it was meant to do – redevelop OTR. 
Along the way, there have been casualties, such as social service organizations that have 
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been moved out of OTR, or longtime residents who have lost their homes. However, 
almost everyone would agree that, “Cincinnati would not be where it is, and OTR would 
not be where it is, were it not for 3CDC” (Developer). 
 
4.2.2. Role of the city in Redevelopment 
While the 2001 riots served as a catalyst, city policy was also changing from a 
laissez faire approach to a more deliberate involvement with revitalization efforts. The 
city of Cincinnati, like many other American cities, realized that “for a city to survive as 
a viable place, politically and economically, we have to counter the white flight and the 
black flight….the middle class…if we’re going to counter blight and have a viable city, 
we need to improve the tax base. To improve the tax base, we need to have more market 
rate housing and city policy ought to be directed toward that” (Key Informant). While 
cities compete against one another to attract corporations or skilled workers to their 
locales, they also face internal turmoil as there is a hollowing out (Rusk, 1993) of their 
urban core to the growing, sprawling suburbs. This creates even more tension as the city 
and the suburbs compete for the same tax revenues. Another key informant put it astutely 
when she said, 
“there [was] no one driving force for renaissance…[3CDC] allowed 
development to take hold. [I] won’t attribute it all to 3CDC because there 
are a lot of people working [to redevelop OTR].”  
When the most recent wave of revitalization in OTR began, two of the biggest 
accomplishments were to get the public utility companies to bring the neighborhood up to 
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code and street calming efforts, such as changing one-way streets to two-way streets, 
which slowed traffic and increased accessibility to the neighborhood businesses.  
A third, very controversial, project that is currently underway is the establishment 
of a streetcar that would connect different neighborhoods. Proponents believe it will 
create connectivity and make the city “more progressive” and attractive to new talent. 
They also believe that the permanence of a streetcar (as opposed to bus lines) shows how 
dedicated the city is to improving its infrastructure. Opponents believe that spending 
money on a streetcar when budgets are already tight is not sensible. They also believe 
that the streetcar will primarily “be a toy for the yuppies” (Longtime Resident), further 
promoting gentrification. 
While 3CDC spearheads the redevelopment, it works very closely with the city in 
its planning efforts. As a developer observed, “everything goes through the city.” The 
planning is conducted in a very methodical manner and ranges from infrastructural design 
such as utility provision to streetscape to parking as well as a financial component where 
sometimes the city provides a portion of the development costs. As a council member 
explained, 
“We provide seed money but then we also help fund specific parts of the 
plan. We work side by side on all the issues, from zoning and planning and 
everything else it takes to redo a building and a plan to redo a 
building…everything is done in partnership between the city and 3CDC, 
at every level…they are the ones who are developing the plans but it’s in 
partnership. They will then come to the city and say we’ve gotten these 
federal dollars, these HUD dollars, these CDBG dollars, and…they 
needed a million dollars more, so that’s where the city comes in.” 
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Through the establishment of 3CDC, it is clear that the city has rescaled urban 
governance in OTR through the devolution and privatization of state power, further 
distancing itself from democratic access and accountability to the local residents. 
Development plans are often orchestrated “behind closed doors,” thereby limiting citizen 
involvement. Even when resident input is sought, it is often not incorporated into the 
development schemes. By letting 3CDC spearhead development, the city has created an 
additional administrative layer between itself and its citizens. 
 
4.3. Impact of Redevelopment 
4.3.1. Longtime Residents and Redevelopment 
During in-depth interviews, the longtime residents, social service organizations, 
and displaced residents had a very different reaction to the redevelopment. While 3CDC, 
the city, and the corporate community are encouraging the rapid redevelopment of OTR, 
the longtime residents, social service organizations, and homeless population are not as 
enthusiastic and are instead more anxious about being pushed out of the neighborhood.  
The relationship between longtime residents and 3CDC, the developers, and the 
corporate community is strained at best. As a longtime resident described it, 
“Suspicion that …people will talk about we’re being taken over or [the 
developers are] not respectful. I know families that have lost housing 
because of the change.”  
Many constituents have criticized 3CDC for showing a lack of sensitivity toward 
the indigent population. As a representative of a social service organization and a 
longtime resident put it, 
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 “For the most part, we don’t feel like the developers value the folks that 
are here already…maybe not even thinking negatively about…but they 
don’t either have a sense of what’s already here ‘cause they maybe believe 
too that there’s nothing…it’s kind of like the whole urban pioneer 
thing…and the settlers.” 
“You’re an urban pioneer and all the language they use…you know, the 
way this country was founded…you know, great white pioneers who 
moved to the West to tame the land that was totally empty or you know 
had savages on it who didn’t need to be there anyway. I mean that 
language is the language they use to gentrify this community.” 
When developers were asked about why longtime residents might be opposed to 
the redevelopment, the answer was simple, uniform, and dismissive of the complex social 
dynamics at play: “Human nature doesn’t like change…change is difficult…people don’t 
like change.” Each developer then discussed how the neighborhood had changed for the 
better, providing the longtime residents with better amenities like increased safety, more 
beautiful streetscapes, and a vibrancy “that was previously lacking.” 
It was easy to sense the tension in the room as one longtime resident described the 
dynamics of neighborhood change in OTR, 
[It] felt like tokens…neighborhood people know what’s going on, know the 
concept of gentrification, and that our land is valuable and it’s being 
occupied and taken over by forces that have the power to do it and giving 
little regard to the little people; little people meaning those with less 
resources.” 
Showing sensitivity to the conceptual complexity, a newcomer described the situation as 
such,  
“when we moved in here, there’s still folks who live on this block and for 
whatever their circumstances are, don’t have a lot of resources and you’ve 
got that mix of people coming in. Obviously, you know, we’re white and 
that isn’t what the neighborhood has been for a while and there had been 
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words about whether the renovation is pushing people out of the area or 
whether it’s renovating shells or empty buildings or saving what’s left of 
OTR’s character. So, I think the real rub comes when people are moved 
out of their homes and facilities.” 
While 3CDC asks for participation from the longtime residents, that input is often 
ignored, leaving the longtime residents feeling overlooked and voiceless. For example, 
the redevelopment of Washington Park on 14
th
 Street cost approximately $48 million and 
turned the park from a haven for the homeless to a destination park for the city. The 
longtime residents fought very hard to keep the basketball courts where young African 
American males liked to spend time, as well as the deep water swimming pool where 
children learned to swim. Their wishes were completely ignored and instead the 
renovated park has a dog park in it. One resident said she felt like their input was nothing 
more than tokenism. To them, although more beautiful, it no longer feels like their 
community park. 
Another glaring aspect of the redevelopment is that although revitalization is 
supposed to spur economic growth, the indigent population is not benefiting monetarily 
from it in any way. For example, when asked whether developers hired locally, most said 
they couldn’t because of a lack of skilled laborers. As a representative from 3CDC 
explained, “we can’t just put a hard hat on anyone.” The city has requirements for 
minority owned businesses, small businesses, and women owned businesses that the 
developers are required to follow. Being very candid and speaking in general terms, a 
developer explained,  
“the African American community has frankly done a terrible job of 
training their workforce. And there just aren’t many that will be good. The 
Hispanics will work…they’ll work 12 hours a day and give you 14 hours 
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of work in a 12 hour day. And I mean, work hard. That’s not true in the 
African American community. I mean there are certain trades we use that 
are minority owned that are good guys. They work hard; they do a good 
job, but they’re few and far between. And some of them like to just take 
advantage of the opportunity. ‘well, we know you gotta have certain 
minorities on the job so you gotta hire us.’…then I gotta hire somebody 
else to fix your work. We do that. That’s what we do. 3CDC will do 
that…’okay, he’s not the low bidder; he’s not the best bidder; we’re going 
to hire him and we’re going to hire him because we’ve got to have certain 
engagement within the community. It’s a cost of doing business.” 
Whether this perception is correct or not or whether it is even a commonly held 
notion among developers, it is a further hindrance for the local population to become a 
part of the redevelopment efforts through gainful employment. The community also does 
not have any training programs available locally so as to develop a local skilled 
workforce. Neither the city, nor 3CDC has made any effort to implement such a training 
program. 
 
4.3.1.1. Local Voice and Activism 
There has been a very rich history of social activism in OTR. It reached its peak 
in the1970s – 1980s through a movement called the People’s Movement. This movement 
was headed by an iconic figure by the name of Buddy Gray. During his time, protests 
were very theatrical in nature, with Buddy and his cohorts being arrested multiple times. 
One social activist described a multitude of situations where Buddy and other social 




Buddy was a staunch advocate for the poor. After inviting the homeless into his 
home for the night for a number of years, Buddy formally created a shelter called the 
Drop Inn Center in 1973. A few interviewees recounted how the Drop Inn Center and its 
inhabitants were moved in the middle of the night to a building next to Music Hall, 
presumably to make homelessness more visible to those with money. This covert move, 
described by some as illegal, was spearheaded by Buddy and required the assistance of 
many social activists who coordinated collective efforts such as driving the shelter’s 
clients in vans in the middle of the night. As a developer recounted, 
“Teaching them how to panhandle. Became a magnet, self perpetuating 
thing. Brought people in, taught them how to be homeless, how to do the 
homeless thing. And then they kinda put themselves in the face of people 
with money…you know the old fart, people in their tuxedos, walking up to 
music hall…[saying] literally, ‘well, I better give them some money.’” 
Ever since the Drop Inn Center was moved to its prime location next to Music 
Hall, a prestigious School for the Performing Arts, and Washington Park, there has been 
much controversy surrounding its location. The city has been trying to relocate the Center 
for years so as to reclaim the valuable piece of real estate that is currently occupied by the 
Center. There was a decision made recently to relocate the Drop Inn Center outside OTR, 
in the neighborhood of Queensgate. Advocates today believe that it will now become 
very difficult for the Center’s client base to access their shelter services due to the lack of 
proximity. The upside is that its new location presumably has a better architectural 
foundation and layout and is therefore better suited for its operations. 
Buddy died an untimely death on November 15
th
, 1996, when he was shot by a 
homeless man with schizophrenia who thought Buddy was trying to poison him. There 
are some within the community who believe Buddy’s death was actually an assassination 
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facilitated by the opposition. Buddy was very anti-development and through very 
strategic efforts, had garnered a lot of clout within city hall, thus giving him the 
opportunity to thwart development. As one developer put it, “wherever development was, 
Buddy Gray was not.” 
After Buddy’s death, the advocacy group broke into a few off-shoots which are 
still in existence today. Although there is still a very strong advocacy presence, the power 
of such groups has waned since Buddy’s death. Part of the reason is that Buddy had 
exceptional community organizing skills. Today, the weakened impact of social 
movements may have something to do with the fact that it is more difficult to mobilize 
people around common interests (DeFilippis, 2004; Newman and Lake, 2006; Lees et al., 
2008). There are also a very large number of social service organizations that are located 
in OTR. They are proponents of affordable housing. While there is a very strong sense of 
activism among a few key players, their challenge lies in organizing the residents. Also, 
the opposition has grown in power, both monetarily and administratively. As a longtime 
resident explained, 
 “But that doesn’t mean we’ve given up. I mean, we’re still here trying to 
stand up for basic human rights and hopefully, you know, we’ll be here in 
the long run. But, I mean, you know…we’re up against a lot of big money 
and power with the corporations of Cincinnati kind of deciding that this is 
an area they want to…I see it as a takeover, an invasion almost because 
we really don’t have a legitimate voice in decision making.” 
Based on observing the OTR Community Council over the course of a year, it is 
clear that there is divisiveness within the community council between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots.” Over the course of the year, there have been an increasing number of 
newcomers attending the meetings. As an outsider, it was easy to see the power struggle 
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and shifting dynamics as the newcomers began to outnumber the longtime residents, 
further weakening their voice. As a representative of 3CDC, in actuality a public-private 
corporation, put it, 
“so because we’re a private non-profit real estate group; we’re private; 
we’re a private company and we certainly do…we try to follow that OTR 
master plan and we listen to the community but…we try to gather as much 
input as we can…[Q: do residents have a guarantee that their input will 
be incorporated?]…nope, we’re a private group, so there’s no 
guarantees.” 
On the flip side, a very remarkable story of successful social justice is the 
example of a building which used to be called Metropole and is today the 21C hotel. 
Some of the 300 plus residents held out on relocation remuneration and 3CDC finally 
settled the case for $80,000. Though small, it was still a great victory for those who were 
displaced.  
Despite past successes during Buddy’s tenure and the victory over the Metropole 
case, the current strength of social activism has weakened. It is strongly present, but 
latent in a sense. This may be because as properties change hands, the longtime residents 
are more worried about getting displaced. This base fear seems to create a sense of 
urgency that is not being translated into a collective identity in the form of tenant 
uprisings or other community-oriented protests.  
Poletta and Jasper (2001, p. 285) describe the term “collective identity” as “an 
individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, 
category, practice, or institution.” While distinct from personal identity, it may form part 




The theory of a “collective consciousness” was first posited by Durkheim. 
According to Durkheim (1973), collective representations may range from totemic 
symbols to moral beliefs (Swindler, 1995). Symbols and rituals serve to “concretize 
‘collective consciousness,’ making the animating power of group life palpable for its 
members” (Ibid., p. 26). An individual must feel a part of an organized whole in order for 
collective action to occur. However, a sense of belonging is not enough to spur action. 
In the case of OTR, there are numerous murals speaking to the strength of the 
community. However, while there is a strong presence of social activism, it lacks the 
cohesion that it had in the 1970s, and especially, the 1980s.  
It is important to touch upon a theoretical framework for social movements and 
resource mobilization. The development of social movement theory can be traced from 
the collective behavior tradition of the 1950s to the resource mobilization theories of the 
1970s to the social constructionism and new social movement theory of the 1980s 
(Buechler, 2000). During the 1970s, sociologists (Gurr ,1971; Turner and Killian,1972; 
Smelser, 1963) viewed social movements as being rooted in shared grievances and 
alienation, and particularly, in the intensification of such grievances or deprivation. Later 
scholarship, however, began to doubt the assumption of a close link between preexisting 
discontent and social movements (Tilly, 1973).  
Traditional analysis of social movements and social movement organizations has 
assumed a close connection between collective grievance and the growth, change, and 
decline of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Resource Mobilization (RM) 
theory, however, is informed by political sociological and economic theories, more so 
than the social psychology of collective behavior (Ibid.). According to RM theory, 
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“society provides the infrastructure which social movement industries and other 
industries utilize. The aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels 
of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, preexisting networks, and 
occupational structure and growth” (Ibid., p. 1217). 
If we were to analyze the activism in OTR using the lens of RM theory, the basic 
infrastructural tenets necessary for resource mobilization are now missing. There are still 
a few key actors with shared grievances. However, over time, having people displaced 
has weakened the base or core constituents and potential participants. The displacement 
of residents has caused instability within the preexisting networks, resulting in 
administrative constraints. For example, basic communication networks are dismantled as 
activists are displaced and are no longer “plugged in” to their old networks.  There are 
also lower levels of affluence and access to institutional centers, further undermining the 
ability for collective activism. The resistance movements are not funded by government 
or private monies, making even basic communication across members an expensive 
endeavor. Although social activists attempt to raise money through fundraising efforts, 
such efforts do not have the sponsorship of donors with deep pockets. For example, ABC 
Corporation is not likely to donate money to anti-redevelopment groups, as it is not in its 
best interest to thwart redevelopment.  
In summary, as gentrification takes a hold of OTR, key actors are being displaced, 
changing the “voice” (and therefore, power) of the shrinking group of remaining activists. 
Displacement of social service organizations is dismantling the necessary institutional 
pillars, and diminished resources in terms of time and monies present further hindrances 
for collective activism.  
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4.3.2. The Newcomers and Redevelopment 
Today, when one visits the revitalizing section of OTR, the 2001 riots become a 
faint shadow of the past. It is a trendy urban district, with a vibrant commercial center 
and nightlife. When developers were asked how they went about attracting residents, all 
of them said that they didn’t:  
“Today, we are the market…pricing at the highest level…now market is 
full…pretty easy…no fixed up apartments available. Now, there is more 
demand than housing. We don’t really advertise. It’s mainly word of 
mouth. Residents are coming to us.” 
Developers also attributed part of the demand to changing cultural attitudes. As one 
developer expounded,  
“by this time, Manhattan was cool; and it was played out on shows like 
‘Friends’ or this idea of loft living, like the movie ‘Big’ and people were 
like wow, ‘I’d love to live in a loft like that.’ So it was kind of a 
consciousness of coming out, like city living could be cool.” 
One newcomer described how she felt that developers were definitely targeting a certain 
kind of demographic and ignoring those that did not fall within this subset. 
“Yeah, they’re for sure targeting a certain demographic. Probably the 25-
45 range. Probably their next demographic will be retirees – mark my 
words. Disposable income; upwardly mobile; college educated; white; 
granite countertops; hardwood floors and they are looking for people to 
draw away from the suburbs, in my opinion. And I think their hearts are in 
the right place; I just think they failed on supporting the rest of the 
neighborhood and that’s where I’m like come on guys, step up.” 
The newcomer was correct in her assumptions, as witnessed in Figure 7. Table 10 
provides additional details on the demographics of recent home buyers. It is interesting to 
note that the majority of new home buyers fall within the 25 – 30 age range (33%), with 
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the second largest group falling within 30 – 35 age range (30%), and the third largest 
group falling within the 45 – 60 age range (15%). The majority of new home buyers are 
White (87.4%), followed by Asians (3.75%), Blacks (3.31%), and Europeans (2.35%), 
respectively. While there was an upswing in suburbanites moving to OTR in the years 
2010 and 2011, the statistics indicate that the new home buyers, on average, came from 
the suburbs and from within the city in equal parts. Even though half of the new home 
buyers came from the suburbs, the fact that the other half of the new home buyers came 
from within the city might undermine the city’s claim of increased tax revenues from 
revitalization in OTR as the inner-city home owners were presumably paying inner-city 
taxes to begin with. 
 




Table 11. Overall Demographics of new home buyers (2008 – 2012) 
 
Source: Over-the-Rhine Community Housing 
 
Looking at some sales statistics over the course of 2007 – 2012 (Table 11), there 
were a total of 180 sales and 178 closings, totaling $33.6 million. The average sale price 
over the five years was $190,126. It is interesting to note the steady increase in sale prices 
over the course of the five years, with the average sales price peaking in year 5 (2012) at 
$240,495. However, it is also important to note that the sales prices may have been 
economically deflated during the years 2008 – 2009, when the housing bubble burst, 
leading to a financial crisis, especially in the housing market. In spite of the housing 
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crisis, home values in OTR continued to rise during the recessionary period (December, 
2007 – June, 2009). This may indicate the speculative nature of real estate in OTR. It 
may also explain the upswing in suburbanites moving to OTR during 2010-2011 in 
response to declining suburban home prices. Additionally, it is important to note that the 
sale prices are not always for refurbished dwellings. As three newcomers explained, they 
purchased dilapidated buildings and then rehabbed the buildings themselves, putting 
additional money into construction costs. 
 
Table 12. Over-the-Rhine Living Sales and Marketing ReCap (2007 – 2012) 
 
  Source: Over-the-Rhine Community Housing 
 
When asked “why OTR?,” most of the newcomers echoed similar sentiments: 
they really wanted to live in a diverse neighborhood. One newcomer described how the 
house next to theirs just sold for $600,000 and “then down the street there’s subsidized 
housing where people don’t know where their next meal is coming from.” He further 
explained what attracted his partner and him to the neighborhood as follows, 
“It’s because we wanted diversity…and [for our son]…so that he grows 
up in a world where he knows that there are people that didn’t have the 
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same opportunities that he had, that often don’t have any control over that 
whatsoever. They were just born into that situation, just as he was born 
into a different situation…we didn’t come here and pay a million dollars 
just to be around suburb[an] people.” 
Newcomers also had a strong disdain for suburban life. They felt that there was “a 
spirit here” that was lacking in the suburbs. Another newcomer gave examples of more 
practical reasons such as convenience to work when she said, 
“I have wanted to live in the downtown area for a while…I spend a lot of 
time down here. Being in an urban environment was what I was most 
interested in. I wanted to be among people who weren’t necessarily like 
me…plus it’s an up and coming area…for better or worse, it’s become a 
cooler place to live… Belief in the neighborhood, wanting to be in an 
urban environment….feeling that culturally that was a better fit for 




4.3.3. Interactions between longtime residents and newcomers 
Based on in-depth interviews and participant observation, it appears that longtime 
residents and newcomers coexist in a civil manner. However, with a few exceptions, 
interaction among the two groups is mostly perfunctory. It is almost as if there are two 
separate communities that live in one neighborhood. This might stem from the 
stereotypes that each group has of the other. 
Longtime residents are apprehensive about their new neighbors. They have a 
preconceived notion that the newcomers are there to replace them as residents. They also 
feel like the newcomers simply don’t see them as they walk down the street. They feel 
invisible, unwanted, and believe that newcomers view them as an inferior group. They 
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also feel powerless as OTR is redeveloped and their concerns and desires are not heeded. 
As a longtime resident put it, 
“[development] does not consider everybody…it just kind of walks over 
us…not giving us what it is that we need and not really seeing the value 
that we are to the community. I mean, when I think about the history of 
our effort here and knowing a lot of neighborhood people here and just 
their energy and enthusiasm for the community and standing up for their 
neighbors, I mean there’s all kinds of neat things. We’re an asset, not a 
liability.”  
The vilification of “the gentry” may be somewhat misdirected. Since the 
redevelopment began, OTR has gained a reputation for being a “hip place” which attracts 
a lot of young to middle-aged “tourists” from the suburbs. There is a very vibrant night 
life as the tourists patronize the multitude of bars on Vine Street. Once the bars close, the 
tourists can be described as being rowdy, and sometimes unruly. One newcomer 
described witnessing a loud fight between a “yuppy couple” at 2:00AM. A developer 
described how tourists often litter or may urinate in residential yards. Understandably, the 
longtime residents feel disrespected and this leads to further alienation as the bars are too 
expensive for them to patronize. There is a further disconnect between the longtime 
residents and the newcomers/tourists because most of the bars and restaurants do not 
employ the longtime residents, nor do they make an effort to do so. There seems to be an 
overall sentiment amongst new store-owners that the indigent population is an unskilled 
labor force, incapable of working in the newly-opened establishments. 
The newcomers, on the other hand, genuinely do not want to displace anyone. 
Each newcomer mentioned how much they valued the diversity of OTR. However, the 
newcomers fail to integrate within the already existing fiber of the community. This may 
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be because they do not realize that there is, in fact, a community already in place. Also, 
the more affluent newcomers and the low-income longtime residents have little occasion 
to mingle or even communicate with one another in social settings, causing further 
alienation between the two groups. 
When newcomers purchase refurbished homes in OTR, they are deeply 
committed to the neighborhood. As homeowners, they have a vested interest in the health 
of the neighborhood. Misguidedly, the low homeownership rates in OTR suggest to some 
newcomers that there is no emotional attachment to the neighborhood on the part of the 
longtime residents. As one newcomer described the neighborhood, 
“very few of the places here are owner occupied by the people that have 
been here a long time. They’re a very mobile group…so the people that 
live here do not have an investment in this area other than it’s a place to 
live and there are a lot of other places to live, too.” 
If we were to analyze the statistics on mobility as presented in Table 12, of the 
4.511 individuals for whom residence status a year ago was calculated, majority of the 
population (3,318 individuals, or 73.6%) lived in the same house, undermining the 
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Census Tract 9 487 274 90 52 38 
Census Tract 10 667 276 50 16 34 
Census Tract 11 689 65 63 38 25 
Census Tract 16 854 21 9 3 6 
Census Tract 17 621 45 44 34 10 
Total 3318 681 256 143 113 
Source: 2012 ACS 5 year estimates 
    
Just as the longtime residents, newcomers also have preconceived notions. Most 
of the newcomers that were interviewed see longtime residents as a lower socio-
economic group that has been disenfranchised for generations and needs to be helped. 
Some newcomers talked about how they made it a point to say hello to the indigent 
population – the panhandlers. Others mentioned how they recognized familiar faces and 
would sometimes purchase a local newspaper called StreetVibes from them. There is a 
sense of patronization in their interactions. 
The form in which development occurs does not help the cause in any way and 
may in fact exacerbate cultural alienation. As a representative of an affordable housing 
developer described, 
“There’s a development called Parvis. It’s on Vine Street and there’s an 
alley behind it called Parvis Alley…then our property is right on the other 
side and backs up to Parvis Alley too…so our building front on Republic, 
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backs into Parvis; their property fronts on Vine Street and backs into 
Parvis. When they developed it, they did a really neat design in the back of 
their building for exclusive use of Parvis Alley by their residents, putting 
gates up, locked gates; getting the city to privatize those alleys for their 
use…and so in that, literally walling our folks off…which, you know, is 
unfortunate…so then the folks moving in just automatically, without 
thinking, assume that this is all ours. This alley’s ours; this is our space.  
And I think when people move in, they aren’t encouraged, it’s kind of like 
‘I’m moving in in spite of the low income folks here’…not everyone for 
sure…but that there is an opportunity to build relationships or that there’s 
somebody here already. ‘Cause I think sometimes the way the 
neighborhood’s portrayed, people might think like it’s largely vacant and 
there’s nothing here of value; they don’t realize that there’s already folks 
living here who have a history, who have a stake in the neighborhood” 
 
4.3.4. Social Service Organizations and Redevelopment 
Many interviewees believed that there were too many social service organizations 
located in OTR. It is a chicken and egg syndrome. There is a concentration of poverty in 
OTR, and maybe that’s why there is a concentration of social service organizations – to 
serve the needs of the people in the community. Or maybe there is a concentration of too 
many social service organizations, thereby attracting the low-income and homeless 
population to the area.  
When asked if there were too many social service organizations in OTR, dating 
his explanation to the 1980s, one developer mentioned that, 
“I think we counted with the chamber something like 115 social service 
organizations. Like, you could get a sandwich or you could get a free meal 
at one of 12 different places at any given time…so, what neighborhood 
can support that?...I mean how could that be good on any level. It was 
kind of like, ‘let’s create a mall of poverty – it was insane’.” 
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A newcomer also mentioned that there were too many social service organizations in 
OTR, when he said, 
“I think there are a lot of shelters here because it was cheap to buy the 
buildings here; people they were serving didn’t mind coming into this 
neighborhood. Now that’s changing. They’re realizing that we just have 
too many out here.” 
Another developer described the social service organizations as “fiefdoms” that 
were interested in protecting their “empires.” He mentioned how there were directors and 
employees, all getting paid to do the social service work and that they had self-serving 
needs such as employment and/or their current clout. He also felt like the current system 
simply “warehoused” people rather than catering to individualized needs and that there 
needed to be a centralized agency to streamline the process. While there is currently a 
centralized system for the greater Cincinnati area, there is not a unique centralized system 
for OTR. 
There is an effort being made to relocate social service organizations to other 
neighborhoods – regardless of where their client base is being relocated. Social service 
organizations recounted stories of how some of them had been moved out of the 
neighborhood, making it difficult for their clients to use their services due to 
transportation logistics. Many wondered how much longer they would be in OTR.  
They also discussed how the different agencies did, in fact, coordinate their 
outreach programs. For example, XYZ organization served meals from 12:00 – 2:00, 
while ABC organization served sandwiches from 2:00 – 4:00, thereby staggering the 
service provision. While there may be some duplication of services, the organizations 
have a close-knit network whereby the social service provision is as complementary as 
98 
 
possible. However, one of the representatives of a social service organization mentioned 
how there is some form of a “prisoner’s dilemma” situation because the agencies are 
applying for the same funding grants, which creates an incentive to withhold information 
from one another. While that may be true on the administrative level, all the 
organizations are on shoe-string budgets, necessitating streamlined operations. 
Based on in-depth interviews, it seems that the goal is to consolidate, reorganize, 
and relocate the social service organizations. As a city official described the plans, 
“Completely reorganize how we deliver services for the homeless, which 
hopefully, will be better than what we have done historically. But, part of 
that is getting away from one shelter to having multiple shelters that 
service different needs. Folks with mental health issues versus folks with 
substance issues…families…rather than just having everyone put together. 
That’s not really beneficial. That’s a really tough area. Broadly speaking, 
that’s the idea…I think that causes a lot of angst.” 
By relocating or displacing the current network of social services that are 
available, there is an immediate strain on the remaining service providers as they struggle 
to cater to the needs of their expanded client base with diminished support from the 
provider network. It is also problematic that the relocation of social service organizations 
is not done in tandem with the relocation of their client base, thereby putting added 
pressure on both the displaced agency and the displaced client base.  
Having analyzed the impact of redevelopment on various segments of OTR, the 
next chapter focuses on an analysis of gentrification in OTR. More specifically, it 
discusses the social benefits and social costs of revitalization; displacement and retention; 
the displaced and homeless; and an analysis of the often interchangeable words 






ANALYSIS OF GENTRIFICATION IN OTR 
 
5.1. Social Benefits 
Besides obvious financial gains such as tax revenue increases from property taxes, 
sales taxes, income taxes, and business taxes, and additional income to the city via 
license/permit fees and parking, to name a few, there are many intangible benefits to 
redevelopment. Interviewees mentioned safety as one of the biggest benefits as 
redevelopment reduced or displaced the criminal element out of OTR.  
Others referred to the benefits of creating a more diverse community. As a 
developer mentioned, 
“I would say that a neighborhood…I forget at what we figured…if it was 
something like 20 percent below poverty line residents, you know, that was 
kind of the tipping point…if you get that mix wrong, then like what 
happens is that the culture of the kids is a poverty culture instead of a 
culture of aspiration.”  
 
5.1.1. Creating a culture of aspiration 
The emancipatory city thesis, which describes gentrification as a unifying process 
creating cultural diversity, tolerance, liberation, and social interaction, has been presented 
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in the works of Ley (1980, 1994, 1996), Butler (1997), and Caulfield (1989, 1994). Social 
mixing allows people of different socioeconomic backgrounds to interact with one 
another, “broadening horizons and raising expectations” (Lees et al., 2008, p. 199). A 
representative of an agency echoed this position, 
“Creating this diversification I think is a benefit…I think that if I am 
around people that are different than myself, unless I’m an idiot, I should 
learn something from them; from that exposure, from that engagement, 
from that observation of people with their troubles…I had to walk to a 
meeting this morning and I saw a couple of guys in different buildings, 
sitting on the stoops with a shopping bag of everything they own, bundled 
up, and I’m thinking ‘jeeze, these poor guys, this [cold] weather is just 
killing them’…nothing I can do about it but I’m confronted by these 
gentlemen who have nowhere to go and it’s societal. I think it’s okay that I 
was exposed to that. I think it makes me understand society a little better.”  
What the interviewee was describing was a “trickle-up” effect, as the learning was 
done by him, an upper-middle class resident, instead of the learning being parlayed to a 
low-income person. This trickle-up effect is interesting because it has not been mentioned 
previously in the existing scholarship on gentrification. Byrne (2003) discusses the 
positive “trickle-down” effects of gentrification. A key informant described how when 
the indigent population is displaced, they form new networks with more well-to-do 
families, creating the chance for upward mobility. Another interviewee echoed Byrne’s 
sentiment when he said, 
“I think the redevelopment efforts should reduce the cost of the social 
service system. It has to have a reverse effect on some people….there have 
to be some people who see  knuckleheads like me and you know go ‘maybe 
I can do a little bit better; maybe I can pull myself up’…because they see 
it; they aren’t just surrounded everyday by homeless people. They also 
observe successful people. It has to have some kind of a trickle-down 




It is important to note that “upward mobility” does not simply happen by 
observing a person in a suit. The indirect realization of the possibility for a better life, or 
direct aspirations for a better life, are not enough to overcome poverty. There is a need 
for job training programs that can enable a person to develop a skill-set that is 
marketable. Such a government-sponsored program has never been in place in OTR and 
there seem to be no plans to create such a program by the city or by 3CDC.  
Although Blomley (2004) argues that interaction in mixed neighborhoods is 
limited and can lead to social segregation and isolation, this is not always the case. One 
newcomer recounted a story of how he helped connect a low-income resident to the 
wealthy elite of Cincinnati, resulting in an upper-middle income resident offering to pay 
for the low-income resident to go to college. While this may be a drop in the bucket, 
there is social mingling that is occurring in certain pockets. As a displacee described her 
reaction to the redevelopment, 
“A lot of people have misconception[s] and I was one of them. I had 
misconception on corporate America. And half of these people down here, 
these are corporate America people. I had a misconception because I 
finally found some that care. Everybody is not evil, like everybody is trying 
to paint it out to be. And I feel like I don’t care what kind of class you are, 
‘cause a poor man can be as selfish as a person with money…you can’t 
put it on a person with money. It’s just a person, period. Yeah, I had real 
misconceptions about a lot of people and a lot of things and I had to 
learn…everybody’s not the same and some of it is stuff, it’s good what 
they are doing, but a lot of it is out of selfish gain…and that piece of it is 
not good but like Washington park…everybody had a gripe about it but 




5.1.2. Washington Park 
Many interviewees described Washington Park (previously mentioned in Section 
4.3.1.) as a tangible example of a social benefit. Proponents described how it was so 
endearing to see the diversity in the park, with children of all socioeconomic and ethnic 
groups playing together while the adults all interacted with one another. However, 
opponents of the redevelopment mentioned how some of the homeless population had 
been displaced and there were fewer amenities present (for example, there are no longer 
any basketball courts in the renovated park). One homeless interviewee described the 
contentious situation: 
“But everybody’s making a big gripe, ‘oh $48 million;’ so what….look at 
these kids. And that’s what it’s about, you know, it’s about everybody 
coming together, and nobody’s looking at that aspect. They’re looking at 
‘oh, this was our park; this was our stuff and they’re taking it away.’ 
No…and I felt that was unfair to the people who re[did] the park because 
you’re looking at gimme, gimme, gimme….but you’re not trying to give; 
just take, take, take; it’s not good. Not good at all.” 
The park also has music nights and different activities that encourage social mixing.  
 
5.1.3. Other Social Benefits 
In addition to the overall beautification of OTR, in the form of the park and the 
streetscape, the city and 3CDC also required the public utility companies to bring the 
utilities up to code.  
Some of the newcomers also mentioned how the proximity to work enabled them 
to walk, creating a new “car-averse,” urban, “green” culture. Others mentioned the 
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increased vibrancy (due to increased safety) as a social benefit of redevelopment. Some 
also mentioned an increased sense of civic pride and increased homeownership rates, 
making them feel like they are living “in a real city” (Newcomer).  
While newcomers and corporate interests were excited about OTR serving as a 
prototype for “a melting pot” (Developer), longtime residents and social service 
organizations were not as enthusiastic and had a difficult time answering the question. A 
representative of a social service organization mentioned that financial benefits were 
directed toward the corporate community alone and that it was difficult for him to see any 
social benefits from gentrification, other than “maybe the trash gets picked up more 
frequently.” As a longtime resident tried to articulate her answer, she said, 
“Yeah, so, does it look prettier; does it look fixed up? Ohhh…the 
neighborhood is really looking great, but to me, the people make up a 
community and I miss people that are no longer here…so I would say 
there are improvements, but who’s benefiting?” 
A Key Informant echoed the sentiment when he said, 
“for the residents, there are not that many benefits because they’re not 
owning the businesses; they’re not working in the businesses. The benefits 
haven’t been that great for the people who live here, that were here before 
the gentry. For the gentry, it’s economic opportunity from which to build 
their wealth and start their lives. For the city, it’s a shining new 
community…once degragated[sic] place that’s now been turned around. 








5.2. Social Costs 
The majority of scholarly research points to displacement as the greatest cost of 
gentrification (LeGates and Hartman, 1981, 1986; Lyons, 1996; Newman and Wyly, 
2006). The dynamics of displacement are further discussed in the next section. As 
displacement occurs, there are tangible repercussions. The greatest ripple effect is the 
erosion of social capital. As longtime residents are displaced, their social networks are 
broken, leading to increased costs such as the cost of daycare, instead of a neighbor 
watching the children while the parents work. Once the neighbor is displaced, that 
support system is lost. As a longtime resident explained, 
Even if you’re in a situation where you might not always have a lot of 
money, you at least have that support base still to where you can at least 
work together to make it through the end of the month. Or, you know, till 
somebody gets off work, if you need to pick somebody’s kids up from 
daycare or something like that for them. All these things, they’re an 
intricate network that don’t always require money. But they do require 
people to be able to work together, to live together, to know each other. 
And even if you weren’t actually related to your neighbor, you might get 
so close that they do become family and you start calling them your cousin 
or you aunt…that’s the kind of network we had at one point, very strong in 
OTR but we no longer have as much of it. It’s still there but it’s not like it 
used to be [because of the displacement of people].” 
The displacement, coupled with the stress of moving, loss of home, loss of social 
networks, and loss of community, all create psychological costs. As friends and 
neighbors are forced to leave the neighborhood, the social fabric of the community 
becomes eroded, often creating resentment and hostility toward the newcomers, further 
intensifying cultural alienation. 
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As displacees move to adjacent neighborhoods, there is alienation amongst 
neighborhoods. As a city representative explained, neighborhoods that are not receiving 
redevelopment funds feel resentful and alienated. Also, as the displacees move in, they 
create a strain on existing services within the new neighborhood. There are also turf wars 
and an increase in crime which causes further instability. These are all tangible societal 
costs. 
The displacement of residents and social service organizations also requires a 
rearrangement of how services are delivered to clients, putting an added strain on the 
organizations that are still located in OTR. Some displacees may try to come back to 
OTR to access those services that are not available in their new neighborhoods. As a Key 
Informant explained, 
“Gilding the ghetto is maintaining the ghetto; dispersing the ghetto is the 
idea of giving people the opportunity somewhere else; where there’s less 
crime, better schools, all that. So, the positive effect of gentrification on 
the existing neighborhood is that the people might end up better off. They 
don’t always immediately end up better off because if they move to places; 
if you force them to move and you don’t provide support services, they are 
not necessarily immediately better off in the new environment…on the 
lowest end of the perspective, you’ve created social instability by breaking 
up existing social networks. And those social networks include those 
social services that are there. You may be putting people in neighborhoods 
where there aren’t those social services they need, available. People 
would try to come back and get those services, I would think.” 
Many interviewees mentioned how the problems of poverty, crime, and other 
pathologies are simply being pushed out to other neighborhoods, “out of sight” 
(Newcomer). Another newcomer mentioned how “the focus is on building, rather than 
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fixing.” Some also noted how those displaced may not be getting the same supportive 
services that they had in OTR. 
As the demographic makeup changes, the culture of the place changes. Resistance 
movements become weaker as the voice of the neighborhood (Chernoff, 1980) changes 
due to displacement of local community activists, which leads to further polarization of 
the community. A developer described how as OTR becomes upgraded, it has lost some 
of its “grit.” He mentioned how without that urban grit, it is no longer the same 
neighborhood. Another impact of redevelopment is the onslaught of suburban tourists to 
the neighborhood. The tourists can often be belligerent and disrespectful or even 
oblivious to the local culture. This creates further hostility between the longtime residents 
and the newcomers because longtime residents tend to “lump together” the newcomers 
and the tourists.  
There are also other quantifiable costs such as increased costs of municipal 
services, law enforcement, developer subsidies, infrastructural outlays, costs associated 
with the move, and sometimes, increased costs of homelessness. As previously 
mentioned, homelessness has associated costs related to mental health, physical health, 
encounters with law enforcement, substance abuse and housing. A 2006 study by the 
Partnership to End Long Term Homelessness finds that the 150,000 chronically homeless 
people in the United States cost $10.95 billion per year in public funds. When coupled 
with developer subsidies, infrastructural outlays, costs associated with increased police 
enforcement, and stabilization of adjacent neighborhoods, the monetary costs may in fact 
exceed the monetary benefits such as increased tax revenues. 
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When asked about social costs, just as it was difficult for opponents of 
redevelopment to talk about social benefits, proponents of redevelopment answered by 
discussing the positives of revitalization or answered by saying, “I don’t see any negative 
costs” (Key Informant). 
Since the 2000s, there have been new policies adopted that impose further social 
costs. At the federal level, the restructuring of Section 8 subsidized housing vouchers in 
2000, whereby the Section 8 voucher now moved with the person rather than being 
attached to the rental unit, resulted in an out-migration of low-income residents from 
OTR. This led to a weakening of the advocacy groups that used to exist in OTR, further 
diminishing their decision-making power. 
After the 2001 riots, the city of Cincinnati adopted the “Impaction Ordinance” in 
October of the same year. The Impaction Ordinance identified the concentration of 
subsidized housing in certain “impacted” neighborhoods as the core of the problem and 
proposed to deal with it by “forbid[ding] the City of Cincinnati from spending, approving 
or in any way condoning more subsidized low-income development in those areas 
deem[ed] impacted.” The ordinance also directed the city to “identify the neighborhoods 
that are impacted by an over-saturation of low-income residents,” and to “require that 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) monies that are designated for new low-
income development not be spent inside the City of Cincinnati until there is more 
equitable regional affordable housing” (Diskin and Dutton, 2002). The rhetoric used was 
that de-concentration of poverty was the solution to the city’s problem. However, by 
restricting affordable unit supply, the city further lowered the availability of affordable 
housing for the low-income population.  
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At a neighborhood level, the designation of OTR as the Historic District in 1983 
and as the most Endangered Historic Place in 2006 resulted in stricter fines for building 
violations that further impacted the low-income residents, causing displacement, as the 
fines were too costly for them to afford. While landlords were ultimately responsible for 
the fines, the costs were often passed on to the tenants in the form of increased rents, 
putting further economic pressure on tenants already living on shoestring-budgets. The 
designations also had an unintended consequence of promoting slum-lording as the 
longtime resident homeowners now had an incentive to let their properties fall into 
disrepair due to the onset of gentrification. As the buildings’ conditions worsened, the 
buildings became ripe for purchase by a developer or 3CDC. The next section discusses 
displacement, as it is occurring today. 
 
5.3. Displacement and Retention 
Displacement, within the context of gentrification, occurs when the lower-income 
indigent population is pushed out of the neighborhood due to various factors such as an 
increase in property values and rents, and is gradually replaced by a middle to upper-
middle income demographic. Although 3CDC and a few other constituents maintain that 
there has been no displacement, majority of the interviewees said that displacement had, 
in fact, occurred but that it was at a nominal scale and that the relocation was handled 
with respect and dignity. Although unable to track it, the corporate interviewees also 
asserted that those displaced were better off in the long run. Unfortunately, in traditional 
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gentrification studies, it is very difficult to track displacees – either numerically or 
geographically.  
When asked about displacement in OTR, consensus amongst developers was that 
there was displacement, however “those that were displaced, needed to be displaced” 
because they represented the criminal element in OTR. All developers also insisted that 
the buildings that they purchased to redevelop were vacant, run-down buildings. As one 
developer said, 
“I believe the objective is not to run people out, it’s to develop buildings 
that were basically vacant. It’s not like they’re coming in, buying run-
down residential units, kicking all the people out and then developing 
some high rise that only the uber, uber rich could afford.” 
3CDC’s response to the question of whether there had been displacement during 
the revitalization was that “with the exception of this building, every building we have 
purchased has been vacant…so we haven’t displaced anybody. Like I said, with the 
exception of this building…it wasn’t a place that these people wanted to live…so we 
actually helped pay for the relocation of the handful of residents in this building.” 
Speaking about the same building, a representative of an affordable housing 
developer described how “if you came down the street today, you’d have no idea that for 
40 years that building was alive with low-income families. There was a school across the 
street, and we had a market around the corner; a deli that served sandwiches…now you 
would never know that.” 




“[the redevelopment] has created a problem by moving folks who couldn’t 
afford to stay out into other communities, therefore putting pressure on 
those communities. It has moved, I believe, some criminal element out of 
OTR and to the West side of Cincinnati up to Clifton, complicating life up 
at University of Cincinnati, out into Westwood and Mt. Airy, and 
Corryville township. So that has been probably an unintended negative, 
unanticipated consequence…there is not intentional displacement of folks 
that want to live here.  
The city echoed this sentiment and a representative described displacement as one of the 
intangible costs of the redevelopment when he said,  
“Yes, there’s definitely been buildings that people have lived in that have 
been bought and turned into higher end condos and apartments. There is 
an attempt every time that happens to find housing for those people. 
Sometimes that housing is not in OTR.  
Yes. There has been a shift to the West side; we’re seeing a crime 
increase, and so, yes, there are specific examples where people have been 
displaced because of the redevelopment. It is not perfect and nothing ever 
will, but there is a real attempt to not gentrify OTR, and to make sure that 
any person that is displaced finds housing that they can afford…and that 
wherever it is, the amenities they need are also there.” 
When speaking to longtime residents, the underlying sentiment was a palpable 
fear of displacement and, for some, resentment that the redevelopment was not to benefit 
the longtime residents and instead geared toward the newcomers. Longtime residents and 
social service organizations recounted countless stories of displacement – of both 
residents and service providers (such as mom-and-pop stores and social service agencies). 
Some longtime residents talked about how stringent landlords had become with rents and 
utility bills, evicting residents over the slightest infraction. 
“If you live where I live…and walk the street…everywhere you look, 
everything is high end…and looking outside…I’m not going to be able to 
afford that. You just see the building and, you know, where are we gonna 
be…in ten, fifteen years when they get all of this situated? Where are the 
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low income people gonna be? I mean you got some, out here, in those 
apartments…they stay while they can but otherwise they’re not because 
they missed one calculation…moving all of us out. We’ve got families, 
children, they could be in school…they’re just moving all of us 
out…families being uprooted ‘cause they’re taking everything from us.” 
 “Out of sight, out of mind. Just go somewhere, we don’t want you.” 
 “After we moved out of there [20 years], they let a company move in 
there…after we moved out, the new company moved in, they increased the 
rent 20%. They fancied up the building and everything. I told my wife ‘we 
should call up the director and ask him why they didn’t fancy up the 
building when we lived there?’” 
Interviewees also mentioned how the displacement seemed to happen overnight. 
As one newcomer observed,  
“I noticed the other day…there’s a building at the corner of Clay and 
12
th…you can’t walk by without getting a contact high…and then I walked 
by the other day and I noticed a big dumpster outside and it had all new 
windows and no one was living there…and all I can think is those people 
were probably displaced because my guess is that they’re making them 
nice and new and shiny and it’s going to become higher income rent.” 
Based on participant observation, it seems that when 3CDC or other developers 
insist that they purchased vacant buildings, they seem to have blinders on and either truly 
do not see the value of the longtime residents who were displaced or are blind to the fact 
that the building became vacant after residents were moved out.  
One such example is a building called Columbia on the corner of 13
th
 and Walnut. 
Notorious for its drug activity and crime, the building houses tenants, who will likely be 
displaced as the building is renovated. Speaking with a representative of the first 
developer who purchased the building, he described the litter in the hallways and the 
horrid conditions of the apartments. As someone who was displaced himself as a child, he 
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said there is nothing wrong with displacement. In fact, he said, displacement was a 
positive thing based on his personal experience.  
However, when I attended tenant meetings, the overall atmosphere was that of 
confusion, helplessness, anger, and fear. Those apartments were their homes and had 
been their homes for years. Residents asked why the building could not be rehabbed for 
them and why the police did not show up when called until after the building was 
purchased. They did not understand their rights as tenants. The developer held a 
community wide meeting to tell the existing residents about their development plans and 
how the residents would get relocation assistance. The room was filled with people to the 
point where it was standing-room only. The presentation was confusing and many 
residents left the meeting not understanding their tenant rights. 
The building has since changed hands a couple times, and there seem to be no 
plans to put affordable housing units in the renovated building. 
 
5.3.1. The Displaced and Homeless 
 “Some people see creating poverty as criminal. And some people see big 
money corporations, big money developers force people to lose their 
housing; some people see that as criminal, too.” (Longtime resident) 
During in-depth interviews with those that had been displaced and ended up 
becoming homeless at some point in their lives, it became clear how pervasive the 
problem of displacement can be. All the interviewees took responsibility for ending up in 
an unfortunate situation. Most blamed drug and alcohol related problems, which resulted 
in them being evicted. One elderly interviewee described how when she was displaced, 
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she received no assistance, monetarily or administratively. Even when the interviewees 
sought to get out of homelessness, there were many impediments. As one formerly 
homeless interviewee described his situation, 
“But I have been…targeted because of my record. My record has actually 
passed. My record’s been clean for like the past 8 years and people still 
talkin’ about when I rent housing that they won’t rent to me because of my 
record, my previous record. And I thought after 7 years, all that would be 
over with.” 
The only option for those making an income and trying to stay off the streets is to 
rent from slumlords who have a vested interest in letting their buildings fall into disrepair 
due to the ongoing gentrification. The interviewee described how even when one tries to 
get out of homelessness, it is very difficult to do so because “being homeless is 
complicated.” He described how basic human needs such as hygiene and sleep were so 
difficult to come by. He explained how if one has to hold down a job which starts at 
7:00AM but the shower house opens at 8:00AM and then there are 35 people in front of 
you, it makes it nearly impossible to get to work. Even though there are several social 
service organizations that cater to the needs of the homeless (for example, food pantries 
and shower houses), navigating the system successfully was still an impediment to 
holding down a job due to sheer logistics such as transportation constraints or finding a 
place to sleep at night. 
During the course of my research, there was an ordinance passed that no longer 
allowed homeless people to sleep on the courthouse steps. The reasoning was that the 
homeless population was creating unsanitary conditions with defecation and urination 
near the courthouse steps. The Sherriff stated that the police will begin enforcement by 
asking the homeless to leave the courthouse steps, and that if they decline to do so, they 
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will be arrested. The Homeless Coalition of Greater Cincinnati has since sued the 
Sherriff’s department. As the Executive Director of the Homeless Coalition stated in an 
email dated October 17
th
, 2013, 
“Tonight, [the] Sheriff will have his deputies demand that people sleeping 
in front of the courthouse and justice center leave, threatening arrest if 
one does not leave.  Tonight will be a very hard night for the men and 
women who found relative safety on this public land.  People may be 
arrested; others will flee into alley ways, under bridges, in front of 
businesses, into abandoned buildings and other unsafe locations.  Those 
who have slept at the courthouse and justice center will lose their safety in 
numbers.  They will lose their ability to fend off possible attackers through 
numbers.  Tonight is a sad night in Hamilton County.  [The] Sheriff has 
decided to push people with nowhere safe to go even further into the 
margins. When people needed to be fed, clothed, visited and housed, [the] 
Sheriff will cast them away tonight.” 
When asked about the courthouse steps situation, a developer explained how he 
could see both sides but mentioned how creating a balance is difficult, and that he did not 
necessarily agree with the ordinance at this point. He also pointed out that the homeless 
did have options and chose not to use them. He did not provide any examples of such 
options. 
The stricter police controls and resulting revanchism are reminiscent of the days 
of “Operation Vortex” in the 1980s when the police were aggressively cleaning up the 
streets which led to further marginalization of the poor and the homeless (Diskin and 
Dutton, 2006). Today, although the police have become more tolerant of the homeless 
population, there is still an underlying layer of mistrust. One homeless person recounted a 
story where he felt he was discriminated against for being homeless. He explained how 
he was cited (usually this means a ticket or an arrest) for drinking beer outside while the 
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patrons of the bars on Vine Street were allowed to openly drink beer outside and were not 
cited for doing so. 
While many of the more fortunate in our society believe that the homeless are 
homeless due to their own inaction, one formerly homeless interviewee described the 
crux of homelessness: 
“Homelessness is like a no-way-out situation…if nobody’s going to help 
you. People say help yourself first and then people will help you…but 
then…I noticed my self esteem was very low…you have to have a concrete 
mind to be homeless ‘cause it’s enough to drive anybody crazy…I 
wouldn’t wish it on my worst enemy.” 
 
5.3.2. “People in the margins” 
One unexpected finding revolved around the question of homelessness and 
choice. Of the six displaced interviewees, two were homeless due to personal choice. One 
interviewee, a young white male, described how he was evicted from place to place and 
ended up migrating from Dayton to Cincinnati, and ultimately, to OTR. He described 
how much he loved OTR because there were so many service organizations to provide 
food and basic necessities. When asked where he slept at night, he said the key was to 
have several different spots so as to avoid police interference. He said he slept in alley 
ways, under the bridge, by the river and other places. He had no intention of joining one 
of the many programs geared toward getting people out of homelessness through 
rehabilitative supportive services and to ultimately finding housing. He said he needed a 
good all-purpose-weather backpack to carry his belongings. After the lunch interview 
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was over, he said he had to rush to DF food pantry because they handed out sandwiches 
at 2:00PM. 
The second interviewee was a female in her late 50s. She used to pay market rate 
rents but eventually became homeless. She lost custody of her three children and had 
been homeless for two and a half years at the time of the interview. She said she had 
never been happier in her life. She described how she felt a greater sense of spirituality 
and community which she had never experienced before. She explained how she did not 
have a mental illness or a substance abuse problem, which meant she could not take 
advantage of many of the social service programs. But, she refused to get on food stamps 
because of the many people who abused the system. She said she had not received any 
governmental assistance for five years and did not plan on applying for it. At the time of 
the interview, she was writing a memoir of her life story and spirituality, using the local 
library computers. She described that her next step would be to get her GED and then to 
go back to school to become a social worker. When asked about finding housing, she said 
it would happen in a month because “the Lord only gives you as much as you can 
handle.” 
All displaced interviewees said they were humbled and found a resiliency that 
they did not know they possessed. One interviewee explained how he felt a sense of relief 
because he had hit rock bottom and how he had anticipated the worst and now that it had 
happened, he knew he could make it through other adversities in life. Along with a sense 
of empowerment, all interviewees described an increase in their level of spirituality. They 
also described finding a strong community of brethren who helped each other and looked 
out for one another.  
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5.4. Revitalization vs. Gentrification 
The term gentrification has many negative connotations, in particular, the concept 
of displacement. When conducting in-depth interviews, it was easy to determine whether 
the interviewee was pro-redevelopment or anti-redevelopment by listening to the 
language that they used. Proponents referred to redevelopment as “revitalization” or even 
“a renaissance” while opponents simply chose to use the word “gentrification.” 
When asked specifically about the term gentrification and what it meant within 
the context of OTR, some interviewees laughed outright. Unexpectedly, a longtime 
resident took offense to the term and to the study itself when she said, 
“So when you called and said I’m doing a report on gentrification, that 
was a slap. We’re not gentrifying. We are not asking anyone to move 
out…nobody is being forced out; we are simply filling in the vacancies 
around them in a way that hopefully connects people and raises the level 
of living for everybody.” 
When asked why people used the term gentrification, she believed that it was essentially 
a bad case of semantics, 
“I think it’s ignorance. I don’t mean stupid; I just mean not being familiar 
with the term that they’re using and what’s really going on. I think if you 
wanted to do a quick label, that’s a word that you grab. It’s got a lot of 
punch, that word does right now, it’s got a lot of punch. So if you wanted 
to get a headline, or if you wanted to get some attention, you know it’s a 
word. It’s not the right word.” 
She went on to describe how one of the developers builds affordable housing in 
addition to market rate housing. Upon completion of the units, the original, low-income 
residents have the option to move back in (albeit with stringent requirements and 
background checks). “It’s not that they can’t come back in, it’s because they choose not 
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to come back in,” she said. This particular developer declined to meet with me for an 
interview so I was unable to get any further details on such situations. 
One developer answered by saying, “I don’t believe in gentrification and I also 
don’t believe in displacement.” Other, primarily corporate interests were softer in their 
approach and saw gentrification as a positive phenomenon, especially because it creates a 
mixed community. As some interviewees described it, 
“It’s a buzz word. I don’t think it’s healthy for any community to lack 
diversity…if gentrification mixes poor, affluent, black and white, what’s 
wrong with it?” 
“From a utilitarian point of view, more good is being accomplished than 
bad.” 
“There is some gentrification, there’s no doubt about that but I don’t think 
in this particular situation, it’s a bad thing. I don’t think gentrification has 
to be a bad thing. OTR has certain buildings…that will always be 
subsidized. And then you have market rate. Everybody gets along…it’s a 
diverse culture…you have to have a mix.” 
A longtime resident also described how the term was now being used in a positive 
manner, 
“And gentrification now is a term that people use in the positive. I heard it 
used in a positive way…people knew it was a pejorative term…but I heard 
it…on the radio [on NPR]. It wasn’t about this community but it was just 
in general. ‘oh yes, the gentrification of da-da-da…it does all this 
greatness, it does all these wonderful things’…and so there’s a movement 
afoot to embrace the term and say yeah, that is what we’re doing.” 
A representative of the city commented on the complexity of the concept by saying, 
“When you say something like gentrification, that just makes it so simple 
and clean; good and bad. It’s not like that. 
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I think the term gentrification was an easy way to paint with a broad 
brush…and usually it was done by the social service folks that were 
getting paid to kind of guard their turf…you say it’s complex because it’s 
in the context of a simply framed argument when the argument should 
never be framed that way.” 
Another interviewee had a similar response when he said “as a historian, I kinda 
see that as an un-useful term because it denies the fact that through time you get these 
ebbs and flows of economic development.” 
When newcomers were asked about the term gentrification within the context of 
OTR, the responses were mixed. Some newcomers believed that in OTR, the 
demographic change could not be described as gentrification because they did not 
personally know of anyone getting displaced. A newcomer described how when squatters 
are removed from abandoned buildings that are then renovated, “[he did not] think that 
renovating that building they were in was gentrification. [He believed that] that was 
saving a building…and facilitating the process of those people finding housing that 
wasn’t third world…developing country.” 
Another newcomer did believe that the revitalization was, in fact, gentrification. 
She was almost apologetic when she described her experience. 
“It does bother me that the neighborhood’s become so gentrified, even 
though I know I’m part of the problem by moving down here and inflating 
the rents and driving lower income people out…I try to become part of the 
neighborhood…because I know I’m part of this influx of new money into 
the neighborhood. I wanna be the example like look, we’re not here to run 
you out of your homes; we wanna just be a part of the neighborhood. It is 
part of the authentic experience I wanna have.” 
With the exception of the previously mentioned longtime resident, when other 
longtime residents were asked about the term, as anticipated, their responses were on the 
120 
 
other end of the spectrum. One longtime resident explained the distinction between the 
terms as follows: 
“I hate the term revitalization…’cause it’s always about money. This was 
a very vibrant neighborhood in 1968; just didn’t have any money. People 
kept talking about revitalizing it all…we’re not dead…thousands of people 
lived here…give us money and we can revitalize…but no, they don’t want 
to do that… just move people out…spray paint it…bring new people in.” 
He then went on to say how the revitalization in one neighborhood occurs at the 
expense of other neighborhoods as “people move with their problems elsewhere.” He 
explained how current policies “don’t help people solve their problems…don’t invest in 
people as they invest in the buildings.” 
A representative of a social service organization had a more comprehensive and 
nuanced definition of the term gentrification when he said, 
“Gentrification is an interesting word. And depending on the individual 
you talk to, it can be an enlightening, educational kind of concept to 
discuss; it can be a motivational concept from which to protest, or to 
move, or to get socially active or politically active. It can be a concept to 
bury and to hide and to work against in order to achieve your aims, your 
ends, you goals for building and construction. And so it really depends on 
your purpose, your intent and who you are and what you’re doing as to 
what that word means, whether it’s positive or negative or somewhere in 
between.” 
As Marcuse (1985) points out, gentrification can take two different forms: direct 
and indirect. A representative of a social service organization explained how 
gentrification in OTR took three different forms, 
“The ground level of gentrification for us probably has two different 
parts; one is often a group like 3CDC will come in to kind of a mom-and-
pop landlord who owns one to three buildings…and says to them ‘hey, 
your building needs some work….we’ll buy it from you and we’ll give you 
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a profit on it.’ Some people say ‘no, I’m not interested’ and other people, 
it’s a big deal for them and they have the conversation and then the 
company can say ‘well, we will buy it from you but the only way is if you 
get everyone that is in there out.’ And so then that landlord can put up the 
rent or find some other way of evicting people and the company who 
bought it says ‘well, we never evicted anybody.’  
The other means would be that they actually themselves do buy directly 
and kick people out or probably a third is more indirect that they take off, 
take over all the commercial space, run out local businesses that benefit 
the neighborhood; run out the places people use and make it hard to live 
here…that would be the indirect gentrification.” 
Based on participant observations, focus group interviews, in-depth interviews, 
and subsequent analysis, it seems that in OTR there has been a significant amount of 
indirect gentrification. Over the past few years, many mom-and-pop stores catering to the 
needs of low income residents have closed down – either due to political pressure or 
economic pressure – it is difficult to determine. One example that kept coming up was the 
fact that there was no longer a laundromat in OTR which worsened the bed-bug problem 
in the subsidized housing units. As one longtime resident described it, 
“gentrification is purposefully closing those businesses [mom-and-pop 
stores]. So the Laundromat that would be supported and…low income 
people that would go there because it existed…now they have to drive up 
to Clifton. So it isn’t here, not because of the need…but it’s not the kind of 
business that they want to have on Vine Street.  
They want a bar, a hoity-toity restaurant and some knick knack shop. And 
that’s the three things, if you don’t fit that, you’re not going to get a 
business there. There was a wig shop that was on the corner; right now 
it’s a bar…the wig shop didn’t go out of business – it moved. Plenty of 
corner stores are now closed because of the people hanging out in them. 
And then they are replaced with art galleries and other things that don’t 
service anybody or hardly anybody. So it isn’t a factor of just a shrinking 
community and lack of demand, it is purposeful lack of wanting those 
businesses to exist in this neighborhood.” 
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The overarching sentiment amongst longtime residents is that even if they wanted 
to patronize the new bars, restaurants, art galleries, and other establishments, it would be 
very cost-prohibitive for them to do so. One longtime resident went a step further and 
implied that this was an intentional tactic when he said, “And I think that’s what it is, 
they want to make the neighborhood unaffordable to low income people.” 
Whether this longtime resident’s assertions are true or not, there still remains 
enough evidence of indirect gentrification. The increasing rents and the diminishing 
services are leading to a tangible form of displacement. It is very difficult to track 
displacement, however, there are many anecdotal stories speaking to a very real 
phenomenon of gentrification. 
If we were to revisit the definition used by Lees et al. (2008), and further 
operationalized in this dissertation, there are four parts to consider. Lees et al. (2008) 
record the key elements of gentrification as follows: 
1. The reinvestment of capital 
2. The social upgrading of locale by incoming high-income groups 
3. Landscape change 
4. Direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups 
In the case of OTR, my findings suggest that there is, in fact, indirect 
gentrification, and not revitalization, that is taking place. There is a significant amount of 
capital that is being invested into the redevelopment of OTR (economic restructuring). 
The funds primarily come from 3CDC, the city, and the corporate community. There has 
certainly been an increase in homeownership rates as a more affluent class moves into the 
neighborhood (social reconfiguration). 
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In order to attract the middle- to upper-middle income residents to OTR, there has 
been substantial change to the landscape as the old Italianate buildings are gutted and 
rehabbed (physical transformation). Finally, although difficult to track, there are a 
plethora of anecdotal accounts that speak to the displacement that has occurred and will 
continue to occur. 
As redevelopment in OTR continues at a rapid pace, the city’s neoliberal agenda 
is being realized via a “back to the city” movement by the middle- to upper-middle class. 
The city, 3CDC, the developers, and the corporate community are providing the 
necessary structure to ensure that gentrification, under the guise of revitalization, 
continues to occur. The longtime residents, social service organizations, and advocacy 
groups have been side-lined as they are either not involved or not listened to during 
redevelopment plans. The displacement of longtime residents is also weakening their 
voice and decision-making power. This “top-down,” developer-driven redevelopment 
process is witness to a devolution and privatization of state power. The changing 
constitution of OTR, physically, economically, socially, and politically, is a testament to 
a dilution of the democratic process and the city’s accountability to its citizens.  
The city claims that it is realizing an increase in tax receipts. However, 
approximately 50% of new homeowners moved from within the city, undermining the 
city’s claim of increased revenues. There are increased revenues; however, the indigent 
population is not benefiting monetarily in any way (for example, via additional jobs). 
Instead, it is a select group of people, such as the new businesses and the developers, and 
all the parties (lawyers, syndicators, to name a few) involved in the “deal”, that can claim 
profits. The indigent population is not realizing the social benefits from the 
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redevelopment and is instead bearing the bulk of social costs associated with the 
redevelopment. 
The next concluding chapter summarizes key findings and then discusses the 
significance of this study, with special emphasis on policy issues and recommendations, 





















The goal of this study was to determine the social costs and benefits of 
gentrification using qualitative methods in a case study format. Qualitative methods were 
used to gain a deeper understanding of the gentrification process. By interviewing all the 
actors in the process, from city officials, to 3CDC, to developers, to social service 
organizations, to newcomers, to longtime residents, and to the displaced and homeless, I 
was truly able to gain a holistic understanding of the social costs and benefits of 
gentrification through multiple lenses. The study was informed by existing scholarly 
literature on gentrification and framed by the overarching research questions presented in 
Chapter 1 and again in Chapter 3. The research questions are as follows: 
1.  What is the rationale for redeveloping Over-the-Rhine? 
2. What are the relationship dynamics amongst various actors in the redevelopment 
efforts? 
3. Who has decision making power? 
4. What are the perceived social costs and benefits of gentrification? 
Each umbrella question is further analyzed in Section 6.1. 
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Chapter 2 turned to existing literature on gentrification. It first discussed the 
social production of space, with particular emphasis on how and why uneven 
development occurs and space becomes a commodity. Next, it delved into the definition 
and explanations of gentrification, situating it within a historic context. It then discussed 
the political, economic, and social factors shaping gentrification today, with particular 
emphasis on the various actors that influence redevelopment.  
The political dimension focused on how the role of the state has changed over the 
past few decades, particularly with reference to urban renewal. As the focus for cities has 
shifted to economic development, the government’s role has morphed from being a 
regulator of development to a facilitator of development. Such facilitation has occurred 
using tools such as tax subsidies and public-private partnerships, thereby spurring 
gentrification in disinvested urban neighborhoods. The economic dimension focused on 
the inter-relatedness between global capital and gentrification. In OTR, gentrification has 
become a very developer-driven process with financial backing from the city and 
corporate community. Thus, economic development decisions rest in the hands of the 
business elite, with longtime residents having very little to no voice in the development 
plans.  
The social dimension focused on resistance movements, beginning with the most 
renown and well-documented violent clash at Tompkins Park Square in Lower East Side 
in 1988. Scholarly literature finds that anti-gentrification resistance movements have 
weakened in scope, although they still exist in many communities (Hackworth, 2002; 
Fainstein and Fainstein, 1991; Lees et al., 2008). This diminished power is due to the 
displacement of core activists (reducing the voice of the group) and greater difficulty 
127 
 
coordinating community organizing in a neoliberal state (DeFillipis, 2004; Newman and 
Lake, 2006; Lees et al. 2008). 
The chapter concluded by enumerating the costs and benefits of gentrification. 
Scholarly literature finds that the greatest cost of gentrification is displacement (LeGates 
and Hartman, 1981, 1986; Lyons, 1996; Newman and Wyly, 2006) and the erosion of 
social capital. The greatest benefits include increased tax revenues, social mixing through 
the de-concentration of poverty, and a general upgrading of the disinvested 
neighborhood. 
Chapter 3 first provided details on the site chosen the case study, Over-the-Rhine. 
It then provided a framework of analysis via a discussion of the overarching research 
questions. These questions centered around the who, why, and how of gentrification. As 
such, a case study was most suitable to gather rich data. OTR was chosen as the site for 
the case study because it has often been described as a prototype for gentrification in 
scholarly literature (Addie, 2008; Dutton, 2007; Maag, 2006; Miller and Tucker, 1998; 
Scheer and Ferdelman, 2001; Smith and Faegin, 1995; Waymer, 2012; Wyly and 
Hammel, 2004). The gentrification taking place in OTR is a very state-driven, developer-
driven process, with the decision-making power resting solely in the hands of the 
business elite. Although there has been much research done on OTR, nobody has studied 
the social costs and benefits of gentrification using a qualitative approach. 
The research questions and interview questions were structured to explore the 
dynamics of the gentrification process and gain insight into the complex web of actors 
and activities that facilitate the process. Furthermore, the open-ended format of 
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interviews, participant observation, a focus group, and print media illuminated the 
nuances of the social costs and benefits of the process. The interviewees included all the 
actors involved in the gentrification process and were identified using snowball sampling 
and systematic random sampling methods. By utilizing the responsive interviewing 
model, it was possible to gain a deeper understanding of the gentrification process from 
multiple lenses. 
Chapter 4 discussed the findings of the study, first providing a context for the case 
study. It then discussed the impact of redevelopment on various segments of society: 
longtime residents; newcomers; and social service organizations. Understandably, while 
the newcomers, developers, 3CDC, and city officials were excited about the 
redevelopment efforts, the longtime residents, social service organizations, and advocacy 
groups feared the reality of potential displacement. Therefore, OTR has become a very 
divided community. The chapter further delved into the interactions between newcomers 
and longtime residents as well as those between the corporate community and the social 
service organizations. While civil, the interactions were strained and perfunctory at best. 
Chapter 5 presented an analysis of gentrification in OTR, with particular emphasis 
on the social costs and benefits of the process. It gave insight into the phenomenon of 
displacement and those that have been displaced or are currently homeless. Some 
unexpected findings included benefits such as a “trickle-up” effect, in which the benefit 
accrues to the more affluent newcomer rather than the “disenfranchised” indigent 
individual. Other unexpected findings included the fact that all displacees felt a sense of 
empowerment and a greater sense of spirituality after experiencing the hardships of 
displacement. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the distinction between the 
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often interchangeable terms ‘revitalization’ and ‘gentrification.’ As the interviewer, I had 
to be careful about my word choice, especially when it came to the politically charged 
terms ‘revitalization’ and ‘gentrification.’ It was easy to determine whether the 
interviewee was a proponent or an opponent of redevelopment by simply listening to 
their word choices. Proponents used the words ‘revitalization,’ ‘urban renewal,’ and even 
‘a renaissance,’ while opponents chose to simply use the word ‘gentrification.’  
This chapter summarizes key findings, discusses the significance of the study with 
special emphasis on policy recommendations, its limitations, and areas for further 
research. 
 
6.1. Summary of Findings 
The following section revisits the umbrella questions that shaped the study. 
1. What is the rationale for redeveloping Over-the-Rhine? 
Today, the redevelopment taking place in OTR is the product of political, social, 
and economic factors, molding inner-city development according to a planned agenda. 
OTR’s valuable location between the Central Business District to the south and the 
medical and university community to the north makes it ripe for redevelopment. My 
findings suggest that the revitalization that is currently taking place in OTR is a classic 
case of gentrification. The fact that 3CDC exists and is redeveloping OTR in such a 
methodical, strategic manner is consistent with the change in the form of gentrification 
itself. In the decades prior to 2000, gentrification was an organic process, where artists 
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moved into a disinvested neighborhood due to the low rents and upgraded the housing 
stock, attracting other artists, and ultimately pushing the original residents out due to 
increasing property values and rents. Today, gentrification has become a systematic, 
strategic, and deliberate state-driven process, as witnessed in OTR.  
2. What are the relationship dynamics amongst various actors in the redevelopment 
efforts? 
The relationships between the various actors can be described as being cohesive 
and strained at the same time. Proponents of redevelopment include city officials, 3CDC, 
the developers, the corporate interests, and the newcomers. Opponents of redevelopment 
include the longtime residents, social service organizations, advocacy groups, and the 
displaced and homeless. There is a strong sense of divisiveness within the community. 
The qualitative methodology used provided for a much deeper understanding of 
gentrification from which to draft better policy solutions. For example, through snowball 
sampling, it was easier to gain a better understanding of the interactions between 
newcomers and longtime residents – an antagonistic situation that could easily be 
remedied through concerted efforts at community building. I was also able to give voice 
to those that had been displaced. Grounded in “lived reality,” I was able to truly 
understand what is meant by “social capital,” the erosion of which leads to increased 
costs such as an increased need for social services or, worst case scenario, the increased 
costs associated with homelessness. 
The form in which redevelopment occurs promotes and exacerbates cultural 
alienation among the longtime residents and the newcomers. There appear to be two 
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separate communities within one neighborhood. While newcomers are attracted to the 
“diversity” in OTR, they fail to integrate within the existing community. The relationship 
between the two groups, though civil, is extremely tense, as is most visible in the OTR 
Community Council meetings. The pro-redevelopment groups currently hold all decision 
making power, leaving the rest of the community feeling vulnerable and voiceless. 
3. Who has decision making power? 
The development currently underway is spearheaded by 3CDC, with financial and 
political backing from the city and the corporate community. The creation of 3CDC itself 
speaks to the fact that the city of Cincinnati has adopted a neoliberal agenda. The 
devolution of state power has resulted in policies that promote gentrification. Since 
3CDC’s board primarily consists of representatives from major corporations in 
Cincinnati, the decision-making power rests in the hands of elite interests. The neoliberal 
agenda devalues the democratic process, not giving voice to those most affected by 
gentrification. By ignoring the reality of displacement, the city is further marginalizing its 
low-income population. As a key informant put it, 
“Instead of wanting to look the other way, Cincinnati needs to 
acknowledge, ‘hey, we’re displacing people, and it’s going to cost 
somebody some money. We get a federal grant, a state grant, we increase 
payroll taxes so that we can pay for that,’ you know…we resist collective 
solutions, so right now we have part of a policy that says gentrify, and no 
policy that says here is how we need to address the consequences of that 
to protect everybody; to make sure that it’s win-win for 
everybody…because there’s no compelling argument for maintaining a 
neighborhood where the crime rate’s always going to be high; where the 
children are too early exposed to sex and violence; that most of the kids 
are going to drop out of school. The just-to-maintain a ghetto policy is 
absurd and to try to wipe it out overnight is even more absurd.” 
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4. What are the perceived social costs and benefits of gentrification? 
By utilizing the responsive interviewing model, I was able to gain a very nuanced 
understanding of the social costs and benefits of gentrification, as presented in Chapter 5. 
The interviewees mentioned that safety and the redevelopment of Washington Park 
(which promotes social mixing) were the most tangible benefits. There were also other 
social benefits in the form of landscape beautification, an upgrading of utilities, and an 
increase in home ownership and civic pride.  
An unexpected finding, not presented in existing literature, was the positive 
“trickle-up” effect from social mixing. Byrne (2003) discusses the positive “trickle-
down” effects, however, existing literature does not point to any positive trickle-up 
effects. It is also interesting to note that opponents of redevelopment had a difficult time 
answering the question and were not able to see any social benefits beyond beautification. 
The most noticeable social cost was displacement of social service organizations, 
mom-and-pop stores, and longtime residents. Thus, the indigent population was the only 
population losing their social support networks. They were also the only ones not gaining 
monetarily from the redevelopment in the form of new jobs or increased opportunities. 
As the demographics of the place change, the very essence of the neighborhood is 
changing. Also, via displacement, there is instability in the new neighborhoods creating 
angst between other neighborhoods and OTR. Just as the opponents of redevelopment 




Another unexpected finding revolved around the questions of homelessness and 
choice and disenfranchisement and empowerment. While existing literature points to the 
displaced being voiceless and helpless, two of the six displacees interviewed in this study 
were homeless due to personal choice. Displacees are also presented as being powerless. 
However, all the interviewed displacees said they were empowered, felt resilient, and 
more spiritual after being displaced. One of them also said that she had never been 
happier in her life.  
The next section discusses the significance of this study, with special emphasis on 
policy recommendations. 
 
6.2. Significance of Study 
This dissertation adds to existing literature by illuminating the social costs and 
benefits of the gentrification process using a qualitative methodology, which will enable 
cities to draft better policy solutions. 
Gentrification is occurring in many cities. By undertaking a social cost-benefit 
analysis, a city can understand true costs such as an increase in resources to stabilize 
adjacent neighborhoods, and take policy actions to mitigate these negative realities of 
gentrification. Cities that are considering revitalizing their urban core areas need to gain a 
holistic tally of the costs and benefits of such an undertaking by going beyond just a 
profitability analysis. A qualitative assessment presents an economic understanding by 
going beyond the numbers and incorporating the social costs and benefits of the process.  
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OTR should be used as a prototype, not for successful revitalization, but instead, 
as a learning lesson for what can be done better. I think before a city undertakes a 
revitalization project, it needs to very carefully consider creating or changing policy so 
that the new community is a truly mixed-income, integrated community. As such, the 
next section presents some policy recommendations for Cincinnati as well as other cities 
that are considering revitalizing their urban core. 
 
6.2.1. Policy Recommendations 
Cincinnati has methodically adopted policies to attract the middle- to upper-
middle class back to the city in order to improve its tax base. There are no policies in 
place that protect the low-income population that is getting displaced. I believe that it is 
possible for a city to revitalize its urban core while protecting its marginalized citizens by 
carefully assessing its current policies and creating policy solutions that mitigate the 
negative consequences of gentrification. A case in point, as mentioned before, is the 
neighborhood of Prenzlauer Berg in eastern Berlin, where revitalization occurred in a 
much more balanced way by focusing on “community participation, local job creation… 
and forming partnerships among churches, charities, and community-based associations” 
(Levine, 2004, p. 104). 
When drafting policy, the first question to consider is ‘who benefits?’. Current 
policy only benefits the city, 3CDC, the developers, the corporate community, and the 
newcomers. The longtime residents, social service organizations, and the displaced and 
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homeless have been left out of the equation. In order to create a more equitable, balanced 
approach to revitalization, I propose the following policy recommendations. 
Just cause eviction laws protect renters by ensuring that landlords can only evict 
with proper cause. Cities, such as New York, San Francisco, Chicago, LA, DC, New 
Jersey, and Seattle, to name a few, have adopted just cause eviction laws and have a 
detailed list of reasons for just cause eviction, the most obvious being failure to pay rent 
or destruction of property (Greater Cincinnati Homeless Coalition). Landlords who fail to 
comply face strict penalties. Compliance must be monitored by a government agency; for 
example, in San Francisco, it is the San Francisco Rent Board. 
Rent control policies, often used in conjunction with just cause eviction policies, 
protect tenants by ensuring gradual rent increases. Today, rent control policies exist in 
140 jurisdictions (Ibid.). Both just cause eviction and rent control, especially when used 
together, stabilize the rental market, increase tenant stability, prevent rapid rent increases, 
and ultimately stabilize the entire community. It is also a deterrent to displacement and 
ensures that longtime residents can also enjoy the increased standard of living that is the 
goal of revitalization. It also helps toward creating a sustainable mixed-income 
community. 
Resident stock ownership in CDC projects is an emerging strategy that is 
currently being explored by several CDCs around the country. While not yet fully 
implemented, the program would provide low- income/low-wealth residents the 
opportunity to invest in neighborhood commercial real estate projects carried out by 
CDCs (PolicyLink).  
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Ownership in CDC projects gives residents a vested interest in economic 
development activities in their communities. It gives them a voice in the development 
process and gives them the opportunity to play a new role: one of stakeholder, 
shareholder, and partner with the CDC and other investors. As community assets 
appreciate, the residents’ assets also appreciate. This leads to greater family security 
while at the same time building a mixed-income community. Most importantly, it creates 
a mutual desire for economic development amongst the longtime residents and the 
corporate community (Ibid.). 
There is a strong push for Cincinnati to adopt an anti-displacement policy. In 
fact, one of the incumbents for City Council, Mike Moroski, ran on this platform. 
According to him, anti-displacement policy accomplishes four major goals:  
1) discourages slum lording,  
2) protects and increases the city’s affordable housing stock,  
3) promotes more equitable development in all 52 neighborhoods, and  
4) increases the safety of everyone in the City: In his words, 
 
 “when more people are housed, there is less crime – when there is less 
crime, there are less people in prison – when there are less people in 
prison, there are more people participating in the economy and everyone 
is better off for it.” 
 
An anti-displacement ordinance however has been discussed since the early 1990s but 
has not passed muster because of political opposition. 
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An inclusionary zoning program is essentially a tax on new housing 
development; developers are required to provide a proportion of housing units at a below-
market rate price, which is only sometimes partially offset by government-subsidies. At 
the below-market price, the developer will either lose money or accept a reduced profit 
by building those units, making it a somewhat controversial tool (Dietderich, 1996).  
Another option may be to require a one-for-one replacement or a percentage of 
funding received by the developer to be set aside for affordable housing. 
There are also some “softer” approaches that the city and 3CDC can undertake. 
Certainly, there needs to be greater communication and inclusiveness in the development 
plans. The city or 3CDC can implement community wide meetings so that everyone is 
working toward mutually beneficial goals. Garnering support from local churches, social 
service organizations, charities, and community-based organizations would go a long way 
towards reducing tensions between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” Creating a 
transparency in process and having open dialogue between all members of the 
community would ensure a more democratic process that gives voice to every citizen, 
regardless of her socioeconomic status. Open communication also provides for an 
educational opportunity as each side learns more about the motivations of the other. It is 
also critical to develop a skilled labor force through job training programs. This task 
can be undertaken by the city or by 3CDC. Additionally, the city could require new 
businesses to hire a certain percentage of their workforce from the local population. This 
would lead to additional job training, and make sure that some of the new wealth is 
captured by the local residents. 
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Additionally, there is a need for social service organizations geared toward 
helping those without substance abuse issues or mental health problems. This would 
reduce some of the homelessness. A displaced person gave an example of a boyfriend 
being kicked out of the home he had been sharing with his girlfriend. If he did not suffer 
from a mental illness or substance abuse issues, he would not be able to take advantage of 
the social service programs that are currently available. If there were such supportive 
services available, it would be a good means to reduce some of the homelessness. 
Moreover, there is an acute need for supportive services for those that have been 
displaced. Comparable access to social services would improve the lives of the low-
income population, reducing some of the stress associated with moving. It would also be 
very beneficial to factor in commuting distances to the workplace, ensuring retention of 
employment. This could perhaps be accomplished via bus vouchers, or some other form 
of subsidized transportation. 
Of the previous policy recommendations, it would be very advantageous for the 
city of Cincinnati to adopt just cause eviction and rent control policies, immediately 
stabilizing the neighborhood and reducing displacement. This will not only benefit the 
existing residents of OTR, it will also have a wider stabilization effect on adjacent 
neighborhoods. Furthermore, it will also ensure a truly mixed-income community. 
However, it is important to note that, in OTR, the positive impacts of such policies will 
be limited due to the high vacancy rates (62.8%). 
It would similarly be easy for the city to adopt policies requiring developers to set 
aside a certain percentage of subsidies for affordable housing or have a one-for-one 
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replacement policy. This would not only offset some of the costs from developer 
subsidies, but also reduce costs associated with homeless. I also strongly propose that the 
city consider resident stock ownership programs. Doing so immediately makes economic 
redevelopment a mutual goal for the longtime residents and the corporate interests, 
reducing the existing divisiveness within the community. This could be accomplished by 
the issuance of vouchers to longtime residents who meet certain criteria (such as income-
level, employment, number of dependents, length of residency in OTR, background 
checks, and an agreement to forfeit the voucher if the resident moves out of OTR, to 
name a few), for investment into 3CDC capital projects. Since displacement is occurring, 
the city needs to make certain that they are providing the necessary supportive services 
for the displacees. 
 
6.3. Limitations of study 
There are inherent strengths and weaknesses to the case study format. Weaknesses 
include the sheer amount of data that needs to be analyzed. For this study, there were 
approximately 90 plus hours of non-stop interviews that needed to be listened to, 
analyzed, thematically organized, and interpreted. Another limitation is that the 
complexity of the data is difficult to express simply. The data does not lend itself to 
numerical representation and is not generalizable in the conventional sense. There are 
also doubts about objectivity, preconceived notions, and interpretation by the audience. 
There are also many strengths to the case study format. It can help us understand 
complex, inter-relationships that facilitate a rich understanding of the phenomenon. Case 
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studies are grounded in “lived reality” which facilitates a deeper exploration of complex 
issues. The depth and complexity of case study data can illuminate the ways in which 
such correlated factors influence each other. And, case studies can be transposed beyond 
the original site of study.  
Sample size: Some might argue that the sample size is a limitation. However, in 
this study, I did reach a point of theoretical saturation. 
Displaced residents: It is very difficult to track down displaced residents because 
once moved, it breaks their social networks. Addresses and phone numbers change, 
making it very difficult to track down the displacees. If this study were to be attempted at 
a larger scale, it would be very difficult to track down those that have been displaced. 
 
6.4. Areas for Further Research 
While this study adds to the literature by presenting an economic tally of the 
social costs and benefits of gentrification, it can be taken one step further by 
incorporating a social accounting approach. Social Benefit Cost Analysis (SBCA) can be 
used to monetarize the “intangibles,” further buffering a traditional Cost Benefit Analysis 
(CBA). SBCA measures the impacts of the project on society as a whole by utilizing an 
accounting of public costs and benefits in addition to traditional costs and benefits. By 
utilizing SBCA, one can monetarize the costs of displacement and homelessness as well 
as the benefits of beautification and increased safety, determining whether the true 
benefits exceed the true costs of revitalization. 
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Another area for future research may include a case study of the Columbia 
building on the corner of 13
th
 and Walnut (previously discussed in Section 5.3). It was 
recently purchased by developers for renovation. The building houses tenants who will 
likely be displaced as the building is renovated. By following the renovation and 
relocation process through a qualitative study, one could gather rich data from the future 
displacees, in addition to the developers, 3CDC, the city and other actors involved in the 
project. Such a study would also enable me to further delve into the concepts of 
displacement and empowerment, which was an unexpected finding in this study. 
Moreover, it will provide some means to track displacees, an inherent shortcoming of 
gentrification-related studies. 
A third area of interest is the changing constitution among CDCs and its 
implication on community development. As is to be expected in a gentrifying 
neighborhood, there is a very large anti-redevelopment sentiment among the longtime 
residents. By default, this means that the advocacy group is against the CDC since it 
plays the role of main developer. This almost seems antithetical to the traditional function 
of a CDC where it acts as a liaison between the community and the city. As CDCs adapt 
to changing political environments, it would be very interesting to study which approach 
– top down (city initiated) or bottom up (citizen initiated) – is most useful to the health of 
a city and its citizens.  
Another striking phenomenon is the existence of acute homelessness amongst a 
bevy of vacant buildings. It would be very useful to draft policy solutions that mitigate 
the ill-effects of vacancy and provide housing for the homeless. As such, another aspect 
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of my research would focus on the relationship between vacancy rates and homelessness, 
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(i). Common Questions for Key Informants (City, Chamber of Commerce, and 
Cincinnati Center City Development Corporation) 
1. Why was Over-the-Rhine (OTR) chosen as an area for revitalization? 
a. Did you draw inspiration from revitalization projects in other cities? 
i. If so, which ones? 
ii. Were there any pitfalls or hazards that you knew you would face? 
iii. What were you most apprehensive about? 
iv. What were you most enthusiastic about? 
2. During the revitalization process, what is the role played by the [entity]? 
3. Who are all the “actors” involved in the revitalization process? 
4. How did this revitalization project progress from an idea to completed project 
phases? 
a. Who, in particular, were the most influential people in getting the ball 
rolling? 
b. When the project faced challenges, who were the key players involved in 
pushing the project forward? 
5. Was there political opposition? 
a. Who led the opposition? 
i. Was support or opposition to the project divided along party lines 
or racial lines? 
b. How were the conflicts resolved? 
 
(ii). Individual Questions 
City: 
1. If I were deciding to move to Cincinnati, how would you “sell” OTR to me? 
2. Do you think it’s fair to say that OTR has had a negative reputation in the past? 
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a. What were some of the negative stereotypes that come to mind?  
3. How does the city attract developers to OTR (given its negative reputation)? 
4. How does the city attract businesses to the area (e.g., tax breaks)? 
5. How has the city improved the reputation of OTR as being a crime ridden, 
dangerous place to live? 
6. Do you think the new residents’ expectations are met once they move to OTR? 
a. If so, how? 
b. If not, why? 
7. Are the new residents able to find services such as coffee shops, dry cleaners, 
daycare etc. that they would have used in their previous communities?   
a. Can you give me examples of such services? 
8. How much has the city invested so far in the revitalization projects in OTR? 
a. How much has the city invested in the building of infrastructure (roads, 
street lights, water, sewer)?  
9. How does the city decide to invest money in a particular project? 
a. Who is the most influential person or entity in making that decision? 
b. Where do the monies come from? 
10. What are some intangible costs associated with the revitalization project in OTR? 
11. What are some of the social costs associated with the revitalization project in 
OTR? And by social costs, I mean sense of community, family cohesion, pride in 
the community, loyalty etc. 
12. What are some of the financial benefits of revitalization projects in the OTR? 
a. Has there been an increase in property tax revenues? 
i. How much? 
ii. What is the expected increase over the next ten years? 
13. What are some of the social benefits of revitalization projects in OTR?  
a. Who is benefiting from the revitalization projects?  
14. What are some intangible benefits associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR?  
a. Who is benefiting from these intangibles? 
15. Has there been an increase in employment in OTR as a result of the revitalization 
efforts? 
a. Can you give me a number? 
b. What kind of jobs? 
c. What is the average wage? 
d. Do the jobs give benefits? 
e. How many of the jobs have gone to longtime existing residents? 
16. What happens to the longtime existing residents as a result of the new 
development? 
a. Do they have to move? 
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b. Do you have any statistics on how many longtime residents have moved 
since the revitalization began? 
c. What does the city do if the longtime existing residents cannot afford the 
new rents or mortgages? 
17. Does the city give housing assistance to those getting displaced? 
a. In what form? 
b. What percentage of housing assistance goes to children? 
c. Has the money spent on housing assistance changed since the 
revitalization in OTR? 
i. Do you have specific numbers on this? 
18. How does the city encourage developers to build affordable housing? 
a. Does the city give developers incentives? If so, what kind of incentives? 
b. Is it a one to one replacement? 
c. What is the timeline for the realization of affordable housing from 
inception to completion? 
d. Are longtime existing residents moved into such affordable housing? 
e. What happens to the longtime existing residents while construction is 
taking place? 
19. Could you give me as many plausible reasons as to why some longtime residents 
of OTR are against the revitalization? 
a. What are some less than plausible reasons that longtime existing residents 
of OTR are against the revitalization? 
20. How do you define revitalization? 
a. I’m sure you’ve heard the term gentrification and the negative 
connotations associated with it. I’m sure you know that critics of 
gentrification claim that it displaces families and tears apart the social 
fabric of communities. These same critics would say revitalization is just 
another word for gentrification. How would you respond to these critics? 
21. Tell me what has been personally the most satisfying part of being involved in the 
revitalization of OTR? 
22. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 
share that we didn’t touch on? 
 
Over-the-Rhine Chamber of Commerce 
1. What goals does the Chamber of Commerce hope to achieve with the 
revitalization of OTR? 
2. If I were deciding to move to Cincinnati, how would you “sell” OTR to me? 
3. How does the Chamber of Commerce encourage new residents to move to OTR? 
a. What is the budget for such promotional activities? 
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b. What is the success rate for such promotional activities? 
c. What kind of demographic do you typically target? 
i. Why, in particular, that type of resident? 
4. Tell me about business development. How does the Chamber of Commerce 
support new business development in OTR? 
a. What kind of businesses does the Chamber of Commerce hope to attract to 
OTR? 
b. Are most of the new businesses formed by existing residents or 
newcomers? 
i. How does the Chamber of Commerce support a new business? 
1. Can you give me some examples? 
c. How much has the Chamber of Commerce invested in business 
development? 
d. Where does the Chamber of Commerce get its funding from in order to 
provide financial incentives and assistance to new businesses? 
e. Does the Chamber of Commerce do anything to ensure that the new 
businesses create jobs that are suitable for longtime existing residents? 
i. If yes, how do you achieve this and how do you measure the 
outcome? 
5. Tell me about the training programs. What are they? How do they work? 
a. How much has the Chamber of Commerce invested in its training 
programs? 
b. How does the Chamber of Commerce fund its training programs? 
c. How do you measure whether or not your investment is paying off? 
d. What have those measurements revealed? 
6. Safety is an important issue. What has the Chamber of Commerce done to make 
OTR a safer place to live? 
a. How much money has the Chamber of Commerce invested in making the 
streets of OTR safer? 
b. How do you measure whether or not your investment is paying off? 
c. What have those measurements revealed? 
7. How has the Chamber of Commerce facilitated better transit opportunities for the 
residents? 
a. How much has the Chamber of Commerce invested in improving 
transportation in OTR? 
b. How do you measure whether or not your investment is paying off? 
c. What have those measurements revealed? 
8. How has the Chamber of Commerce contributed to increasing diversity in OTR? 




b. Tell me about your most successful diversity initiative. 
c. Tell me about an unsuccessful diversity initiative and the lessons learned. 
9. Are there any longtime residents or new residents that are active with the 
Chamber of Commerce? Is there anyone you could refer me to in order to get a 
resident’s perspective? 
10. What happens to the longtime existing residents as a result of the new 
development? 
a. Do they have to move? 
b. What happens if they cannot afford the new rents or mortgages? 
11. How does the Chamber of Commerce encourage the retention of longtime 
existing residents? 
23. What are some of the social costs of revitalization projects in OTR? And by social 
costs, I mean sense of community, family cohesion, pride in the community, 
loyalty etc. 
12. What are some intangible costs associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
13. What are some of the financial benefits of revitalization projects in the OTR? 
14. What are some of the social benefits of revitalization projects in OTR? 
15. What are some intangible benefits associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
16. How do you define revitalization? 
a. I’m sure you’ve heard the term gentrification and the negative 
connotations associated with it. I’m sure you know that critics of 
gentrification claim that it displaces families and tears apart the social 
fabric of communities. These same critics would say revitalization is just 
another word for gentrification. How would you respond to these critics? 
17. Tell me what has been personally the most satisfying part of being involved in the 
revitalization of OTR? 
18. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 
share that we didn’t touch on? 
 
Cincinnati Center Community Development Corporation (3CDC) 
1. How does 3CDC attract developers to build in OTR? 
a. What is 3CDC’s greatest success story in attracting a developer to OTR? 
i. What, in particular, do you think appealed to that developer? 
b. What were some of the challenges that 3CDC had to overcome in order to 
attract developers? 
c. What are some concerns that a potential developer may have when 
considering a project in OTR? 
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2. How does 3CDC work with developers to coordinate revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
3. Besides developers, who are some other partners that 3CDC works with on 
revitalization projects in OTR? 
4. How much has 3CDC invested in the revitalization efforts in OTR? 
5. Where does 3CDC get its funding from? 
6. Can you tell me how the CEF and CNMF funds work? 
a. Who manages these funds? 
b. What are the funds’ investment objectives and parameters? 
c. What are the criteria used to determine what project the fund invests in 
and how much the investment value is? 
7. How does 3CDC decide to invest money in a particular project? 
a. Where do the monies come from? 
8. How much has 3CDC invested in the building of market-rate housing? 
9. How much has 3CDC invested in the building of affordable housing? 
10. How much has 3CDC invested in the building of infrastructure (roads, street 
lights, water, sewer)? 
11. How does 3CDC act as a liaison between the various actors such as developers 
and longtime existing residents? 
12. Let us talk about the existing residents. How much say do existing residents have 
in constructing development plans?   
a. What is the process by which they are able to give input? 
b. What guarantees are there that their opinions are taken into account? 
13. What happens to the longtime existing residents as a result of the new 
development? 
a. Do they have to move? 
b. What happens if they cannot afford the new rents or mortgages? 
14. How does 3CDC encourage the retention of longtime existing residents? 
15. What are some of the social costs of revitalization projects in OTR? And by social 
costs, I mean sense of community, family cohesion, pride in the community, 
loyalty etc. 
16. What are some intangible costs associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
17. What are some of the financial benefits of revitalization projects in the OTR? 
18. What are some of the social benefits of revitalization projects in OTR? 
19. What are some intangible benefits associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
20. How do you define revitalization? 
a. I’m sure you’ve heard the term gentrification and the negative 
connotations associated with it. I’m sure you know that critics of 
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gentrification claim that it displaces families, tears apart the social fabric 
of communities. These same critics would say revitalization is just another 
word for gentrification. How would you respond to these critics? 
21. Tell me what has been personally the most satisfying part of being involved in the 
revitalization of OTR? 
22. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 
share that we didn’t touch on? 
 
Over-the-Rhine Community Housing (OTRCH)—(develops, manages, and owns 
affordable housing in OTR) 
1. Can you tell me the history of the organization and what OTRCH does? 
2. How many tenants do you have? 
a. What percentage of those are children? 
b. What percentage are 65 and older? 
c. What percentage are disabled? 
d. What percentage are women? 
e. What percentage are people of color? 
f. What percentage are single parents? 
3. What is the occupancy rate? 
4. How many applications do you receive per week? 
5. What is the acceptance rate? 
6. What is the retention rate/turnover rate? 
7. On average, how long does it take an applicant to actually move into affordable 
housing? 
8. On average, how long does a tenant stay in OTRCH housing? 
9. Have you seen an increase in your tenants since the revitalization efforts (either 
through increasing rents or tenureship conversion or displacement)? 
a. If yes, how has OTRCH handled the increase in the number of eligible 
applicants? 
10. How has OTRCH handled an increase in its tenants? 
11. How much does it cost OTRCH per tenant (in administrative costs etc.)? If an 
applicant is denied acceptance by OTRCH, what are alternative housing options 
available to the applicant? 
12. According to your estimates, as a result of the revitalization efforts, how many 
people end up becoming homeless? 
a. Tell me how you get to that figure. 
b. Are there alternative figures out there? 
c. Could you share an example? 
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13. According to your estimates, as a result of the revitalization efforts, how many 
people end up leaving OTR? 
a. Tell me how you get to that figure. 
b. Are there alternative figures out there? 
c. Could you share an example? 
14. According to your estimates, as a result of the revitalization efforts, how many 
people move in with relatives?  
a. Tell me how you get to that figure. 
b. Are there alternative figures out there? 
c. Could you share an example? 
15. How many affordable housing units are there in OTR?  
16. How much affordable housing has been converted to market rate housing due to 
the revitalization process in OTR?  
a. Tell me how you get to that figure. 
b. Are there alternative figures out there? 
c. Could you share an example? 
17. How much of the revitalization efforts have focused on the building or 
rehabilitation of affordable housing?   
a. How do you arrive at that number? 
b. What might be some alternative methods for calculating that percentage? 
18. Given the rate of homelessness and numbers of low-income households in OTR, 
has the revitalization process provided for an adequate amount of affordable 
housing?   
a. Why do you think that is the case? 
b. Do you feel like the focus of the revitalization project marginalizes the 
longtime existing residents? 
19. What are the primary funding sources for OTRCH? 
20. How does OTRCH work with the city in achieving OTRCH’s goals? 
21. How does OTRCH work with 3CDC in achieving OTRCH’s goals? 
22. How does OTRCH work with the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce in achieving 
OTRCH’s goals? 
23. Who are some other partners that OTRCH works with? 
24. How many of the OTRCH tenants are a part of Cornerstone Renter Equity 
program? 
25. What are some of the social costs of revitalization projects in OTR? And by social 
costs, I mean sense of community, family cohesion, pride in the community, 
loyalty etc. 
26. What are some intangible costs associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
27. What are some of the financial benefits of revitalization projects in the OTR? 
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28. What are some of the social benefits of revitalization projects in OTR? 
29. What are some intangible benefits associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
30. How do you define revitalization? 
a. Is revitalization just another word for gentrification? 
i. How is it different? 
31. I would like to speak to some of the existing and displaced residents to get their 
perspective. Is there anyone I could follow up with? 
32. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 
share that we didn’t touch on? 
 
Funding Source 
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your organization and what it does? 
2. Who are [entity’s] primary clients? 
3. How does the [entity] evaluate project proposals? What are the criteria for 
evaluation? 
4. What are the kinds of loans offered by [entity]? 
5. What are the kinds of interest rates offered by [entity]? 
6. How is the financing offered by [entity] comparable to that offered by a 
commercial bank in terms of interest rates, loan terms etc.? 
7. Are loan disbursements made in a lump sum or are they broken down per the 
phases of the project? 
8. After underwriting the loan, how involved is [entity] during the progress of the 
project? Do the clients have to submit progress reports? 
9. Where does [entity] get its funding from? 
10. How does the [entity] decide to invest money in a particular project? 
11. Where do the monies come from? 
12. How much has the [entity] invested so far in the revitalization projects in OTR? 
13. How much has the [entity] invested in the building of market-rate housing? 
14. How much has the [entity] invested in the building of affordable housing? 
15. How much has the [entity] invested in the building of infrastructure (roads, street 
lights, water, sewer)? 
16. How does [entity] work with the city in achieving [entity’s] goals? 
17. How does [entity] work with 3CDC in achieving [entity’s] goals? 
18. How does [entity] work with the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce in achieving 
[entity’s] goals? 
19. What are some of the social costs of revitalization projects in OTR? And by social 




20. What are some intangible costs associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
21. What are some of the financial benefits of revitalization projects in the OTR? 
22. What are some of the social benefits of revitalization projects in OTR? 
23. What are some intangible benefits associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
24. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 
share that we didn’t touch on? 
 
Social Service Organizations 
1. Get data over past ten year period. 
2. Tell me all you want to tell me about the revitalization program in OTR. 
3. Have you seen an increase in the number of homeless individuals as a result of the 
revitalization efforts in OTR? 
a. How much of an increase? 
b. How did you get that number? 
4. What are your operating costs per month? 
5. How much does it cost [entity] per homeless individual? 
6. What sources of funding are available to the [entity]? 
7. How does [entity] work with the city in achieving [entity’s] goals? 
8. How does [entity] work with 3CDC in achieving [entity’s] goals? 
9. How does [entity] work with the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce in achieving 
[entity’s] goals? 
10. Who are some other partners that [entity] works with? 
11. According to your estimates, as a result of the revitalization efforts, how many 
people end up becoming homeless? 
a. How do you get this number? 
b. Could you recommend some other sources who might also be tracking 
these numbers? 
12. According to your estimates, as a result of the revitalization efforts, how many 
people end up leaving OTR? 
a. How do you get this number? 
b. Could you recommend some other sources who might also be tracking 
these numbers? 
13. According to your estimates, as a result of the revitalization efforts, how many 
people move in with relatives? 
a. How do you get this number? 




14. What are some of the social costs of revitalization projects in OTR? And by social 
costs, I mean sense of community, family cohesion, pride in the community, 
loyalty etc. 
15. What are some intangible costs associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
16. What are some of the financial benefits of revitalization projects in the OTR? 
17. What are some of the social benefits of revitalization projects in OTR? 
18. What are some intangible benefits associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
19. I am interested in speaking to some of the existing and displaced residents to get 
their perspective. Do you know of anyone I could follow up with? 
20. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 
share that we didn’t touch on? 
 
Developers 
1. Why did you choose to develop in OTR? 
2. Did you draw inspiration from revitalization projects in other cities? 
a. If so, which ones? 
b. Were there any pitfalls or hazards that you knew you would face? 
c. What were you most apprehensive about? 
d. What were you most enthusiastic about? 
3. How do you attract newcomers to your developments? 
4. What kind of a demographic do you typically target? 
a. Why, in particular, that type of resident? 
5. How does the marketing and leasing process work? 
6. How do you overcome the negative reputation that OTR has, in terms of crime 
etc.? 
7. Let us talk about a typical project, how does it progress from start to finish? 
8. What kind of challenges have you faced during the course of the project? 
a. How did you overcome these challenges? 
9. How does the financing work? 
10. What are the primary funding sources? 
11. What kind of subsidies do you get? 
12. Are you typically required to build a certain amount of affordable housing units 
along with the market rate housing? 
a. If so, what kind of tax breaks do you get? 
b. Is it a one for one replacement? 
13. Are the street, sewer, water, lighting and other infrastructural improvements 
typically made by the developer or by the city? 
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14. How would you describe your relationship with the city? 
15. How would you describe your relationship with the existing residents? 
16. Do the existing residents have a say in the development plans?  
a. Why or why not?  
b. How so? 
17. Do you hire existing residents for the construction projects?  
a. Why or why not? 
18. What happens to the longtime existing residents because of the new development? 
a. Do they have to move? 
b. Do you know where they typically end up moving to? 
19. Do longtime existing residents become your new clients/tenants? 
20. Why do you think some longtime residents are against the new development? 
21. Has there been any opposition to any of your developments? 
a. Has there been any vandalism, graffiti, destruction of property? 
b. How did you overcome such opposition? 
22. Have you had to take special security measures to protect your property? 
23. What are some of the social costs of revitalization projects in OTR? And by social 
costs, I mean sense of community, family cohesion, pride in the community, 
loyalty etc. 
24. What are some intangible costs associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
25. What are some of the financial benefits of revitalization projects in the OTR? 
26. What are some of the social benefits of revitalization projects in OTR? 
27. What are some intangible benefits associated with the revitalization projects in 
OTR? 
28. I would like to speak to some of the new residents. Is there anyone you could 
refer me to? 
29. How do you define revitalization? 
a. I’m sure you’ve heard the term gentrification and the negative 
connotations associated with it. I’m sure you know that critics of 
gentrification claim that it displaces families, tears apart the social fabric 
of communities. These same critics would say revitalization is just another 
word for gentrification. How would you respond to these critics? 
30. Tell me what has been personally the most satisfying part of being involved in the 
revitalization of OTR? 
31. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 






1. Demographic info  
a. Age 
b. Race 
c. Educational attainment 
d. Occupation 
2. Why did you decide to move to OTR? 
3. Where did you move from? 
4. What was your old neighborhood like? 
5. Did you limit your house search to OTR? 
6. Did you search for a long time before finding your current home? 
a. How long? 
7. Did you own your prior home? 
a. Did you downsize? 
b. Was it difficult selling your old home? 
8. How much were your moving costs?  
9. How much time did it take you to access your service needs (grocery, dry cleaner, 
coffee shop, night entertainment etc.)? 
a. What kind of services do you use in OTR? 
10. Do you still travel back to your old neighborhood for any services?  
a. Which ones? 
b. Why? 
11. How would you describe your new neighborhood? 
12. How does your new neighborhood compare to your old neighborhood? 
13. Do you feel “better off” in OTR when compared to your old neighborhood? 
14. Have you ever felt unsafe, threatened, or uncomfortable in OTR? 
a. Tell me about it. 
b. Do you know of anybody who’s been mugged? 
c. What precautions do you take to ensure your safety?  
d. Do you avoid being out after a certain time? 
e. Do you avoid certain areas? 
15. What kind of interaction do you have with the longtime OTR residents?  
a. Have you made any friends with longtime existing residents? 
b. Have you made friends with any of the new residents? 
16. Are you involved with any of the local community organizations? 
a. Which ones? 
b. How long have you been involved with them? 
c. What are some of the main neighborhood concerns? 
17. Do you feel welcomed by the longtime residents? 
18. If you have children, where do your children go to school? 
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a. Did they change schools once you moved to OTR? 
i. Do they like their new school? 
ii. Have they made new friends? 
iii. Are you active in the parent-teacher-association? 
19. How has your commuting to work time changed as a result of moving to OTR? 
20. What are some of the positives of moving to OTR? 
21. What are some of the negatives of moving to OTR? 
22. Do you have any stories or anecdotes that typify life in OTR? 
 
Longtime Existing Residents 
1. Demographic info  
a. Age 
b. Race 
c. Educational attainment 
d. Occupation 
2. Tell me about yourself and how long you’ve lived in OTR and what your 
experience has been like. 
3. How would you describe OTR to a stranger? 
4. Do you have a lot of family and friends who also live in OTR? 
5. Have any of your family and friends moved? 
a. Why did they move? 
b. Has that strained the relationships? 
c. How far away did they move? 
d. Do you have a car? 
i. If not, how easy is it to catch a bus to visit them? 
6. Have you noticed a decline in church membership since the revitalization project 
began? 
a. Could you give any examples? 
7. Have you noticed a strain on social services since the revitalization project in 
OTR? 
8. What has happened to the job situation since the revitalization project in OTR? 
9. Have you noticed higher prices (for example, at the grocery store) since the 
revitalization project in OTR? 
10. Have your property taxes or rents gone up since the revitalization project in OTR? 
11. Do you have to travel now to go to establishments that have moved since the 
revitalization, such as the barber shop, church, pool hall etc.? 
12. What are some improvements to the OTR neighborhood as a result of the 
revitalization projects?  
13. How much voice do the longtime residents have in the revitalization plans? 
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14. What are some of the drawbacks of the revitalization projects? 
15. Are you for or against the revitalization projects? 
a. Why? 
16. In your opinion, what is the general feel in the community about the revitalization 
projects? 
17. How much activism is there in the community? 
a. Who are the activists? 
b. What methods of activism are used? 
c. What are the costs? 
d. What are the benefits? 
e. Where is the funding coming from? 
18. Are you actively involved in the people’s movement? 
19. What are the benefits of having newcomers to OTR? 
20. What are some of the negatives of having newcomers to OTR? 
21. How do you interact with the newcomers? 
a. Have you made any friends with the newcomers? 
22. In general, what is the interaction like between longtime existing residents and 
newcomers? 
23. Do you think the arrival of the newcomers has created any racial tensions? 
24. Sometimes communities are divided along racial lines. Other times the division is 
between existing residents and newcomers. Do you think existing residents of 
different races are more cohesive than existing residents and newcomers of the 
same race? 
25. Before the revitalization, would you say that blacks and whites in OTR felt and 
acted like a part of the same community? 
a. Has that changed since the revitalization? 
26. Do you think you will move out of OTR? 
a. If yes, why is that? 
27. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 
share that we didn’t touch on? 
 
Displaced Residents 
1. Demographic info  
a. Age 
b. Race 
c. Educational attainment 
d. Occupation 
2. Tell me about living in OTR? 
3. When did you move from OTR? 
170 
 
4. Why did you move? 
5. How long did it take you to find a new place to live? 
6. How do you like the new neighborhood? 
7. Do you think your new neighborhood is safer? 
8. I’d like to ask you a few questions about how much it cost you to move: 
a. Were you renting? 
i. If yes, how much more are you now paying in rent? 
b. Were you a homeowner? 
i. If yes, were you able to make a profit on the sale of your house? 
ii. How long did it take you to sell your house? 
iii. Do you own your current house? 
iv. How does your new house compare to your old house? 
v. Did you have to go from being a home owner to a renter? 
vi. How would you compare your current apartment/house to your old 
house? 
9. Was there room for everyone living in your former home to move into your new 
home? 
a. If somebody had to move, where did they go? 
10. Have you made friends with your new neighbors? 
a. Do you feel those bonds are as strong as your OTR neighbors? 
11. Did you lose your job as a result of the move? 
a. Did the job loss have anything to do with transportation difficulties? 
b. Have you found a new job? 
i. If so, how long did it take? 
12. Has your commuting time to work increased as a result of the move?  
a. Have you figured out the increased cost of your longer commute? 
13. How does commuting time affect time with kids and how does it affect them? 
14. Impact on children 
a. Daycare hours post-move? 
b. Did your children have to switch schools in the middle of the school year? 
c. How many kids get held back a grade? 
d. How do your kids like the new school? 
e. Have they made friends? 
f. How do you like the new school? 
15. Do you regularly socialize with residents of your new neighborhood? 
16. Did you attend a church in or close to OTR? 
a. Do you still attend the same church? 
i. How long does that commute take? 
ii. How much does it cost to travel back to OTR? 
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b. If you are attending a new church, how long did it take you to find that 
church? 
i. Do you feel as supported by the new church as you did by the OTR 
church? 
17. How often do you go back to OTR? 
a. What are the main reasons for going back? 
b. How long does it take to get there? 
c. How much does it cost to get there? 
18. Has your commuting time to the grocery store increased as a result of the move?  
a. By how much? 
19. What are the benefits of moving? 
a. Are you happier after the move? 
20. Would you ever move back to OTR? 
21. What kinds of support services were available to you during your move? 
22. What kinds of support services were available to you after your move? 
23. Did you receive any financial assistance?  
a. From which agencies? 
24. I’m going to ask you about what you gained and what you lost by moving: 




25. So let’s end on a bright note, tell me what’s the best thing that has happened to 
you since you moved to the new neighborhood. 
26. You’ve been very helpful. Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on or 



















Department of Urban and Public Affairs   Home Address: 3750 Boone St 
426 W. Bloom St.                  Louisville, KY 40208 
Louisville, KY 40208      Cell Phone:        502-836-0376 





University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky, expected defense May, 2014 
Ph.D, Urban and Public Affairs 
  - Graduate Research Assistantship 
 - Dissertation: “Analysis of Social Costs of Gentrification in Over-the-Rhine.” (Chair: 
Dr. Cynthia Negrey) 
 
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 2004 
Master of Business Administration 
 
Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, 2000 
Bachelor of Arts in International Business 
- Semester off-campus in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Fall 1998 
 
PROFESSIONAL AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE: 
Consultant, Louisville¸ Kentucky, Summer 2013 
Grant from the Lexington Metropolitan Housing Authority  
 Evaluation of Bluegrass HOPE VI Project 
 
University of Louisville, School of Urban & Public Affairs, Louisville, Kentucky, January 2008 
- Current 
     Graduate Research Assistant; Instructor 
 Bourassa, Steven C., Martin Hoesli, Elias Oikarinen, Shireen Deobhakta. “Measurement 
of house price bubbles,” work in progress. 
 Contributed to article by Bourassa, Steven C. "The Political Economy of Land Value 
Taxation." Richard F. Dye and Richard W. England. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of 
Land Policy (2009). 
173 
 
 Contributed to chapter by Weinberger, Rachel, and Frank Goetzke. "Drivers of Auto 
Ownership: The Role of Past Experience and Peer Pressure." Auto Motives: 
Understanding Car Use Behaviours (2011): 121. 
 Collected and analyzed data for the Kentucky State Data Center. 
 Prepared Housing Market Reports using Costar and CCIM software. 
 Performed research on Pennsylvania Land Use Taxation policies. 
 Collected data for mortgage delinquency rates for Counties in Kentucky; 
mapped mortgage delinquency rates using GIS software. 
 
 Strayer University, Louisville, KY, Fall 2010, Summer 2012 
      Adjunct Professor 
 
Huntington Capital Corporation – Investment Banking Group, Columbus, Ohio, April 2004 – 
December 2005. 
Assistant Vice President 
 
Bank One – Public Finance Group, Columbus, Ohio, August 2000 – April 2004. 
Senior Municipal Originator 
 
Pro-bono work in the field of Housing: 
Network Center for Community Change – vacant property mapping project. 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
University of Louisville 
 Urban Political Economy (POLS 302), Fall 2011. 
 Housing Policy (POLS 405), Spring 2012. 
 Teaching assistant responsibilities for MBA Real Estate Finance (College of Business), 
Fall 2009. 
 Teaching assistant responsibilities for Urban Economics (UPA 603), Spring 2011. 
 Teaching assistant responsibilities for Economic Development (UPA 632), Spring 2011. 
 
Strayer University 
 Managerial Economics (ECO 550), Fall 2010. 
 Introductory Finance (FIN 100), Spring 2012. 
 
PAPERS AND RESEARCH: 
“Greater Louisville Project 2010 Competitive City Report,” Greater Louisville Inc., Kentucky 
State Data Center, Contributor. 









o Quantified and analyzed risk variables for underwriting. 
o Utilized fixed income mathematics and financial modeling for pricing securities. 
o Analyzed  portfolio performance results against benchmarks. 
o Performed research for securitization of portfolio. 
 Modeling and Analysis 
o Developed pricing models, metrics and methodology based on extensive market data 
analysis and modeling.  
o Modeled, quantified and analyzed risk within portfolio and asset classes. 
 Origination 
o Managed the appropriation-backed debt products for 3 of Bank One’s largest client 
accounts (State of West Virginia, New Jersey and Florida), and developed marketing 
strategies to further market penetration.  
o Expanded real property program for municipal borrowers within Bank One’s footprint 
states. 
o Originated 363% ($25.4 million) of annual budget for fiscal year 2001. 
o Originated and structured new issue securities for private placement portfolio. 
 Management 
o Co-managed the development of a new business group within Huntington Capital 
Corporation’s Investment Banking Group directly reporting to Huntington National 
Bank’s Executive Management Team. 
o Worked closely with members of Risk Management, Portfolio Management, Asset 
Specialization, Investment Accounting, Compliance, Legal and Operations departments 
to create policy and procedures for transactional flow from origination to close, including 
post-closing operational functions. 
o Maintained compliance with regulatory and statutory requirements. 
o Originated and structured securities for private placement portfolio as well as trading 
portfolio. 
 Computer Skills 
o Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Access), Super Trump, Seibel, 
Lotus Notes, Bloomberg, GIS, Costar, SPSS, SAS, NVivo. 
 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
 Institutional Review Board (IRB) training and certification. 
Grant Writing Academy, School of Interdisciplinary and Graduate Studies, University of 
Louisville. 
PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Served as President of School of Urban & Public Affairs Ph.D Student Organization 
(2009 – 2010). 
Served as Student Leader of search committee for Faculty and Director of Kentucky 






Two-thirds educational costs funded via scholarship during entire tenure at Ohio Wesleyan 
University. 
MEMBERSHIPS 
Urban Affairs Association 
American Planning Association 
The Urban Salon 
Metropolitan Housing Coalition 
Over-the-Rhine Community Housing 
 
SERVICE 
The Homeless Coalition of Greater Cincinnati 
Center for Community Progress 
Network Center for Community Change 
Center for Neighborhoods 
Food in Neighborhoods 
Power Members for Food 
 
 
 
 
